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ABSTRACT 
From the outset global cities have been primarily seen as outcomes of changes in global 
economic capitalism. This has led to critical responses arguing for the need to consider more 
centrally the role of politics in global city formation, and in particular the need to critically 
analyse city-state relations in varying geographical contexts. Three dominant strands of 
critique have emerged: a literature on state rescaling (primarily based on experiences of North 
American and Western European cities), a literature on developmental states (on East Asian 
cities) and a literature on postcolonial urban theory (primarily on cities in the Global South). 
Although these approaches all argue for a re-focusing on the role of the political in global city 
formation, they do not easily fit other geographical and geopolitical contexts. This thesis aims 
to contribute to the debate by focusing on the case of Istanbul as Turkey’s emerging global 
city. Based on semi-structured interviews, this research challenges some key assumptions of 
global cities research, state rescaling approach, developmental approach and postcolonial 
urban theory through the case of Istanbul. It also provides a critical conceptual understanding 
of Istanbul’s globalisation, argues the role of actors in global city making and will 
demonstrate that contrary to what is generally claimed in the literature, the relationship 
between Istanbul (city) and Turkey (state) could be assessed as more harmonious rather than 
tension-filled. Furthermore, the research goes beyond revealing the points where Istanbul 
conforms or does not conform to the existing approaches, and addresses the very recent 
academic debates between those who believe that we need new theories to understand the 
dynamics and impacts of the actual global urbanisation and those who suggest that instead of 
calling for new theories there is a need to examine and improve the existing approaches. To 
do that, my research develops an alternative conceptualisation -- the in-between city - that 
might cover the cities located in the region spreading from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. 
The argument behind this concept is that owing to their intersectional positions between East 
and West, and the continual links between their imperial and global periods, cities such as 
Istanbul, Vienna, Budapest, St. Petersburg or Moscow, present more hybrid characteristics in 
comparison to the cities categorised by the existing approaches.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Is Global Urban Research Global Enough? 
“This paper calls for ‘new geographies’ of imagination and epistemology in the 
production of urban and regional theory. It argues that the dominant theorizations of 
global city-regions are rooted in the EuroAmerican experience and are thus unable to 
analyse multiple forms of metropolitan modernities” (Roy, 2009: 819). 
“[T]here is an urgent need to go beyond narrow calls for ‘new’ theory to more openly 
recognise the validity of renewing existing approaches to urban theory making. Less 
fashionable but far more important is the task of ‘stress-testing’ both new and existing 
concepts” (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017: 2854). 
1.1 Global Cities at Centre Stage  
Presenting ‘world’ and ‘global’ cities as new city typologies1, John Friedmann (1986) and 
Saskia Sassen (1991) are synonymous with the beginnings of a new epoch in urban studies. 
At that same time, they also lit the touch paper on what has developed into a longstanding, 
and sometimes heated, debate on the impact of global cities research on urban theory making 
(Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009; Peck, 2015; van Meeteren et al., 2016; Hoyler and Harrison, 
2017). From the criteria they used to characterise world and global cities, to their main claims 
and assumptions (e.g. the driving forces behind the global/world cities, functions of these 
cities, their relationship between each other and with their host states), through to the 
geographical scope of their research, have long been critiqued and defended by scholars 
writing from various disciplinary backgrounds and geographic contexts (Acuto and Steele, 
2013).  
Over the following past three decades, global cities research has remained at the very centre 
of an academic polarisation of which the various urban approaches are located on different 
sides of the argument. In this thesis, the most established approaches – or schools of thought – 
are examined: (i) the global cities thesis; (ii) the state rescaling approach; (iii) the 
developmental perspective; and (iv) postcolonial urban theory.  
                                                 
1 Both terms are often used synonymously and interchangeably, albeit with subtle nuances which are discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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Against the backdrop of a restructured global economy characterised by diminishing profits in 
industrial production, increasing mobility of commodity, labour and capital through 
technological and political developments, and a geographically more open and market-based 
form of flexible accumulation, the rise of global and world cities research was the recognition 
that dense nodes of economic, social and political activity were where globalised capital 
accumulation crystallised out on the ground (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2001). 
Further, in so far as global capital, along with others above, became more mobile across the 
world, the control capacities of the nation-states within their own borders began to be 
diminished, and so  the sub-national forms of states became more apparent (Taylor 1994; 
1995).  That is, it was recognition that a select group of increasingly powerful global and 
world cities harboured the geoeconomic power to orchestrate the operation of the global 
economy (Beaverstock et al., 1999), and that these cities are increasingly connected to each 
other in diverse ways in a network – what is commonly referred to as the World City Network 
(Taylor, 2004b; Taylor and Derudder, 2016) – superseding national boundaries (Taylor, 
1997). In subsequent years, a vast array of interventions have extended the theoretical, 
empirical and methodological scope of global cities research (Derudder et al., 2012; Ren and 
Keil, 2018), and the initial assumptions and empirical findings of global cities researchers 
have prompted the emergence of an extensive literature which has come to dominate – and 
arguably create – the field of global urban studies.    
However, global cities research has also been confronting serious criticisms. The first of those 
is that global city theory contains an inherent political deficit: namely, that it explains the 
emergence of global cities with the transformation of the global economic system and 
minimises the role of the national/regional/local governmental actors (Brenner, 2004a; 
Ancien, 2011; Acuto, 2013 a/b). The second is that the empirical applications of the global 
cities research are narrowly constructed from, and reinforce, a North American/Western 
European geopolitical context. Somewhat related to this, the third critique is that the global 
city argument falls far from explaining how global cities emerge in geographical contexts 
outside the global North/Western world. These deficiencies have seen the emergence of other 
global urban approaches which have critically engaged with global and world cities research – 
most notably, a state rescaling approach which has its origins in the same North 
American/Western European context of neoliberal urbanism, postcolonial urban theory which 
is rooted in advancing a Southern perspective, and a literature on developmental states which 
has its origins in Asia. 
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The state rescaling approach provides geo-politico-economic insights into the emergence of 
global cities through drawing attention to the administrative and financial restructuring of 
advanced capitalist states under conditions of globalisation (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner, 
1998; Keil, 2003). Facing up to the serious crises in the Keynesian-Fordist system during the 
1970s, nation-states in North America and Western Europe have not perished as some 
predicted (Ohmae, 1995); rather they have witnessed an intensive period of rescaling as 
power, responsibility and authority has been ‘hollowed out’ from the national level and ‘filled 
in’ at both supranational and subnational scales (Brenner, 2004a, 2018b; Keating, 2013, 2014; 
Harrison, 2015). Through case-based empirical works, the state rescaling approach makes 
significant contributions to the political deficits of the mainstream research. Yet, just as in 
global cities research, the rescaling approach too suffers from the same geographical 
limitations. More precisely, albeit often assumed to be true, it is still questionable whether re-
scaling has taken place – certainly to the same extent – in practice in non-western settings 
(Park, 2013). 
The developmental literature emerged from concerns about the applicability of the global 
cities paradigm in the East Asian context. Developmentalist accounts advocate that because of 
their political, historical, and even religious characteristics, East Asian global cities (e.g. 
Tokyo, Seoul) and city-states (Singapore) present a different city typology from the western 
global cities (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003; Ma and Timberlake, 2013). More specifically, 
the developmental characteristics of the East Asian states mean they have not been simply 
hollowed-out, nor have been rescaled in a similar way to that the western-centred literature 
asserts (Fujita, 2011). Instead, considering the economic opportunities which globalisation 
offers, they have reconfigured their development policies and the developmental state 
apparatuses (Waley, 2007; Park, Hill and Saito, 2012). Of particular interest is how global 
city making is often seen as a part of these changing developmental strategies and supported 
by the national governments as the impetus of national economic development (Fujita, 2011). 
The third important counter-theory to the global cities thesis is what many refer to as the 
postcolonial critique. To the postcolonial researchers, global cities research suffers from an 
intellectual parochialism because it looks at global South cities through the lenses of the 
global North (Parnell and Robinson, 2013), and fails to explain local dynamics of global 
Southern cities that have different historical patterns (Chakravorty, 2000; Miraftab, 2012; 
Schindler, 2017). Further, by focusing on a small number of specific cities, global cities 
research drops many cities of the global South off the map of global urban research 
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(Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009). Those writing from a postcolonial perspective argue that we 
should see all cities as ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2006) and adopt a comparative perspective 
that puts ‘off the map’ cities back on to the map of global urban research (McFarlane, 2010; 
Robinson, 2011; 2016) in order to understand local dynamics of global/globalising cities in 
the global South (Dupont, 2011; Shatkin, 2014). More explicitly, they advocate entirely ‘new 
geographies’ of urban theory, without North-Western lenses to understand the 21st-century 
metropolis (Roy, 2009; 2016).  
Taken all together, global/world cities research and three critical approaches make invaluable 
contributions to urban theory making. They provide a comprehensive understanding of 
changing social, spatial, economic, political patterns of cities under globalisation. They, 
moreover, develop very beneficial arguments about changing relations between cities and 
nation states; global linkages between cities; divergent and convergent dynamics of the cities 
from different geoeconomic and geopolitical contexts. These arguments have the power to 
provide an explanation for hundreds of cities from the global North and the global South (or 
from West and the East). In other words, after three decades, the cartography of the global 
urban studies covers a significant part of the world map today. 
Despite all these contributions, since global cities research is still “an evolving literature” (van 
Meeteren et al, 2016: 254), it always needs empirical and theoretical interventions that extend 
and deepen the knowledge of the research agenda. In that sense, first of all, some recent 
studies show that there is also an increasing need (and demand) for stress-testing of existing 
theories (Peck, 2015; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017; Derudder and Taylor, 
2018). Secondly, the research also needs interventions to cease the ongoing academic 
polarisation between different approaches, which might be possible by developing a more 
nuanced body of global cities research (Sigler, 2016) and revealing the pluralist nature of 
urban theory making (Peck, 2015). Thirdly, the conceptual map of global urban studies needs 
to be extended. While existing approaches handled in this thesis build their arguments on 
certain geographies such as global North, East Asia, or global South, other geographical 
regions remain outside of their scope (e.g. Eastern Europe or Eurasia) and are commonly 
excluded – or at least less well-represented – in the research agenda. 
The vital question here is which cities can be best for stress-testing and extending the research 
in line with above critiques. As argued above, many of the existing studies have an overall 
tendency to focus on core cities which have certain characteristics that fit their story (e.g. New 
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York-London for global cities, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Mumbai for postcolonial urban 
theory). These cities, however, reproduce and enhance the existing polarisation, as they can be 
explained by one theory and cannot be explained by others. However, van Meeteren et al. 
(2016: 254) suggest that “exclusively drawing on older references has the effect of neglecting 
developments that may be meaningful when appraising the literature”. Therefore, rather than 
focusing on these often-used cities, it is necessary to focus on the cities outside these 
geographical patterns. By the same token, the cities to be selected must have plural and 
intersectional characteristics that simultaneously allow for stress-testing the four main 
approaches in global urban research.  
This thesis suggests that these cities are neither ‘on the map’ or ‘off the map’ but stand in the 
very middle of the map. Leading cities of Russia, Turkey, Hungary (standing between Asia 
and Europe), or Austria (between East and West Europe) might be presented as examples of 
these. These cities, first, because of their distinctive geographical, historical and political 
patterns, present an uncomfortable area that existing theories might have difficulty to 
categorise alone. In other words, unlike the other cities mentioned above, these cities might be 
considered a neutral ground for the theories. However, at the same time, owing to their 
geographical positions, these cities bear the political and social traces of looking East and 
West (plus other possible variants), so they have great potential to allow us to put these 
theories into a stress test simultaneously. In brief, global cities research arguably needs 
interventions from the in-between of the map if it wants to become more global. 
1.2 Extending Global Cities Research to Consider Cities Caught In-Between: Istanbul 
on the Stage  
Is Istanbul a global city? According to the latest GaWC ranking, in 2016 Istanbul was 
classified as Alpha (along with 18 other cities); only nine cities have a higher classification 
(Alpha+, Alpha++). However, where to draw the line to determine what is and what is not a 
global city is something contentious. Ultimately this is not the most important question. What 
is not in doubt is that Istanbul is a regionally and globally connected city – best thought of as 
a globalising city – and the question of global city-ness is secondary in this thesis to the 
question of how useful the global city concept is in deepening our understanding of Istanbul 
(and other similar cities) and its urban development. 
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As the only major city sitting on two continents, Europe and Asia, Istanbul seems to be an 
excellent case study to stress-test the major approaches in global urban theory and to extend 
the geography of global urban research. Simply stated, Istanbul is located at the intersection 
between East and West, and also North and South (Sassen, 2009: 2018). As the capital of 
three major empires it also has a distinctive historical pattern compared to many other cities 
around the world (Sarkis, 2009). Crucially, unlike the core global cities, Istanbul was not a 
part of the Keynesian-Welfare system, so it is not a part of the post-Keynesian geography. 
Moreover, Turkey has never been a colony like many global South countries and cannot be 
considered postcolonial. Contrary, it had been an imperial power whose capital was Istanbul. 
Finally, Turkey is not a developmental state, so Istanbul is not a developmental city or 
Istanbul-Turkey a city-state.  
Looking from these perspectives, it is hard to put Istanbul within one of the existing 
categories discussed above. The city challenges certain assumptions of the global cities 
paradigm (Akcan, 2015). By the same token, it also differs from the state rescaling arguments 
as it follows a different neoliberal path in which administrative structure has not been 
decentralised in practice (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Kuyucu, 2018). In other words, Istanbul is 
not a typical “western/global North” global city. However, due to the above-mentioned 
features, Istanbul is not a typical Eastern developmental city or city-state, or a global South 
postcolonial city either. In the past, Istanbul had been defined as a special city having both 
eastern and western characteristics (Ortaylı, 1978). Today, it “represents the characteristics of 
both the Global South and North” (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). In short, as Sudjic (2009: 4) 
aptly puts it:  
‘‘[Istanbul] is a city like no other and yet it is a city that has things in common with 
many other cities, even if it does not always recognize it.”  
Therefore, focusing on Istanbul as a case-study, this thesis in many respects contributes to the 
current body of global urban studies. First and foremost, this study extends the map of global 
urban research by explaining the emergence of Istanbul as a global city. In a study by the 
Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) research group that classified Istanbul as a “Gamma” 
World City in 2000, the authors noted that “Istanbul is noteworthy because there are no other 
world cities identified for the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Central 
Asia” (Walker and Taylor, 2000: para.3). In the latest GaWC report, Istanbul is an “Alpha” 
World City and one of the leading cities in the same hinterland (GaWC, 2017). To explain the 
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political, economic, global and historical dynamics behind this uptrend, which has not found 
an adequate place in the literature yet, is at least as important as this rise itself. Moreover, this 
thesis offers more than just an explanation of a single case-study. It also provides a basis for 
future studies involving other cities that have similar geographic and historical dynamics to 
Istanbul, such as Vienna, St. Petersburg, or Moscow. Such a conceptualisation allows an 
extension to the existing map of global cities research, but also urban theory making. 
Secondly, the dissertation contributes to the recent calls for stress-testing the existing theories 
in global urban research (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). The study also provides new ways for 
this stress-testing, such as examining the role of the central and local governments in 
Istanbul’s global path, the divergent nature of the local-central relationship, sectoral change, 
and the city’s national linkages. Additionally, putting the three counter-arguments to test, the 
study also methodologically contributes to stress-testing. Comparative studies often contrast 
two cities, or two different approaches, however, this study compares four different 
approaches in a single-case study. For example, apart from the global cities theory, the 
research also examines the applicability of the geo-political-economic approach to Istanbul 
through discussing the rescaling process in Turkey. Likewise, the strong central government 
argument is also used for testing the developmental approaches. Moreover, the case of 
Istanbul also challenges the postcolonial thesis by searching for traces of ‘catch-up’ 
motivation, which is posited to be among the key characteristic of non-western cases.  
Thirdly and finally, this study, as a side benefit, might serve as an example of how to reduce 
the contestations and polarisations between different approaches and for bridging them akin to 
how Istanbul connects the continents. With the exception of urban network studies, which 
include a large number of cities, the majority of the case-studies discussed so far focus on 
cities with certain characteristics. This is mostly because these cities offer a comfortable way 
to show the strength of an argument and/or a critique. As for Istanbul, the city sits in a very 
advantageous location in terms of geographical connectivity and remains in the centre of 
different intersections. That is to say, with a reference to the above quote of Sudjic, Istanbul 
on the one hand challenges all four approaches, but on the other hand, has some partial 
similarities with the cities being framed by these approaches. This partiality can help the in 
black-white toned academic debates (explain/not-explain, applicable/not-applicable) evolve 
towards exploring new ground in which different approaches meet and interlock – a form of 
bricolage. 
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1.3 Aims and Objectives  
Using Istanbul as a case study, the main aim of this thesis is to stress-test four main global 
urban approaches and to extend the map of global urban research. 
To achieve this, the objectives of the thesis are as follows:  
i) To situate the development of Istanbul as a global city within the context of four dominant 
theoretical approaches: global cities research, state rescaling approach, research on 
developmental cities, and postcolonial urban theories.  
ii) To examine the roles of global city-makers in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city, 
and to assess the relationship between them. 
iii) To develop a critical conceptual understanding of Istanbul’s development under 
globalisation.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in two parts. The first half of the thesis (Chapters 2-4) develops the 
theoretical, historical and methodological arguments for adopting a singular case study to the 
wider body of global urban research. More specifically, drawing on theoretical discussions in 
mainstream global cities research, Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of this literature from 
when it has emerged to where it stands now. The chapter then discusses three critical 
approaches (state rescaling, postcolonial and developmental) including their critiques of 
global cities research, their main assumptions, and their major contributions to global urban 
studies. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on how the current body of global 
urban research might be extended and how explaining Istanbul might help achieving this. 
Chapter 3 examines the urban development of Istanbul within three different periods – 
imperial, national and global – and argues that the city has followed a different trajectory than 
many other cities discussed in the literature. It suggests that various dynamics shaping the 
global city formation of Istanbul (e.g. strong central government and the aspiration to become 
a leading global city) can only be understood within this historical trajectory, notably the 
continuity between the imperial capital and the global city. Finally, it discusses whether 
Istanbul is a unique or exceptional city and introduces the in-between city concept that might 
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provide an insight not only into Istanbul but also into other cities such as Vienna, St. 
Petersburg or Moscow. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach which has been applied to empirically 
answer the theoretical questions of the thesis. Beginning with a brief discussion tracing the 
recent methodological approaches in global urban studies, the chapter, firstly, argues why 
semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders and individuals, supported with 
secondary sources, is a suitable way to make sense of the global development of Istanbul. The 
chapter then outlines the steps being followed before, during, and after the fieldwork. It 
explains how potential interviewees were selected and recruited, how robust research was 
conducted in the field, and how a substantial body of voice recordings was turned into 
codified data providing the empirical basis for examining the research questions.  
The second half of the thesis (Chapters 5-7) outlines the empirical findings based on the data 
collected in the field and the secondary sources. Chapter 5 reveals important insights into 
Istanbul’s global development and positions this development within national and 
international urban systems. It does this, first, by blending official economic and demographic 
statistical data with the opinions of participants with different perspectives, positions, and 
occupations, providing relevant background knowledge beyond the published materials on the 
topic. Second, it discusses that as Turkey’s major city and economic capital, Istanbul’s global 
development is seen as an instrument of national economic development. Moreover, it reveals 
that globalisation does not provide uneven economic growth beneficial to only the country’s 
leading city, but other major cities in Turkey have also enjoyed economic growth in this 
process. Third, it discusses that with this development Istanbul should be assessed in-between 
the top global cities and the non-western cities such as cities of the global South. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the political dynamics behind what is discussed in Chapter 5. It outlines 
how central and local governmental actors have been shaping Istanbul’s global development 
(e.g. through legal arrangements, visionary projects, or mega-projects), and interprets the 
nature of the relations between these actors. The chapter challenges some widespread 
arguments in mainstream global urban research in two principal ways. First, it reveals that 
contrary to the assumption that local authorities have a growing autonomy in their own cities, 
the Turkish central government is still the leading actor in urban policy-making. Second, it 
shows that the local and central relations are not necessarily in tension, on the contrary, there 
are strong rational and political reasons for this relationship to be harmonious for both sides. 
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Chapter 7 seeks to explain the emergence of Istanbul as a global city by returning to the four 
leading perspectives in global urban studies as potential explanatory tools. To this end, it 
separately assesses the global city formation of Istanbul within the perspectives of each of the 
four approaches. The central argument here is that even though Istanbul, owing to its position 
at the intersection between East and West, can be explained to a certain degree by each of 
these four approaches, it has also strong political, economic, and relational characteristics 
challenging their fundamental assumptions. 
Chapter 8 acts as a discussion and conclusion chapter and blends the ideas being put forward 
in the empirical chapters under the light of the existing literature. Furthermore, and more 
explicitly, with an empirically supported theoretical debate, the chapter assesses whether 
explaining Istanbul (and some other similar cities) requires a new conceptual frame or a blend 
of the existing approaches. The chapter, in this way, encourages the reader to reflect on the 
observation that historical and geographical differences between cities necessitate different 
perspectives, if not new conceptualisations, to understand their ongoing global developments.   
Overall this thesis contributes to advancing contemporary debates in global urban studies by 
forming an empirical basis for stress-testing major global urban approaches, interrogating 
local dynamics of global city-making in a highly centralised state, and providing a critical 
conceptual understanding of Istanbul’s development as a global city. Furthermore, based on 
these arguments being drawn in the empirical chapters, the thesis speculates on how existing 
conceptual frameworks could be blended and expanded so as to explain those cities which fall 
into the cracks between the main approaches for doing global urban research. By doing this, 
the thesis goes beyond the explanation of a case study and aspires to find a more pluralist and 
less polarised way of global urban theory making. In order to justify these contributions, the 
next two chapters respectively critically discuss existing theoretical approaches in global 
urban research and reveal why Istanbul requires a different perspective. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Global Cities Research & Urban Theory Making 
2.1 Introduction: Theorising Cities in the age of Globalisation 
The geographies of globalised urbanisation have been a focal point for research following the 
collapse of Fordist manufacturing in the 1970s. This collapse sparked significant changes to 
the way the global economy was managed and organised, political structures were rescaled, 
and the relationship between state and civil society was reconstituted (Brenner, 2004a). Since 
the 1970s, urbanists – be they geographers, sociologists, economists or historians – have 
sought to develop new theoretical and conceptual frameworks to account for the rapidly 
changing nature of globalised urbanisation (Ward and Jonas, 2004; Brenner, 2018b). One of 
the most influential theoretical framings to emerge for understanding the new geographies of 
globalised urbanisation was the global and world cities thesis (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 
1991).   
Although global cities research has had a ground-breaking effect on shaping the nature of 
urban studies over the past quarter-century (Acuto and Steele, 2013; Derudder et al., 2012; 
Parnreiter, 2013), it has not escaped some strong criticisms. Many different approaches have 
critically engaged with global cities research. Among the critical approaches, perhaps the 
three most stringent approaches are (i) the state rescaling approach, (ii) the developmental 
approach, and (iii) postcolonial urban theory. Each of these approaches – based on different 
theoretical grounds, concentrating on different historical, geographical and/or political 
contexts, criticising different points of global cities theory – has built a vast range of critical 
works with different proposals ranging from new theory calls (e.g. Hill and Kim, 2000; 
Brenner, 2009; Roy, 2009; Brenner and Schmid, 2015) to internationalising urban research 
(Robinson, 2011; Parnell, 2016). 
Recent studies show that these debates continue with an increasing momentum (Brenner and 
Schmid, 2015; Robinson, 2016a; Storper and Scott, 2016; van Meeteren et al., 2016; 
Schindler, 2017). On the other hand, many recent studies advance the argument that there is a 
need for engaged pluralism and a more nuanced body of global urban research to understand 
and conceptualise the planetary scale urbanisation, which contains new and different cities, 
relations and networks, urbanisation patterns and dynamics (e.g. Sigler, 2016; van Meeteren 
et al., 2016; Brenner, 2018a). This can be done by finding innovative ways of doing global 
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urban research (Harrison and Hoyler, 2018a/b), expanding the empirical scope and geography 
of the research (e.g. Derudder and Taylor, 2016), and/or stress-testing existing approaches 
(Hoyler and Harrison, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017; Derudder and Taylor, 2018). As in this 
study, this can also be done in a way including three of the above, that is, stress-testing all 
approaches in a single example in a case-study which cannot easily fit into one of these 
existing approaches. Such a work might reveal why these theories should be improved and 
how they can be improved, instead of strengthening a “polemical pluralism” (van Meeteren et 
al., 2016) which implies that one theory can explain, while others cannot. 
In the light of these discussions and taking into consideration the current calls in global urban 
research, this chapter critically evaluates four major approaches in global urban studies in 
turn.  In line with this aim, the chapter begins with a critical review of global and world cities 
research (2.2). It then proceeds to discuss other critical approaches; respectively (2.3.1) state 
rescaling approach, (2.3.2) developmental approach and (2.3.2) postcolonial urban theory. In 
the concluding part (2.4), the chapter discusses potential ways to extend the research and 
suggests that stress-testing is a fruitful way to do this. Finally, that part also discusses why 
and how Istanbul offers great potential for stress-testing all four major approaches. 
2.2 Global Cities Research: The Geoeconomic Logic for Global City Formation 
Studies analysing cities according to their functions and/or positions within an international 
system can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, but this took on another 
meaning when the world/global cities literature emerged in the 1980s following the collapse 
of North Atlantic Fordist manufacturing and Keynesianism in the 1970s. It was the 
observation that a select number of so-called ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities, predominantly in 
North America and Western Europe, were playing a significant role as anchor points for 
increasingly mobile, transnational capital, labour and knowledge that triggered a new 
approach to conceptualising these new urban forms (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; although 
these two terms are generally used interchangeably, as explained below, each of them is based 
on different analytical frameworks). This then raised the idea that these cities are linked to 
each other and hierarchically positioned in a global network which transcends national 
boundaries (Taylor, 1994). Building on these theoretical origins, subsequent studies have 
produced an extensive body of work commonly referred to as global/world cities research. 
The research, nevertheless, still has some shortfalls arising from the geoeconomic perspective 
on which its theoretical assumptions are based. 
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The original world city hypothesis was as an interpretation of the “spatial organization of the 
new international division of labour” (Friedmann,1986: 69) within a world-systems 
perspective. Simply put, what creates this new division of labour is two important processes: a 
shift of the activities of global corporations from industrial to non-industrial sectors and 
increasing capital and labour mobility (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). In this way, global 
capital was argued to be free of national ties and boundaries, and the global economic map 
was reshaped from discrete national space economies towards a network of cities which 
housed the headquarters of these large global corporations which were seen to be managing 
and orchestrating the global economy. In other words, while the old international division of 
labour is based on state-centred categorisations, the new international division of labour 
(NIDL) assumes a city-centred hierarchical system. In this system core cities are the spaces of 
finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE) and advanced producer services (APS), the leading-edge 
sectors of the globalising economy, and periphery and semi-periphery cities are the spaces of 
industrial and commodity production (Friedmann, 1986). 
According to Friedmann and Wolff (1982: 310), “at the apex of this hierarchy are found a 
small number of massive urban regions that we shall call world cities”, such as New York, 
Tokyo and London. To identify this new city type, Friedmann (1986: 72) applied certain 
criteria such as “major financial centre, headquarters for TNC, rapid growth of business 
services sector; population size”. Further, being a world city depends on a city’s role in the 
global economic system. For example, world cities are “the basing points for capital in the 
spatial organization and articulation of production and markets” (Friedmann, 1986: 71). 
Additionally, world cities are the spatial reflections of controlling production and market units 
by transnational capital, by serving as banking and financial centres, administrative 
headquarters, centres of ideological control, and so on (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). 
Sassen (1991) takes the arguments of Friedmann (1986) and Friedmann and Wolff (1982) a 
step further and shifts the terminology to speak of ‘global’ cities. Sassen (2001: 347) argues 
that the purpose of her global city concept is “to conceive of economic globalization not just 
as capital flows, but as the work of coordinating, managing, and servicing these flows.”  For 
Sassen, trans-border economic and technological developments have not only extended the 
geography of capitalism but also complicated it, global companies have therefore established 
headquarters in some cities to manage and control their dispersed activities. Global cities have 
emerged as the strategic sites in which these command and control functions are highly 
concentrated and centralised. Along with these strategic functions, a new demand for APS 
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firms has developed in these cities. Since the global companies have outsourced some of their 
managerial and organisational functions to specialised service firms such as information 
technologies, lawyering, accounting, finance firms, these advanced producer services have 
also been seen to agglomerate in these cities. 
These ideas were then supplemented by Peter Taylor. Taylor (1995) agreed in principle with 
Sassen and Friedmann’s theses that the changing nature of the global capitalism diminishes 
the control capability of the nation states, and global and world cities become the important 
nodes of a hierarchical global system. Yet he criticises them on two points. First, for Taylor 
(1997, 2001), although many studies imply the existence of a hierarchical global urban 
network, these assumptions are not empirically supported. Second, while their concepts 
concentrate on global and world cities themselves they overlook the relations within the 
global urban system. Instead, Taylor (1997) suggested shifting the focus of research to inter-
city relations and hierarchical tendencies in the world-city network. Taylor (2001) then 
developed an interlocking world-city network model to specify this hierarchical global urban 
network.  
These pioneering studies have paved the way for subsequent theoretical, methodological, 
empirical and geographical interventions most of which aim to describe, interpret and/or 
investigate the fundamental assumptions of the global/world city concept. Two major research 
strands can be mentioned here: work on global cities themselves and work about the world-
wide relations and linkages between global cities. Generally built on Sassen’s theoretical 
assumptions about global cities (see Sassen, 2005), some of the studies in the first group have 
focused on the relevant socio-economic transformations that global cities have undergone, 
such as social polarisation (Fainstein, 2001; Hamnett, 2003; Timberlake et al., 2012), 
immigration (Benton-Short, Price and Friedman, 2005; Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; 
Sanderson et al., 2015) or social diversity (Pooch, 2016). 
Moreover, others assess the political aspects and the changing nature of the relations between 
global cities and their nation-states. The general idea here is that the ties between global cities 
and their nation-states tend to weaken, since, as Sassen (2005: 30) argues, “economic fortunes 
of these cities become increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even their 
national economies”. Further, global cities have different agendas, interests, and linkages, 
which sometimes cause tensions between both (Barber, 2013; Clark and Moonen, 2017). 
Some accounts even claim that cities no longer need their nation-states (Langley, 2002). 
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The second major expansion of global cities research occurred from the 1990s onwards as 
part of the broader relational turn in social scientific research (e.g. Castells, 1996; 
Beaverstock et al., 1999; 2000, Beaverstock et al., 2000; Taylor, 2004b). This body of work 
has been stimulated by the empirical deficiencies of the initial studies and the questions about 
how cities relate to each other in the global economic system (Watson and Beaverstock, 2014, 
Taylor and Derudder, 2018). Network studies make three major contributions to the growing 
body of global and world cities research. First, by producing different data-sets (e.g. airline 
flows, Derudder et al., 2011; APS firms, Taylor et al., 2014; NGOs, Taylor, 2004a; global 
media corporations, Hoyler and Watson, 2013) these studies visualise the global urban 
networks in which cities are connected to each other in diverse ways. Second, they 
empirically reveal the (putative) hierarchy in this invisible network of which the most 
connected cities rank at the top (Taylor, 2005; Taylor et al., 2011, 2013; Liu et al., 2014). 
Third, measuring changing connectivities and positionalities in these networks (e.g. Derudder 
et al., 2010; Bassens et al., 2010a; Hanssens et al., 2011; Derudder and Taylor, 2016), they 
provide comprehensive analyses about both the trajectories of individual cities and also 
changing geographical patterns of the global economy. 
Today, there is an ongoing endeavour of stretching empirical, methodological and geographic 
limits of the research (Sigler, 2016; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). One essential and useful way 
of this is to stress-test the fundamentals of the global city paradigm (Peck, 2015; Hoyler and 
Harrison, 2017). This can be said to appear as a necessity, namely that so long as the 
phenomenon called globalisation deepens and expands, new global urban formations, each of 
which has separate local dynamics, emerge and they begin to push the limits of the central 
assumptions of the theory. Testing these assumptions through case studies show ‘‘where 
global city theory needs to be extended, nuanced, and adapted’’ (Krijnen et al., 2017: 2883). 
This, in one sense, will serve to strengthen the concept but, in another sense, can be read as a 
kind of defence mechanism against some critiques which have been characterised as creating 
a ‘straw man’ argument (van Meeteren et al., 2016). Namely, emphasising the 
exceptional/unique patterns of cities, as non-western approaches often do, helps to understand 
the pluralist nature and divergent local dynamics of global urbanism; however, it inherently 
includes the risk of misunderstanding and/or ignoring the planetary dynamics of global 
urbanism (Peck, 2015). Therefore, instead of being interested only where they come from, the 
aim of testing should be to improve theories' explanatory powers (Peck, 2015). 
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In line with Peck's suggestions, it can be said that a recent agenda in global cities research 
begins to emerge. There are significant contributions on stress-testing of core assumptions of 
the global cities paradigm inside and outside of its inherent geographic boundaries, such as 
advanced producer services and highly skilled labour (in Beirut, Krijnen et al., 2017); 
command and control functions (Kleibert, 2017; Parnreiter, 2017), and social polarisation 
(Crankshaw, 2017). Apart from these, some innovative works empirically extend the 
asymmetric interurban network assumptions by using different measuring techniques such as 
research and development activities (Csomós and Tóth, 2016), interurban research 
collaborations (Kanai at al., 2018) and energy networks (Martinus and Tonts, 2015); some of 
them extend the boundaries of these networks by incorporating ''off the map'' cities into the 
map (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Kanai et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2017). 
Despite a recognition that global cities research has been in the flagship position of global 
urban studies, it has also faced serious criticisms, both internal and external. One of the first 
and most important among these is that the research is theoretically and empirically western-
centric. While the initial studies concentrate on a few putative global and world cities, 
subsequent interventions create a huge accumulation of knowledge about the globalised and 
globalising geography of cities. In parallel with the rise of non-western forms of global cities, 
many global cities researchers have researched their strategic functions (Parnreiter, 2010; 
Sigler, 2013); divergent and/or convergent dynamics (Jimenez et al., 2002; Parnreiter et al., 
2013); different pathways of being a global city (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999; Golubchikov, 
2010; Chubarov and Brooker, 2013; Acuto, 2014), city-region (Segbers et al., 2007) or city-
state (Olds and Yeung, 2004); or different geographical variants of hierarchical interurban 
networks such as Asia-Pacific (Csomos and Derudder, 2014) or the Middle East and North 
Africa (Bassens et al., 2010b). 
Nevertheless, just like the research itself, the geography of globalisation has rapidly and 
extensively been spreading on the planetary scale (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). While, thirty 
years ago, Friedmann (1986) identified a few world cities almost all of which are located in 
core countries, Sassen (2016: 98) recently argued:  
“As the global economy globalized more and more, the number of global cities also 
grew. Today we can identify a hundred or so global cities; these vary considerably in 
their capacities, with some counting on only a few genuinely global operational 
circuits.”  
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This implies much more than a quantitative increase in the number of cities. It highlights new 
problems, new relationships, and most importantly new and diverse pathways of becoming a 
global city. Of course, the ongoing efforts in this regard cannot be denied, but nevertheless, it 
is hard to understand these differences without critically examining the core claims and 
assumptions within the research. The research, in other words, needs to be questioned and 
refreshed in a way to provide a more extensive understanding of this planetary age of global 
urbanisation. 
Second, stressing the economic processes of global city formation, global and world cities 
research often underplay the global city maker roles of political agents (Acuto, 2013a, also 
see following sections). However, local, regional and national governments throughout the 
world enthusiastically adopt global city strategies and shift their policies to make their cities 
as global cities (Clark and Moonen, 2017). That is, global cities are not only spontaneous 
outcomes of economic globalisation but also constructed forms. Recent research in the field 
addresses this notion of ‘constructed’ by focusing on the role of economic actors in global city 
making (Hoyler et al., 2018b). Improving this notion by including political processes and 
actors might serve for a more comprehensive understanding of how and why global cities are 
constructed. A different aspect is how global cities research assumes that the relations 
between global cities and their host-states weakens and/or is generally in tension. It is 
questionable to what extent these assumptions conform with the realities of Western contexts, 
let alone non-western contexts. As will be seen in the East Asian section, there are different 
examples contradicting these assumptions. Therefore, the research may also be renewed 
towards a more nuanced examination of city-state relations. 
To summarise, it could be said that from the early works of Friedmann and Sassen to date, 
global cities research has made invaluable contributions to the understanding of impacts of 
globalisation, notably economic globalisation, on cities, and their relations between other 
cities and nation-states. Despite some weaknesses in the early works, recent studies show that 
the research has broadened its geographical scope both theoretically and empirically. Yet, as 
will be seen by the discussions in the following sections, there are still some blind spots that 
need to be further examined and improved. 
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2.3 Critiques of the Global Cities Thesis 
2.3.1 Critique I: State Rescaling and the Geopolitics of Global City Formation 
The previous section has concentrated on the key concepts and accounts of global and world 
cities research. As discussed, within global cities research, the rise of global cities is explained 
with the effects of globalisation, neither the role of the nation state nor the significance of 
space is emphasised in their formation (Friedmann, 1986; Taylor, 1994; Sassen, 1996). Some 
commentators even go so far as to attest that concentration of geoeconomic power in cities is 
so profound that major urban regions have now superseded national economies as the 
fundamental unit of the capitalist economy (Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998, 2001; 
Barber, 2013; Katz and Bradley, 2013). From a political-economic perspective, such a 
conceptualisation of global cities falls short because it ignores the political dynamics of 
urbanisation and role of the political and economic rescaling of nation-states in this process 
(Brenner, 1998; Jonas and Ward, 2007; Jonas, 2013). Instead, the rescaling approach is 
concerned with the spatiality of capitalism, spatial responses to its crises and restructuring 
advanced capitalist-states (Brenner, 1998, 2004a; Harrison, 2015).  
The political deficit of the global and world city concepts is a long and much-debated critique. 
There are many accounts arguing that the research exaggerates the role of the global economy 
in global city formation and downplays the role of the political dynamics of becoming a 
global city (see Acuto, 2013a/b). However, the objection in the rescaling approach, in a more 
theoretical sense, concerns how global cities research conceptualises the urban and capitalism. 
As Brenner (1998: 8) argues, “much of world cities research has been premised upon the 
assumption that intensified globalisation entails an erosion of state territoriality” and have 
neglected “the role of state-level processes in the current round of capitalist restructuring”. 
However, each round of capitalist production brings to, and exists within, new modes of 
political-economic regulation and territoriality (Harvey, 2001). That is, “this major 
restructuring does not come at the expense of the state; in accordance with some kind of 
either/or, zero-sum, logic” (Harrison, 2015: 19), but triggers a shift to a new mode of 
regulation. 
Unlike much global cities research, the rescaling approach explains the issue within historical 
and contemporary dynamics of capitalism and also organisational and spatial reflections of 
these dynamics (Brenner, 1998; 2004a). During the 1970s, the advanced capitalist states of 
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North America and Western Europe faced a series of economic crises that they were unable to 
overcome with postwar Keynesian economic policy instruments. Following the collapse of 
the Fordist-Keynesian institutional compromise the advent of post-Fordist, post-Keynesian, 
post-national policies fuelled an intense period of state rescaling and research into this 
(Jessop, 2000). While many argued the irreversible decline of nation-states, the advanced 
capitalist nation-states have not perished following the demise of Fordist-Keynesianism but 
have instead undergone a process of rescaling which has seen powers transferred to sub- and 
supra-state scales (Brenner, 2004a; Keating, 2013, 2014; Harrison, 2015). As will be seen 
below, this process is often associated with two main processes: (i) the glocalisation of the 
state (Brenner, 1998), and (ii) the shift from a Keynesian Welfare National State to a 
Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop, 1993, 2000). 
Brenner (1998) associates global city formation with the process of glocalisation, indicating a 
transformation of the historical relationship between capital, state and state-territoriality. For 
Brenner, nation-states are not eroded but rearticulated and reterritorialised under the 
conditions of global capitalism. Simply, as capital becomes more mobile and global and the 
capitalist production tends toward non-industrial sectors, states renew their economic policies 
and regulatory institutions in a way that attracts capital to their major urban places (Brenner, 
2004b). Whereas cities and city-regions become tools of capital accumulation, the nation-
scale regulatory policies and institutions required by the Fordist- Keynesian system are 
variously decentred, devolved, delegated to sub- and supra-scales of governance (Brenner, 
2004a/b). As a consequence: 
“Rather than promoting ‘balanced’ urban and regional development within relatively 
auto-centric national space-economies, the overarching goal of urban locational 
policies is to position major cities and city-regions strategically within supranational 
(European and global) circuits of capital accumulation” (Brenner, 2009: 128). 
Whereas in Brenner’s thought nation-states still have strong control mechanisms on, and ties 
with their cities, Jessop (1996) points to the “hollowing out” of the regulatory power of 
national states towards both supra-national and sub-national scales. In this way, the 
geoeconomic and geopolitical structure of nation states is going towards denationalisation in 
terms of territoriality. Jessop (2002a/b) argues that the role of central governments in local 
and regional development was re-functionalised in the process of transformation from 
Keynesian Welfare National States to Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes, which 
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concerns economic competition. To him, in this process, while the importance of national 
scale of economic, social and political organisation has declined, it cannot be said the other 
scales, such as local, urban, or global, have exactly won and nation states have lost (Jessop, 
2013).  
While these early studies have laid the theoretical basis for the rescaling approach, Brenner 
(2009) calls researchers to empirically interrogate these descriptive formulations in the second 
wave of work on rescaling, the subsequent extension of the rescaling literature can be divided 
into two major strands: the content and conceptualisation of rescaling and the geography of 
rescaling. In relation to the first, a considerable number of works examine the rescaling 
practices of western nation-states at local/metropolitan (e.g. Horak, 2013; Cochrane, 2016; 
Armondi, 2017) and regional levels (Harrison, 2008; Keating; 2013; Jonas, 2013). Moreover, 
some accounts are concerned with the more specific and/or diverse forms of rescaling. For 
example, austerity policies are a widely-discussed topic, especially after the 2008/9 global 
financial crisis (Lobao and Adua, 2011; Donald et al., 2014; Armondi, 2017). Despite that 
political rescaling is generally the focus of the research, some studies reveal that rescaling 
occurs not just as an intergovernmental exchange but also as an authority-transfer between 
state and non-state actors (Buchs, 2009; Keating; 2014; Keating and Wilson, 2014). 
As pointed out by many scholars, in terms of urban governance, this reorientation of state also 
appears as a more entrepreneurial, competitiveness- and growth-oriented framework (Harvey, 
1989; Brenner, 2004a/b; Cochrane, 2016; Peck, 2017b). “The focus on competition between 
cities as a means of achieving economic advantage” (Cochrane, 2016: 911) has forced  city 
governments to reconfigure their policies so as to create “a good business climate” (Harvey, 
1989: 11) that enhance their competitive advantages. In other words, in this process, which 
has begun from the advanced capitalist countries of the West and has spread to the world, the 
city administrations, and of course the central governments, have begun to implement the 
required policies (i.e. public-private partnerships, mega-projects, place-specific projects, 
international events, etc.) in order to attract the increasingly mobile and getting urbanised 
capital into their cities (Harvey, 1989; Brenner, 2003; Müller, 2011; Li et al., 2014; Le Gales, 
2016; Mayer, 2018). 
Another conceptual expand has also occurred through the discussions about the geography of 
rescaling. The central argument here is that neoliberalism, urbanisation, and rescaling are 
tripartite processes. Namely, even though this rescaling and the entrepreneurial shift were the 
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endogenous political-economic transformations in the advanced capitalist states, it has gained 
an economic and political paradigm status titled as neoliberalism and has migrated to the 
other parts of the world by the imposition of the supranational organisations such as IMF and 
World Bank (Theodore and Peck, 2012, Chorev, 2018; Mayer, 2018). Neoliberalism, in principle, 
includes a series of assumptions such enforcement of free-market, withdrawal of the state from 
the market, privatisation and deregulation policies (Peck et al., 2018). However, in urban scale, it 
also implies competitive and growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies and the implementation of 
the rescaling strategies which to give an increasing administrative and fiscal autonomy (Mayer, 
2018). In other words, if neoliberalism is taken as a process, that is neoliberalisation, this leads us 
to the argument that in so far as the scope of the neoliberalism expands, states necessarily tend to 
re-scale (Lobao et al., 2009). As Brenner and Schmid (2015) argue, although cities are different 
everywhere, neoliberal urbanisation and its political and economic regulatory apparatuses 
inevitably acquire a planetary-scale form. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that many states throughout the world have gradually become part of 
a neoliberal restructuring process that imposes entrepreneurial, flexible, liberal policies, either 
intentionally or through the pressure of international regulatory agencies. In this sense, there 
are strong observations that state rescaling processes rapidly spread towards non-western 
states (Klink, 2013, Park, 2013, Bayırbağ, 2013). Nevertheless, in practice, rescaling 
initiatives can differ from case to case which have different dynamics in terms of institutional 
backgrounds, political and ideological factors, and urban environments (Horak, 2013; Jonas, 
2013). Even between the USA and Western Europe, the inherent places of rescaling, there are 
strong differences in terms of practices and aims (Cox, 2004; 2009; Herrschel; 2014). 
Moreover, these differences become so obvious when looking beyond the North Atlantic Rim. 
This is because these reforms are generally imported as a state-led strategy for national 
economic development (Tsukamoto, 2012; Wu, 2016; Kinossian, 2017) and implemented top-
down (Ye, 2014) and selectively (Le Galès, 2016).  
In many cases, strong central governments limit to profound diffusion of neoliberalism into 
administrative mechanisms (Le Galès, 2016). In such cases, while entrepreneurial policies are 
enthusiastically adopted by (often central) bureaucratic and political elites, administrative 
decentralisation usually takes place either never (in practice) or at a lower level (Kuyucu, 
2018). Hence, it should be critically noted: 
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“...explanations of state rescaling require more nuanced understandings of historically 
and geographically specific political, economic and social processes and conditions 
that have affected the scalar (re)configurations of the state in different countries (e.g. 
geopolitical contexts, nation-building processes, the nature of rule-setting 
mechanisms, the nature of party politics, uneven geographies of development, 
processes of social struggle, and national and local rhythms of regulatory stability and 
crisis)” (Park, 2013: 1121). 
The rescaling approach partly fills the political shortfall of the global cities research. It is 
partly, because, as in global cities research, the rescaling approach is also empirically based 
on the scalar organisation of the state within a certain historical and political context. These 
configurations might make sense in the context of neoliberal North Atlantic states, however, 
as discussed above, there are strong observations showing the contrary examples in non-
western contexts. The following discussion will provide a better understanding of these 
differences.  
2.3.2 Critique II: The Rise of Developmental Cities 
The approaches that have been discussed thus far are interested in developing a universal 
conceptualisation of contemporary urbanisation, however, the developmental approach 
identifies and limits itself within a certain geopolitical context – East-Asia and developmental 
states and/or city-states. Developmentalist accounts criticise global cities literature not only 
because it ignores the role of politics but also because it is Western-centric. Drawing upon a 
set of historical, political and economic differences, generally titled as state-
developmentalism, the literature generally tends to reject western-centric theories, that is not 
only the global cities literature but also the state rescaling approach, neoliberal urbanisation 
and the new urban politics. Within this motivation, this literature is keen to argue and theorise 
the distinct urbanisation of East-Asian cities with a particular emphasis on the role of state 
politics. 
As Tokyo is counted among the key global and world cities in the global cities approach (see 
Sassen, 1991), initial studies have generally attempted to reveal the distinctiveness of Tokyo 
when compared to London and New York. White (1998) argues that Tokyo’s globalisation 
story relies on a state-guided development of Japan and is therefore very different from 
London and New York in terms of “collusion, collaboration, or the adhesion of state and 
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capital” (White, 1998: 461). Kamo (2000) makes a similar distinction on the basis of the 
economic structure of these cities: while Tokyo’s globalisation is industrial, London and New 
York’s are financial. For Fujita (2000: 2187), Tokyo (and other East-Asian capital cities) is 
mainly associated with “the state-centred financial system”, which is seen as “a policy tool for 
national development by the state” (ibid.: 2202). The most noteworthy effort in the early 
studies was that Hill and Kim (2000) furthered these differences into a new conceptualisation 
of developmental global cities. 
Drawing on a set of assumptions based on the distinctive historical institutionalisation of East 
Asian Developmental-States, they argue that Tokyo, and other developmental cities, are 
significantly different from western world cities (Hill and Kim, 2000; see also Ma and 
Timberlake, 2013). To conceptualise developmental world cities, they dichotomised the world 
city typologies as state-centred, political-bureaucratic (SWCs) and market-centred, bourgeois. 
The former’s prototype is Tokyo and Seoul, while the latter’s is London and New York (Hill 
and Kim, 2000). Among many assumptions, perhaps the most important one is that Tokyo’s 
and Seoul’s world city formation is mainly shaped by their national governments in line with 
the national economic and political priorities. They further assert that their conceptualisation 
can also provide an explanation for other cities, notably Taipei, Osaka, and city-states such as 
Singapore and Hong-Kong (Hill, 2004). 
Hill and Kim’s conceptualisation was problematic in two respects. First, it can be argued that 
they have overplayed the role of national government by ignoring the roles played by other 
stakeholders. By searching the changing relationship between the Japanese state and business 
groups, Waley (2007: 1485) points out that national business groups play the leading role in 
the recent restructuring of Tokyo, while “the state [...] plays an increasingly withdrawn role”. 
Likewise, Saito (2003) and Saito and Thornley (2003) observe that local governments have 
gained a decision-making autonomy in developing their cities. Saito (2003) argues that there 
is a competition between Tokyo’s local and Japan’s central governments in Tokyo’s world-
city projects, stemming from increasing decision-making power of local government. 
Nevertheless, when arguing that this intergovernmental competition means not a local-central 
tension, but a “mutual dependence with strong rivalry” (ibid.: 301), Saito agrees with Hill and 
Kim on Tokyo’s distinctiveness which is embedded within the capitalist developmental state. 
Yet another case study shows that the political differences in different tiers of government 
might easily turn this relationship into a conflict which damages the world city-goals of the 
cities, as in Taipei (Wang and Huang, 2009). 
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Secondly, although Hill and Kim assert that other East Asian cities can be best understood 
with their concepts, some other scholars critically examine this and point out the differences 
of the other global cities and city-states in the region. For example, while Wang (2003, 2004) 
argues that decreasing manufacturing production in the economy vis-a-vis rising FIRE sectors 
and relative liberalism are distinctive features of Taipei from Seoul and Tokyo, Shin and 
Timberlake (2006) claim that Seoul is differentiated from Tokyo in terms of openness to 
foreign capital and industrial decentralisation policies. Yet, they agree with Hill and Kim on 
the crucial role of South Korean and Taiwan’s central governments in Seoul and Taipei 
achieving world city status. With a different point of view underlining city-state 
characteristics in Singapore, Olds and Yeung (2004) put forward the developmental city-state 
concept. To them, despite its similar developmental characteristics, Singapore is significantly 
different from others with its fully urbanised territorial structure, direct links to the global 
economy, openness to global capital flows, and international financial centre position (see 
also Shatkin, 2014b).  
While the early studies were generally not very persistent on the changes of traditional forms 
and policies of developmental states, recent studies concentrate on these changes, in particular 
practices of neoliberal policies. There is an obvious observation that developmental states 
selectively adopt neoliberal policies as the impetus for national economic growth (e.g. Park et 
al., 2012; Tsukamoto, 2012; Waley, 2013; Heo, 2015). That is, these policies were generally 
adopted under the orchestration (and proactive intervention) of central governments, without 
much sacrificing the core traits of the developmental state system (e.g. Fujita, 2011; 
Tsukamoto, 2012; Wang, 2012; Jou et al., 2014, for an opposite view see Yeung, 2017b). 
Even administrative decentralisation is often realised as a state-strategy, so the central 
governments keep their leading positions, contrary to western-centric neoliberalisation theory 
(Pereira, 2008; Fujita, 2011; Tsukamoto, 2012, for a counter argument from South Korea see 
Bae, 2013, 2016): 
“Tokyo’s urban policy does not conform to neoliberal urbanization arguments: its 
redevelopment policy is firmly placed in the national policy framework and is 
financed either by the state or by state-led financial schemes with private and public 
sectors” (Fujita, 2011: 324). 
These studies pave the way for a new and increasingly popular debate: can East Asian states 
still be defined as developmental in the classical sense (Waley, 2013)? Much recent research 
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proposes new hybrid concepts to gain insight into regional characteristics of neoliberalism 
such as neoliberal developmentalism (Liow, 2011; Heo, 2015), developmental neoliberalism 
(Choi, 2012), or more popularly post-developmentalism (Park et al., 2012; Waley, 2013; Shin 
and Kim, 2016). While neoliberal economic policies and urban policy changes compatible 
with neoliberal rhetoric have been spreading throughout the region (Liow, 2011; Waley, 
2013; Bae, 2016), the existing structure of developmentalism prevents turning these 
developments into a full neoliberal regulatory regime. Contemporary urban policy formation 
in developmental states, therefore, contains both elements of neoliberalism and 
developmentalism (Shin and Kim, 2016), for example a “combination of the government’s 
neoliberal political rationality and the developmental state’s governmentality” (Heo, 2015: 
351). Despite that there are continuities between traditional and new forms of developmental 
institutionalism (Shin and Kim, 2016), these developments, nevertheless, imply a turn into a 
post-developmentalism which cannot be easily understood with the traditional arguments of 
developmentalism (Waley, 2013). 
As discussed so far, this literature develops a highly successful counter-argument against the 
universal assumptions of globalist and neoliberal accounts, through which it shows how these 
processes follow different pathways in certain specific geographic contexts. The empirical 
arguments that they provide reveal how strong central governments have a significant role in 
the making of their global cities, how they selectively utilise the global/neoliberal processes in 
line with their national aims, and so that global city formation, at least in the East Asian 
context, does not come at the expense of or demise of nation-states. Nonetheless, their 
arguments might be criticised in three respects. Firstly, an observation is that theoretical 
arguments of the literature are based mostly on the experiences of a few global cities (e.g. 
Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei) and city-states (Singapore) and often over-generalise the 
similarities while minimising differences. In fact, by doing this, they fall foul of what they 
accuse global city researchers of doing, namely generalising from empirical observations of a 
few selected cities. 
Secondly, recent studies point out that the developmental-state form is not as strictly rigid as 
those early studies assert. In contrast it has been evolving over time. Given the evolution of 
the literature from developmentalism to post-developmentalism, it is possible to think that the 
distinctiveness phenomenon, which is the epistemological core of this literature, will be even 
more questionable in the near future. Third, state developmentalism does not just point to a 
geographical region; it is also a concept that is formed by the combination of historical, 
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political, economic, and even social elements (see Öniş, 1991; Yeung, 2017a). Therefore, it is 
questionable whether the developmental (or post-developmental) city concepts can be 
applicable in other cases that do not conform with these elements, such as Chinese global 
cities (Ma and Timberlake, 2013; Zhang, 2013) or others elsewhere.  
To conclude, different from the literature discussed previously (and to be discussed further in 
the thesis), developmental accounts are concerned with the different dynamics of 
neoliberalism and globalisation in a narrow and specific geographical context, that is East 
Asia. This approach asserts that developmental states and city-states in East-Asia present 
distinctive characteristics and that the global or world city concept (or others e.g. rescaling) 
relying on the experiences of western cities are far from explaining the reality of East Asian 
global cities. Despite their success, it is doubtful whether they provide a strong generalisable 
theoretical insight into the plural characteristics of globalisation/neoliberalisation in local 
contexts. This is exactly what the next approach, at least in some accounts, tries to develop. 
2.3.3 Critique III: Postcolonial Urban Theory 
The third and final counter-approach to global cities research is postcolonial urban theory. In 
general terms, unlike the global and world cities research, the postcolonial literature is very 
sensitive to different forms of urbanism based on historical differences, most notably 
colonialism (Chakravorty, 2000; Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016). Postcolonial theorists do 
not only criticise the criteria used to identify global cities or the overall methodologic 
tendencies in the mainstream global cities research but also fundamentally question the 
applicability of global and world city concepts to the geography of cities in the global South. 
Postcolonial theorists tend to develop new conceptual arguments that allow understanding the 
developments of global South cities under globalisation, rather than categorising these cities 
through the lenses of western-produced theories, concepts and vocabulary. This section 
respectively examines the critiques of postcolonial researchers on global cities research, their 
alternative arguments, and finally concludes the discussion with a brief critique of the 
postcolonial approach to global urban studies. 
The first and perhaps the most-cited critique on the part of postcolonial theory is that global 
cities research, at best marginalises, at worst excludes, the global South from (the centre of) 
urban theory-making (Robinson, 2002, 2006, 2008; McCann, 2004; McFarlane, 2008; Parnell 
and Robinson, 2013; Sheppard et al, 2015). As Robinson (2002) points out, by identifying a 
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small range of cities as global and world cities, the mainstream global urban research drops 
hundreds of cities off the map of urban studies. More explicitly, global cities literature 
“persists in defining some cities out of the game, as ‘excluded from global capitalism’ and 
therefore as irrelevant to their theoretical reflections” (Robinson, 2002: 538). Further, since 
much of the empirical evidence underpinning global city theory is developed from the 
experiences of the global North/Western cities, their theories, implicitly or explicitly, reflect 
the Anglophone (Parnell and Robinson, 2013), Anglo-American (Robinson, 2016b), 
Eurocentric (Roy, 2016), or Euro-American (McFarlane, 2008; Bunnel, 2015) perspectives. 
The literature, in this way, reflects an ethnocentric logic and falls into an intellectual 
parochialism believing that their concepts can explain other parts of the world (McFarlane, 
2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2013). 
However, as Chakravorty (2000: 57) expresses, the arguments built on the experiences of 
western cities do not quite coincide with the realities of postcolonial geography: 
“It is clear that the two-stage Fordist/post-Fordist model cannot adequately describe 
the economic and urban development of India, particularly its colonial cities (and 
perhaps some other once-colonized third world nations and cities).”  
Based on this historical dissimilarity phenomenon and its subsequent components, as Roy 
recently argued (2016), there is an epistemological objection to mainstream research. Put 
simply, since many cities in the global South have undergone different historical stages, in 
each of which they experienced different urbanism practices and faced different social, 
political and economic problems, these cities have different urban dynamics than their 
western counterparts (e.g. Grant and Nijman, 2002; Shatkin, 2007; Simone, 2010; Miraftab, 
2012). Therefore, the notion that these cities can be explained through western-based 
conceptual lenses is theoretically misleading (McCann, 2004; McFarlane, 2008; Parnell and 
Robinson, 2013, Sheppard et al., 2013; Schindler, 2017). For example, the social polarisation 
in Cape Town has an ethnic characteristic, as different from the Fordist/Post-Fordist 
polarisation experienced by western cities (Lemanski, 2007), and the restructuring of the local 
and central state in Cape Town has directly addressed the post-1994 (post-apartheid period) 
rather than post-1970 transformations in the international political-economy (Parnell and 
Robinson, 2013).  
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The second concern of postcolonial critique is economism and hierarchical tendencies in 
global cities research. In the simplest terms, identification of some cities as global and world 
cities (as command and control nodes of the global economy) does not only move other cities 
off the map but also hierarchically divides cities into global and non-global (Robinson, 2002). 
Such an approach does not serve developing a universal understanding of global urbanism, in 
contrast, it enhances and reproduces existing divisions such as East-West, North/South, 
developed/underdeveloped, and so on (McFarlane, 2010). This approach is also flawed as it 
reflects a “Darwinian ecology of cities: the survival of the fittest in the keen competition of 
network capitalism” (Roy, 2009: 821). What is more, hierarchical approaches, even if 
unintentionally, cause leading global cities to be perceived as success stories, and even, more 
dangerously, as ideal forms of the city: 
“While the world/global cities literature has expanded to incorporate some cities that 
might, until recently, have been classified as ‘Third World’, the continued assumption 
of hierarchical relations continues to present alpha [or, most recently, ‘alpha++’] cities 
as the leading edge of urban innovation, dynamism, and aspiration” (Bunnel and 
Sidaway, 2012: xvi). 
This perceived attitude of global cities research provokes the feeling of backwardness and 
triggers catch-up motivations of developing countries, particularly of postcolonial countries. 
Terms like ascent or descent which are used to discuss the changing position of cities in the 
global urban network encourage the authorities of low-ranked cities to raise their cities’ 
position within this system. More interestingly, rankings show them the way how they can do 
this: by mimicking the policies of other global/world cities, that is by following the successful 
examples of the west (Robinson, 2006). Many cities and states in the global South quickly 
adopt these policies and spend their economic resources on turning their cities into 
global/world cities (e.g. Goldman, 2011; Dupont, 2011). Global city making, in this way, is 
elevated to a policy-goal and a strategy of national, regional or local economic development: 
“In policy terms, the hierarchies and categories embedded in the global- and world-
cities approaches suggest that if cities are not to remain inconsequential, marginalised 
and impoverished or to trade economic growth for expansion in population, they need 
to aim for the top!” (Robinson, 2006: 111). 
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As the section has discussed thus far, from the postcolonial perspective, mainstream global 
urban research is inherently problematic as it is ethnocentric, economically reductionist and 
hierarchy-based. Postcolonial urban theory therefore suggests removing these flaws and 
developing more cosmopolitan, locally sensitive, pluralist, and inclusive urban theories. 
Theoretically, this can only be possible if global urban theory is postcolonised (Robinson, 
2002, 2006), deconstructed and decolonised (Roy, 2009) or provincialised (Robinson, 2003, 
Pile, 2006; Sheppard et al., 2013, 2015). For example, Robinson’s (2006, 2008) frequently-
cited ordinary city proposal is quite noteworthy. She suggests building a postcolonial urban 
framework that “cuts across the long-standing divide in urban scholarship between accounts 
of ‘Western’ and other kinds of cities” (Robinson, 2006: 1). In light of this theoretical 
manoeuvre, Robinson, and others, propose a methodological turn towards comparative 
urbanism: to globalise urban theory through comparative studies, especially between Northern 
and Southern cities (e.g. Robinson, 2011). 
On the other hand, some accounts attempt to analyse and describe global Southern cities as 
“other urbanisms” (Shatkin, 2011a: 79), such as “occupancy urbanism” (Benjamin, 2008), 
“subaltern urbanism” (Roy, 2011a), “actually existing urbanism” (Shatkin, 2011a), “southern 
urbanism” (Watson, 2009), or “black urbanism” (Simone, 2010b). Some even, more 
ambitiously, seek to relocate the centre of the urban theory making to the global South (Roy, 
2009). For example, rejecting the universal understanding of urbanism, Roy takes Robinson’s 
proposals forward in a different way and argues that postcolonialism should be understood as 
“a critical, deconstructive methodology that inaugurates a new way of doing global 
metropolitan studies” (Roy, 2011b: 308). To do that, Roy (2009) proposes to focus on the 
contemporary worlding processes and practices as a means of understanding distinctiveness of 
global South urbanism (see also Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2011c; McCann et al., 2013).  
In brief, by their critiques and proposals, postcolonial researchers have made significant 
contributions to advance global urban research. The first and foremost, postcolonial theory 
brings another type of thinking that allows “to undertake a political economy attentive to the 
historical difference as a fundamental and constitutive force in the making of global 
urbanization” (Roy, 2016: 205). Secondly, it makes considerable contributions to the 
geographical and methodological expansion of global urban research not only through their 
own studies but also through their critiques (Robinson, 2016a). Their critiques, perhaps, push 
global and world cities researchers to think more inventively about different functions and 
roles of global Southern cities (Kleibert, 2017), or to consider more extensive global 
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interurban networks (Derudder and Taylor, 2016). Finally, their attempts, especially their calls 
for comparative studies, are very helpful as they provide an empirical base for stress-testing 
fundamental assumptions of global and world city concepts (van Meeteren et al., 2016). 
Taken altogether, it is hard to deny that postcolonial research provides an invaluable ground 
for a more global urban research. 
On the other hand, the critiques and counter-narratives of postcolonial theory have faced 
serious objections over time (Surborg, 2011; Smith, 2013; Derudder and Parnreiter, 2014; 
Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Scott and Storper, 2015; Storper and Scott, 2016; van Meeteren et 
al., 2016). First, although Roy (2016) insists that their primary concerns are about the 
epistemology of the mainstream research, some researchers think that postcolonial researchers 
are more concentrated on the outcomes and findings of the global and world city concepts 
rather than focusing on the logic of them (Smith, 2013). Their critiques have, therefore, been 
misguided about what the global/world city paradigm actually is. More explicitly, global and 
world cities research is not about positioning cities as followers and followees (Surborg, 
2011) or building hierarchical city-layers (van Meeteren et al., 2016) but about making sense 
of and visualising the uneven geography of global capitalism. 
The second critique is about the particularism and perpetual calls for new theories. As 
mentioned above, in some postcolonial accounts, there is an emphatic tendency to produce 
new theories for global Southern cities. Such a call for new concepts can be taken forever. For 
example, as Taylor pointed out earlier, 100 different ways can be found to describe recent 
urbanisation (Taylor and Lang, 2004). However, while the discussion of differences is 
undeniably useful for creating new perspectives, a blessed particularism might sabotage 
making sense of the communal processes covering all cities (Peck, 2015; Scott and Storper, 
2015), or crises and nature of the capitalist urbanisation which has been experienced on the 
planetary scale (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). Instead of this, what is needed is to concentrate 
on a general account for the urban and urbanisation (Scott and Storper, 2015; Storper and 
Scott, 2016).  
To conclude, within postcolonial thinking global and world cities research is flawed as it is 
western-centric, economistic and hierarchy-based. Therefore, to produce a more 
comprehensive urban research, these flaws have to be removed. In this sense, postcolonial 
contestation is not just a critique of the mainstream urban research but also a counterattack to 
winnow out these inherent problems within the body of this literature. Though some insist on 
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calls for new concepts, their overall calls are for a more pluralist and nuanced, non-
hegemonic, nonpolarised and wider urban theory. However, although it is not possible to deny 
their contributions, it is difficult to say that they have totally reached their overall goal. Recent 
studies show that the debate, and therefore polarisation, continues. The next section 
concentrates on these recent debates with a particular aim: What is the way ahead for 
expanding the body of global urban research? 
2.4 Conclusion: The Way Ahead? 
This chapter has critically evaluated four major literatures in global urban studies: global 
cities research, state rescaling theory, the developmental approach, and postcolonial/global 
South urban theory. The chapter briefly summarises the key arguments with some concluding 
comments, and discusses how global urban studies, in general, can be extended. This section 
explicitly suggests that not only the global/world cities theory, but also other counter-
approaches need to be stress-tested and that this should be done in a case-study encompassing 
plural characteristics. 
Global cities research argues that a new city typology and hierarchy/order have emerged in 
the current phase of global capitalism. Global cities, from which the global economy is 
spatialised, commanded and controlled, are the new spatial forms of this phase, as was the 
nation states in the previous phase, and sit on top of this hierarchy. Contrary to geo-economic 
assumptions of the global cities research, state rescaling researchers approach the issue from a 
more geo-political perspective and argue that nation states are not dying but rescaling to sub-
national, local and regional, scale as well as supra-national. From this perspective, what 
creates global cities and city-regions is not only globalisation but also the reorganisation and 
reterritorialisation of nation-states. On the contrary, postcolonial and developmental 
approaches argue that both global cities and rescaling theories are western-centric and 
therefore not applicable in the rest of the world in which different historical trajectories are 
experienced. 
Nevertheless, considering these discussions, and against the backdrop of deepening and 
rapidly extending globalisation, it is clear that global urban research needs a more 
comprehensive and explanatory framework. Two critical questions arise here; how this can be 
done and where this can be done empirically. For the first, as discussed in the previous pages, 
some scholars insist on developing new theories of global urbanisation (e.g. Roy, 2009; 
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Brenner and Schmid, 2015). An alternative might be to improve existing theories (or 
somewhat blend them) in a way to allow to conceptualise both global characteristics of 
contemporary urbanism and also local pluralities in this planetary scale development. 
However, some others think that developing new concepts, approaches or theories might be 
prolonged forever, and more importantly, that such an effort might undermine the process of 
developing an urban theory that will allow understanding the common dynamics of global 
urbanisation covering all cities (Taylor and Lang, 2004; Peck, 2015; Scott and Storper, 2015; 
Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). Instead of insisting on perpetual calls for new theories, they 
argue the need to stress-test the fundamental assumptions of the existing theories so as to see 
where the theories need to be refreshed, and stretch their conceptual limits (Peck, 2015, 
Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). 
By demonstrating both suggestions are possible (and by discussing their plus and minuses), 
this study aims to take the debate between these two groups a step further. For this purpose, 
the first and vital step is to stress-test all four major urban approaches in the same case-study 
rather than testing just a single particular theory in a city as other studies do. This allows 
noticing where the theories are flawed and how they might be improved. As a side effect, 
depending on which city is used for testing, to interrogate all approaches simultaneously can 
allow seeing which approach might fail or succeed in explaining a different dynamic of a city. 
In this way, the debate can be carried beyond a triumph-defeat duality, asking whether there 
really a need is for developing new concepts or it is possible to stretch existing approaches by 
strengthening their explanatory frameworks. 
Another question is what kind of case-study provides sufficient empirical ground for this 
attempt. Looking at existing studies, each theory generally focuses on specific geographical 
contexts and is empirically based on the experiences of cities in these contexts. Whereas 
global cities and rescaling approaches generally focus on North Atlantic cities, developmental 
and postcolonial studies are concerned with East Asian and global South cities. However, 
comparatively examining these approaches in one of these cities would obviously conclude 
with the triumphs of one of these approaches. For example, to compare the developmental 
approach with global cities theory in the case of Tokyo, as in much of the literature, cannot 
provide an unbiased empirical ground. Further, since it possibly will reveal the explanatory 
veracity of the developmental theory such an approach serves what Meeteren et al. (2016) 
criticise as polemical pluralism. More importantly, such cities with certain characteristics do 
not provide a common ground to allow all theories to be tested. So instead of this, it should be 
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tested in a more pluralistic city in which none of these theories can totally conceptualise but 
all of them partially explain. 
Considering what has been discussed above, it can be thought that Istanbul is one of the most 
suitable cases to reach the above aims in many respects. First, it does not totally confront any 
of the four approaches alone. As Turkey was not a part of the Keynesian-welfare system, 
today it is hard to explain the economic and political transformations which Istanbul and 
Turkey have undergone by either a global/world city concept or the state-rescaling approach. 
Furthermore, as the former capital of three major empires and one of the most important 
destinations of the Silk Road, one of the most-known routes of the early periods of global 
trade, Istanbul, until the early 20th century, had always been a major political, economic, 
military and cultural command and control point in both global and regional sense (see for 
example Francopan, 2015). In this respect, there is an obvious difference between the 
historical trajectories of Istanbul and of postcolonial and developmental cities. As can be seen 
in the empirical chapters, this historical feature, which distinguishes it from others argued in 
this chapter, makes itself visibly felt even today. On the other hand, since it sits on the 
intersections between East and West, and North and South, there are various similarities 
between Istanbul and global Northern and global Southern cities (Yetişkul and Demirel, 
2018). Istanbul, therefore, provides a common and neutral ground for comparing and testing 
theories. The following section will examine the urban development of Istanbul since the 
imperial period and thereby contribute to the understanding of the similarities and differences. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Istanbul: A Global City Between History and Geography 
 
“From a distance, Istanbul is the immutable intersection of vast and diverse mobilities. 
It reaches across the East-West and the North-South axes of the world, and all their 
possible variants. Out of these histories of intersections comes the need to develop 
specific capabilities for handling and enhancing network functions; it is not simply a 
question of location at intersections. It seems to me that developing such capabilities 
across diverse histories and geographies is a particularity of Istanbul’s deep history” 
(Sassen, 2009: 5). 
3.1 Introduction: Framing Istanbul from Imperial to Global 
As the previous chapter has discussed, global and world cities research, along with its three 
counter approaches, provides comprehensive insights into urbanisation (even including its 
planetary characteristic, political dynamics, localities etc.) under contemporary economic 
globalisation. On the other hand, the final section of the chapter has also discussed that there 
are still some cities which do not easily fit into these major approaches and that Istanbul is 
one of these cities. Precisely because of this, Istanbul offers an attractive ground for stress-
testing and extending the scope of global urban research. In order to understand why Istanbul 
does not fully conform to any of these approaches, this chapter critically analyses Istanbul’s 
development from the 19th century to the present. 
Istanbul has characteristics that contradict the basic assumptions of the major global urban 
approaches in some respects. For instance, as Akcan (2015:364) puts forward: “Istanbul 
seems to disrupt a few established notions of the global city paradigm. The first is the role of 
an authoritarian government, [and] the second is the history of illegal settlements.” Further, it 
does not totally conform to the neoliberal approach that assumes neoliberal economic 
transformations lead to an administrative decentralisation (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011; La 
Galès, 2016; Kuyucu, 2018). Indeed, although some early studies position Istanbul as a third-
world metropolis (Keyder and Öncü, 1994) or peripheric city (Jimenez et al., 2002), it seems 
that Istanbul rather presents a more hybrid characteristic: 
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“Like its geographical location, Istanbul resembles both West and East; in addition, it 
has been characterised generally by the less-developed attributes of the Global South 
but also has certain modern, developed aspects of the Global North” (Yetişkul and 
Demirel, 2018: 3).  
A brief historical analysis of the development of Istanbul is therefore necessary to understand 
this hybrid, or in-between (see more below), characteristic of the city. There are three reasons 
for this. First, much of the relevant literature only focuses on the AKP era and the dominant 
role of its central government in local policies (e.g. Karaman, 2013a; Akçalı and Korkut, 
2015; Sanli and Townshend, 2018). However, strong centralisation is not an invention of 
AKP governments, but rather an administrative tradition whose roots are in the imperial 
times. Second, some ideological tensions (e.g. secular-conservative conflict) shaping Turkey’s 
politics, including local-central relations, and why Istanbul holds an important place in these 
tensions can only be understood within such a historical analysis. And third, besides 
Istanbul’s frequently-cited intersectional characteristic between east and west, the link 
between its imperial capital and global city status provides an interesting case which is rarely 
discussed in the academic literature (for an exception see Sassen, 2018) – as Sarkis (2009: 14) 
explains: 
“As the capital of an empire that ruled over an extended territory, Istanbul illustrates 
the continuities between empire and global city through its current relationship with its 
first (national) and second (regional) territorial rings.”  
With these motivations, this chapter discusses the urban development of Istanbul within three 
different periods: imperial, national and global. While doing so, it often goes beyond a city-
based analysis and examines these developments by referencing the general political climate 
of Turkey. In this way, it discusses how Istanbul has been reproduced by different forces and 
with different motivations (symbolic, political and/or economic) in different periods. It also 
demonstrates that despite the different periods of governments, Turkey’s centralised 
administrative tradition is maintained almost unchanged. Additionally, by dividing this 
analysis into different periods, the chapter argues that transition from imperial to national 
period marks a decline in Istanbul’s status in many respects and globalisation is often seen as 
an opportunity to reclaim this status in different shapes. This discussion especially helps to 
understand why global aspirations of Istanbul (and its global city status) are often stated with 
reference to its imperial past (not national). As a final attempt, it tries to conceptualise this 
 36 
 
exceptional pattern of Istanbul as an ‘in-between city’ and discusses whether this 
conceptualisation can be applied to other cases. 
To achieve these aims, the remainder of the chapter consists of five sections: three sections of 
analysis, with each section devoted to a different period of Istanbul (as imperial, national and 
global), and two sections of discussion and conclusion. To this end, the next three sections 
outline the development of Istanbul in different time-periods, each of which gives a different 
characteristic to the city. These are respectively imperial (3.2), national (3.3) and global (3.4) 
periods. The chapter then introduces and discusses the concept in-between city (3.5) before a 
brief conclusion.  
3.2 Istanbul in Retrospect: The City as an Imperial Capital 
Looking back to the 19th century, if the industrial and the colonial cities were the precursors 
of many of today’s global/globalising cities, the precursor of today’s Istanbul was doubtlessly 
the imperial capital. Istanbul had experienced the 19th century globalisation as an imperial 
capital (not as an industrial city nor as a colonial city) and had witnessed profound social, 
economic and political changes, each of which has left significant heritages to later periods. 
Within the notion that Istanbul’s global city formation has important links to imperial 
Istanbul, this section not only discusses the social, economic and political aspects of the 
Ottoman capital and the modern developments in the late imperial period2, but also traces the 
imperial origins of global city Istanbul.  
Demographically speaking, one of the words that best describes imperial Istanbul is diversity. 
In an age when nation-states were beginning to be founded in much of Europe, the Ottoman 
capital was still reflecting the social mosaic of a multi-national and multi-religious empire 
spread over two million square-kilometres from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. The 
population of Istanbul, which was one of the largest cities in Europe with a population of 
more than one million, consisted of various Muslim (Turks, Arabs, Bosnians, Albanians, etc.) 
and non-Muslim (Armenians, Greeks, Jews etc.) groups3. Interestingly, contrary to the general 
demographic structure of the Empire, the number of non-Muslims citizens in the city was 
approximately one hundred thousand more than Muslims. In addition to the city’s inherent 
                                                 
2 From the 19th century, especially its second half, to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Ortaylı, 
1978; Pamuk, 2007) 
3 The spatial division resulting from this diversity is one of the bases of the discourse of meeting east with west, 
used often today, especially by the politicians (see Chapters 5-7). 
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diversity, 15 percent of Constantinople’s population was expatriate in the second half of the 
19th century (Madden, 2016)4. This was almost three times more than that of London, which 
was considered the most cosmopolitan city in Europe for that period (White, 2007). 
Some demographic developments that the city had experienced – especially from the second 
quarter of the 19th century – made an important contribution to this diversity. In parallel to 
that experienced by other European cities, there had been a significant population growth in 
Istanbul. This saw the city’s population increase from 359,000 in 1828 to more than one 
million at the end of the century (Karpat, 1978).  However, migrations to the Ottoman capital 
had different dynamics than that of the European experience, where it mostly resulted from 
industrialisation (Lawton and Lee, 1989). The first reason for the growth was the Muslim 
immigrants, coming from the lost territories of the Empire or escaping massacres and 
conflicts in Russia. The second reason were increasing economic and political relations with 
Europe; this had led many foreigners, most of whom were tradesmen, bankers, merchants, or 
diplomats, to relocate to the city (Gül, 2009). As will be seen below, these migrations (and the 
ethnic and religious diversity of the immigrants) mapped onto the existing spatial pattern of 
the city, and, when considered their socio-economic consequences, further deepened it. 
Apart from the social composition, the spatial pattern of Istanbul (more broadly of Ottoman 
cities) also made it different from its counterparts. Even though Ottoman cities are often 
thought of within the concept of Islamic (or eastern) cities (Weber, 1958, also see Eldem, 
Goffman and Masters, 1999 for a comprehensive discussion), what determines the spatial 
characteristic of an Ottoman city is, before anything else, the Empire’s sui generis social order 
– known as the Millet System (Inalcik, 1990; Öner, 2014).5 In this structure, each religious 
community, or millet, had settled in particular neighbourhoods in which they lived with their 
community members. In other words, “neighbourhoods in traditional Turkish cities; is a 
physical space that is not yet shaped by class and status differences” (Ortaylı, 2010: 305). 
Cities had also consisted of these different neighbourhoods which were religiously 
                                                 
4 Constantinople was the principal official name of Istanbul throughout the Byzantine period and the common 
name used in the West until the early 20th century. It was also used by the Ottoman Empire until the advent of 
the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
5 In the millet system, the Ottoman society is divided on the basis of religion; not on the basis of race, as in 
colonial cities, or class, as in industrial cities. Each religious community was regarded as separate millets that 
had a partial autonomy in their internal affairs such as electing their community leaders (Mordtmann, Inalcik and 
Yerasimos, 2007), carrying out their religious rituals and daily routines and providing some municipal services 
such as street cleaning or tax collection within their own communities (Ortaylı, 2008). Although millet is 
translated into English as nation, it actually defines a religious community, not nation in the modern sense 
(Scruton, 2007). That is, there is no word in English corresponding to this word. 
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homogeneous in themselves. Such a spatial composition is more easily observable as religious 
diversity increases, and Istanbul, the biggest and the most cosmopolitan city in the Empire, 
was inherently the city in which that pattern was the most visible: 
“The capital city now consisted of four main areas: the ancient walled city, commonly 
known as ‘Stamboul’, with a mixed population and the seat of government and 
commerce; Galata, on the north shore of the Golden Horn, inhabited by Westerners 
and their embassies as well as sizeable populations of Greeks, Jews, and Armenians; 
Üsküdar, across the Bosporus on the Asian side, a mainly residential area populated by 
Turks; and Eyüp, to the west of the land walls, with a variety of residences, military 
buildings, and palaces along the shore” (Madden, 2016: 286). 
In parallel with the existing social and spatial pattern, Muslim immigrants generally settled in 
Dersaadet (Stamboul in the above quotation), Üsküdar and Eyüp. Since it was both the 
business district of the city and the location of the embassies/consulates (and they have 
cultural-religious ties with the non-Muslim population of Istanbul), the address of foreign 
immigrants was mostly in the Galata quarter: 
“Free-trade agreements led thousands of Europeans to relocate to the city, invariably 
settling in the Galata/Pera6 areas that had been home to expatriates since the days of 
the Genoese merchants” (Madden, 2016: 300). 
Therefore: 
“Beyoğlu [a district covering Galata and Pera] was the gateway to ‘civilised’ Europe, 
the quarter of the city, with its cosmopolitan structure, its Parisian cafes and 
ballrooms, through which the European world could be accessed” (Boyar and Fleet, 
2010: 325). 
80% of the population were non-Muslim citizens and Europeans (Shaw, 1979), meaning 
Galata had become the modern face of the city compared to the other regions preserving their 
traditional and Muslim character (Çelik, 1993). Some modern municipal services such as 
street lighting with gas lamps, or public transportation (tram and underground7) were first 
provided in this quarter (for more information on these developments and changing social life, 
                                                 
6 Also called Frengistan (Land of Europeans). 
7 The underground was built in 1875 and was one of the first in the world. 
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see Lewis, 1968; Fleet and Boyar, 2010). Along with the diversity, this interesting spatial 
pattern is the basis of the often-used discourses that Istanbul is the ‘melting pot’ or meeting 
point of Easterners and Westerners (especially by officials).  
As its social and demographic composition, the economic structure of Istanbul and its position 
in the global order were mostly linked with its capital city status. Although there had been 
initial attempts to establish various industries, especially from the second half of the century 
(see Clark, 1974), there is no doubt that Istanbul was not an industrial city (and was not a 
colonial city). In an economy where the state was the biggest purchaser, the main sector that 
kept the city’s economy alive was the trade sector mostly depending on public expenditures. 
Istanbul, not only because it was the biggest city of the Empire (and therefore of the region) 
but also because it was the capital city, was a major centre for domestic and international 
trade. The ports of Istanbul, especially those in Galata, were the busiest ports of the Empire 
and most of the port traffic were imports (Eldem et al., 1999). This is significant for 
understanding Istanbul’s internationalisation because: 
“It attracted foreign merchants from well beyond the empire, from China and India in 
the east to England, and later America, in the west, from Russia to the north and sub-
Saharan Africa to the south. It was the central nexus of the empire from which all 
networks of commercial power radiated outwards, connecting Ottoman merchants and 
traders to the capital. A supremely important port, Istanbul’s prosperity and wealth 
was dependent on the sea and the arrival of ships in its harbours” (Boyar and Fleet, 
2010: 157). 
Addressing its dependence to import products, some accounts (e.g. Wallerstein, 1979) tend to 
situate Istanbul (more broadly the Ottoman Empire) as the periphery within the 19th century 
global economic system, which was defined as an asymmetric integration between core 
regions and colonial regions (commodities from the colonised region and processed goods to 
it; Chakravorty, 2000). This approach provides a useful explanation to some extent, but this is 
not the whole picture. In essence, since the Silk Road established, Istanbul had always had an 
important place in land and maritime commerce between East and West (Francopan, 2015); 
and the 19th-century economic globalisation not only strengthened this position of the city, 
but also diversified its economic activities and economic functions:  
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“During the nineteenth century, its role in transit trade increased in tandem with the 
growth of world commerce; and it acquired a new commanding position in the world 
economy with respect to financing of trade, banks, and insurance. Foreign 
businessmen lived there and organized in chambers of commerce; commodity 
exchanges were established as well as futures markets; regional centers of foreign 
banks were also located there” (Keyder, 1999: 13). 
As highlighted in the quote, Istanbul, as the capital city, was the fountainhead of movements 
of money spreading over a large region in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa 
and was de facto the financial centre in the region. In the city, there had always been a 
financial market, which had been developing through short-term loans that the state needed 
and tax-farming8, and a group of investors who were dealing with those (these investors, who 
mostly consisted of non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, were also known as Galata Bankers; see 
Pamuk, 2004). Moreover, supported by the institutionalisation attempts of the government 
such as the establishment of a central bank and a stock exchange, increasing financial 
integration with the European financial markets had led financial institutions, creditors and 
merchants to invest in Istanbul and had deepened the financial market in the city (Pamuk, 
2004). As will be seen in Chapter 7, this is one of the aspects pointed to by those who 
associate the financial centre role Istanbul today with its imperial history. 
Finally, politically speaking, the Ottoman capital had a different administrative form not only 
from the emerging modern administrations in Europe but also from the other cities in the 
Empire. In the classical system, which underwent significant changes from the second quarter 
of the century, there had been neither modern codified rules regulating local administrations, 
nor local government offices (Çelik, 1993; Ortaylı, 2010). Essential municipal services, such 
as street cleaning or tax collection, had been provided by the millets (that is religious 
communities) themselves under the supervision of local administrations (Ergin, 1936; Çelik, 
1993).9  
This form of government, which was highly decentralised compared to the administrative 
systems in Europe, had been gaining a more centralised characteristic from the periphery to 
                                                 
8 A mode of revenue collection. In the tax-farming system, the right to collect tax revenues was farmed out 
through auction. There were great merchants in Istanbul, especially in Galata, dealing with this business 
(İslamoğlu-İnan, 1994). 
9 In the classical system, the local authority equivalent to the mayor in the modern sense was the Islamic Judges, 
called kadı. Some responsibilities of kadı were to control street widths, building heights, markets and security of 
the city (Çelik, 1993; Ortaylı, 2010). 
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the centre (Eldem et al., 1999). Istanbul was, naturally, the most strictly controlled and the 
most centrally governed city among the other cities. In reality, the Ottoman capital was not 
regarded as a province and/or legal local entity. Unlike the other cities that were governed by 
local governors and had their own budgets, the capital was financed by the central 
government and was governed under the strict supervision of the Grand Vizier (Ortaylı, 
2010). 
The change of this classical system, or more precisely modernisation, was on the one hand a 
consequence of bottom-up demands fuelled by developing and changing socio-economic 
conditions in the city, especially in Galata10 (see Lewis, 1968). On the other hand, and more 
importantly, it was a top-down strategy pursued by the ruling elites seeking to strengthen the 
Empire’s authority and power against European states through reorganising 
(modernising/westernising can be used interchangeably) provincial administrations (Davison, 
1963; İnalcık and Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2006; Ortaylı, 2010). Mostly because of the latter, the 
reforms had a centralised characteristic and the imperial elite had a pragmatic and selective 
attitude towards these western style reforms – both of which were going to be an inheritance 
to later periods.  
The most important part of a long reform process that must be known in terms of the scope of 
this work is that: 
“A new system of provincial and municipal government was now worked out and put 
into effect which, with only minor changes, provided the legal and administrative 
framework of the local and provincial government of the Turkish republic” (Lewis, 
1968: 228). 
Inspired by some European examples, two important laws – the Provincial Law in 1864 and 
the Municipal Law in 1877 – formed the legal basis of the modern provincial and municipal 
administrations in the Empire (Ortaylı, 2010). Interestingly, both laws do not cover Istanbul; 
separate municipal and provincial laws (significantly more centralised) were later enacted for 
Istanbul (Tekeli, 2009a).11 As pointed out in the quotation above, this two-tier administrative 
system was later more centralised and adopted by the Turkish Republic (Ergin, 1936). This 
                                                 
10Thus, it is not a coincidence that the first modern municipality in the Empire was established in Galata in 1858. 
11 In 1908, a provincial organization was established in Istanbul for the first time. However, only in Istanbul, a 
local official directly appointed by the central government served as both mayor and governor (governor-mayor) 
(Ergin,1936; Ortaylı, 2010). This would be applied until the 1960s during the republican period (Ortaylı, 2010). 
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has, further, been the core of Turkey’s current local administrative organisation without being 
the subject of any significant change until recently (Özbudun, 2011). Hence, the centralised 
characteristic of Turkey’s administrative system and the strong intervention of the central 
government in local politics (see Chapter 6) have important links to the reforms in this period. 
3.3 From Imperial Capital to National City  
The date of 1923 is one of the most important landmarks of Turkish history, in particular of 
its political history, this being the birthdate of the new Turkish Republic after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. However, the date of 1923 is a very important place in the story of 
Istanbul as much as it is for the Turkish political history. 1923 was, after all, the starting point 
of a long downturn and rebuilding period for the city. The city which had been the capital for 
more than one thousand years, firstly lost its status as capital city and all other political and 
economic privileges. Since consulates, diplomats, commercial attaches and other foreigners 
like manufacturers, businessmen, and ultimately non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, became a 
minority in the new republic, they started to leave the city and as such it lost its cosmopolitan 
characteristic and its significant status. What the new national period brought forward was a 
period of ignoring Istanbul, followed by reconstruction, and after this, a period of seemingly 
uncontrolled growth that would transform the imperial city into a metropolis of four and half 
million people.  
3.3.1 Neglected City of the Republic (1923-1950) 
As noted above, 1923 symbolised a very important landmark for both the country and the city. 
Following the foundation of the Republic, Turkey entered an overall modernisation period 
which is qualitatively and philosophically different from its antecedent. Unlike the imperial 
modernisation, Republican modernisation, under the single state-party, CHP (Republican 
People’s Party) ruling, sought a total adaptation to Western norms, social life, and institutions 
(Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1993; Kasaba, 2008). In this period, the capital of the collapsed empire 
was the city that the new Republic ignored and then reconstructed. 1923-1950 was, therefore, 
a period in which the city experienced a range of negative political, economic and 
demographic changes. 
There is no doubt that the most dramatic impact of this period on Istanbul was the relocation 
of the capital. This relocation had two important reasons; the first was security, the second 
was symbolic. In relation to the first one, after the First World War, Istanbul and some other 
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Anatolian cities were occupied, and the Turkish War of Independence was commanded from 
Ankara, one of the unoccupied cities. Ankara, therefore, gained a de facto capital city feature 
and right before the foundation of the Republic, it was officially declared as the capital. The 
second was the ideological and symbolic purposes of this relocation. To understand this, it is 
necessary to investigate the internal dynamics of the Republican modernisation thoroughly. 
But before that it is important to recognise how:  
“[I]n most countries outside Western Europe and North America, modernisation was not a 
profound societal experience [but] it was an official program conceived and implemented 
either by colonial governments or by the modernising elites of authoritarian nation-states” 
(Bozdoğan, 2001: 9). 
As a non-western case, Turkey’s modernisation experience could be argued as a state-led 
project. Along with this, it did not emerge as a consequence of, or within, a colonial process. 
The rulers of the new Republic built their modernisation project on the country’s imperial past 
but by othering it. They attempted to build a new modern, laic nation-state through othering 
their imperial background which was symbolised as traditional, cosmopolitan and Islamic (for 
detail see Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Ankara, and Istanbul in the negative sense, had an 
important place in this process. For Republican elites, the making of Ankara, which used to be 
a small Anatolian city, as a modern capital city was going to be the showcase of this state-led 
modernisation (Gül, 2009). Therefore, whereas Ankara was the symbol of a rising new 
modern and secular nation that the new regime sought to build, Istanbul was seen to be 
everything that Republican elites wanted to leave behind – Turkey’s Islamic, cosmopolitan 
and imperial past12: 
“Istanbul [noted the deputy Celâl Nuri] was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, a 
multinational state formed of peoples of various religious and ethnic identities. 
Ankara, on the other hand, will have a different meaning as the capital of a national 
state, a young state still growing up” (quoted in Ahmad, 1993: 93). 
In doing so, however, they followed a well-known administrative path: 
                                                 
12 Istanbul and Ankara thus became two of the symbols of the conflicts between secular and conservative groups 
representing the two main wings of Turkish politics. 
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“While the Kemalist regime tried to overthrow many past institutions, it also followed 
the well-worn path of its Ottoman predecessors and established a heavily centralised 
system of government” (Gül, 2009: 86). 
This allowed the central government to allocate its financial resources in line with its political 
and economic priorities and to control local policies through the governor-mayor appointed 
directly by the prime minister (Keyder, 2008). This had serious negative impacts on Istanbul 
not only in the political sense but also in terms of its economy. In the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Empire, the city had already lost much of its financial power and former significance as 
a centre for international trade. Further, the central government, which prioritised the 
establishment of a national industry based in Ankara, directed most of its investments not in 
Istanbul but in Ankara and its surroundings. It is known that Istanbul received less public 
investment than many Anatolian towns in the early Republican years (Bisel, 2007). Hereby, 
while an economic network and infant bourgeoisie started to rise in the new capital, and 
around, Istanbul lost its position as the major economic centre for the country’s economy, 
even if it was only for a short time (for detailed information, see Keyder, 1987). 
In addition to, and because of, these political and economic upheavals, Istanbul also lost much 
of its population and most importantly its cosmopolitan characteristic in this period. Even 
though there had been a significant migration influx from the lost territories of the Empire, the 
city’s population, which was more than one million in 1897, halved to approximately six 
hundred thousand by 1927 (Tekeli, 2009b). A significant portion of the people who left the 
city were its non-Muslims. Some of them were the foreign businessmen and investors who 
left the city because of the abolition of the economic privileges granted to foreign investors 
and the nationalisation of foreign companies, but the clear majority of the leavers was the 
non-Muslim Ottoman citizens. The result was that the population of Istanbul became 
homogenised. Whereas the non-Muslims were the majority of Istanbul’s population at the end 
of the 19th century, their proportion fell to 35% by 1927, and 16% in 1950 (ibid.). 
This matter must be slightly deepened to understand the current cultural ties between Istanbul 
and the cities which were once ruled by the Empire but today remain outside of the national 
border of Turkey. This demographic homogenisation of Istanbul is often identified as an 
ethnic purification (or Turkification) process by many accounts (e.g. Keyder, 2008). 
However, this process has not an ethnic, but rather a religious character. With the foundation 
of the Republic, Muslim peoples, who remained within the new territorial boundaries of the 
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Republic or migrated from the lost territories of the Empire, such as Bosniaks, Albanians, 
Arabs were regarded as Turk in the new constitutional context. This meant that the city was 
homogenised to some extent by the leaving of non-Muslims, but partially kept its ethnically 
cosmopolitan characteristic. This point which is often missed is important in two aspects. 
First, it allows understanding the cultural diversity in today’s Istanbul. Second, it also allows 
understanding the historical background behind the ongoing cultural links between Istanbul 
and the Muslim people of the Middle East and the Balkans, which is seen to be one of the 
most important dynamics shaping Istanbul’s regional leadership today. 
Returning to Istanbul’s development, despite losing much of its significance and privileges on 
the global and national scale, it was still the biggest city in Turkey and it could not be 
expected that the central government would ignore such an important city for a longer period. 
Following the making of the new capital and the surrounding cities, it was time to reconstruct 
Istanbul (Gül, 2009; Tekeli, 2010; Akpınar, 2014). In the eyes of the central government, as in 
other cases, the reconstruction of Istanbul was part of the modernisation process. However, 
because of the city’s imperial heritance and existing urban structure, this reconstruction had a 
different meaning than for the others. As stated by the mayor Cemil Topuzlu (1937, cited in 
Gül, 2009: 80-81): 
“In my opinion in order to transform Istanbul into a contemporary city, there is no 
solution but total demolition with the exception of Istanbul’s monuments, and gradual 
reconstruction.”  
This reconstruction was mostly shaped by the master plans drawn up by the French planner, 
Henri Prost, who was invited to the city in 1935 (Gül and Lamb, 2004; Bisel, 2007; Akpınar, 
2014).  The main idea of the Prost plans was to build a modern and beautiful city, which also 
coincided with the modernisation ideals of the Republican rulers. Briefly stated, the plans 
proposed the opening of new boulevards, streets and main roads for automobiles and public 
transportation vehicles, and the establishment of new industrial sites, residential and 
entertainment areas (for details see Bisel, 2007). In direction of Prost’s plans, there had been 
significant demolitions especially in the old city centre known as Historical Peninsula. 
Nonetheless, despite the negative effects of these demolitions, it should also be noted that 
there was at least a planned urban development in the Prost era. In the following years, this 
planned development would give way to rapid growth and unplanned urbanisation. 
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3.3.2 The Growing Metropolis (1950-1980) 
The second stage of the national period was between 1950 and the 1980 Coup D’état. This 
period can also be divided into two sub-periods – the 1950s and 1960s-1970s. In the former, 
Istanbul became the subject of significant building activities and demographic changes both 
of which were politically promoted by the central government. Istanbul in this period almost 
retrieved its old importance, becoming the economic centre of the country, although not the 
political. The later sub-period, which began with a military coup in 1960, was the time of 
planned industrialisation and is better known as the period of import-substitution 
industrialisation. This second period, as did the former, also subjected Istanbul to significant 
waves of migration from rural areas that neither the city nor the country was capable of 
managing. Altogether, this stage brought to Istanbul a new urbanisation phenomenon that still 
has serious impacts on the city spatially, socially and politically – gecekondu (see below)13. 
This era started when the Democratic Party (DP)14 came to power after the transition to a 
multi-party system. Contrary to secular/modern and statist RPP, DP has defined itself as 
politically conservative and economically liberal, so this changeover meant also a shift in 
political and economic paradigm. For Istanbul, this shift meant a series of urban operations 
shaped within an ideological approach that was completely different from the previous period. 
To DP rulers, Istanbul was neglected by CHP during the single-party period, and it needed to 
be reconstructed to return to “its glorious past” (Gül, 2009: 133). In parallel with the 
conservative ideology of DP, the rhetorical ground here was the imperial background of the 
city. Prime Minister Menderes in particular forged a symbolic link between his vision for 
Istanbul and the imperial history of the city: “Istanbul’s reconstruction is the story of triumph 
parade. We are, once more, going to conquer Istanbul” (Menderes, 1957, in Akpınar, 2015: 
56). 
Asserting that technical and financial capacity of the local government was not enough to 
undertake such a great scale activity, the central government thought that the redevelopment 
of Istanbul “is not merely the task of the Municipality [but] a part of the great task of the 
state” (Menderes, 1956, in Akpınar, 2015: 56). In other words, Istanbul’s (re)development 
policies were mainly financed by the central government and shaped by the direction of 
                                                 
13 Literally, landed overnight; a structure similar to, yet different from, squatter settlements (see Buğra, 1998). 
14 This period should be given in detail because AKP and DP (and their leaders) are similar in terms of their 
discourses about Istanbul, their political and economic ideologies, and the special importance that they attribute 
to Istanbul. 
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desires and priorities of the central government, even directly by Prime Minister Menderes 
(Gül, 2009; Boysan, 2011; Akpınar, 2015). With full support of the central government and 
personal involvement of Menderes, significant urban operations took place in this period 
which radically changed the spatial and social fabric of the city: 
“The Democrat [DP] government made the city’s redevelopment a top priority, and 
channelled major funds and resources towards this goal. [...] This period saw the 
demolition of thousands of buildings, the expropriation of many properties and the 
construction of gigantic boulevards, both within and outside the Istanbul Peninsula. 
These works largely shaped modern Istanbul what it is today” (Gül, 2009: 140).  
In addition, to move the city’s spatial development beyond its historical core, DP’s urban 
policies significantly influenced the population growth in Istanbul. Here, besides the political 
ideology of DP, their economic perspectives had an important role. As already pointed out 
above, DP pursued a more liberal economic policy in comparison to CHP who were 
characterised as statist. While CHP mostly made capital investments in Ankara and some 
other Anatolian cities, under DP ruling, capital investments were directed to Istanbul. This 
meant that Istanbul became the major economic centre of the country once again. This trend, 
in addition to the top-down political interventions of the central government, triggered a 
labour-migration influx into Istanbul such that in just ten years of DP, the population of the 
city nearly doubled and reached approximately two million.  
This extremely rapid growth, alongside insufficient resources of the city municipality, and the 
ideological approach of the central government brought a new problem: gecekondu. The 
problem was that there had been neither enough housing for the newcomers nor enough space 
within the core areas of the city to build new houses. For the central government, this could 
only be solved by “increasing the amount of land released for new residential areas” (Gül, 
2009: 148). In practice, the problem was solved by the newcomers themselves (but with the 
connivance of the central and local authorities) by constructing gecekondus on the public 
lands which remained in the rural periphery of the city at that time. Gecekondu 
neighbourhoods were to be one of the most important phenomena of the urban development 
of Istanbul during the 1950s.  
The DP period ended with a military coup in 1960. With the coup, Turkey shifted to a 
planned-economy, known as import-substitution. Through the development plans prepared by 
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the newly established State Planning Institute, the central government aimed to achieve a 
state-led industrialisation, rapid economic growth and efficient delivery of welfare services 
that resembled Keynesian welfare models (Eraydın, 2008; Eraydın and Tasan-Kok, 2014). As 
expected, the import-substitution system has significantly increased, developed and 
diversified the industrial production in Istanbul, and by this way, made a trigger effect on 
demographic and spatial growth (for a broader discussion about the impacts of import-
substitution on cities see Jacobs, 1970).  
Yet, because of two important reasons, import-substitution industrialisation has reflected in a 
negative way, rather than positive, to Istanbul's subsequent urban development. First, 
although this period was called as ‘planned industrialisation’, in fact, a national-scale 
effective planning could not be implemented and a large portion of the industrialisation 
investments of Turkey was agglomerated in Istanbul (Türkün et al., 2014). This, inherently, 
caused a serious labour migration from other parts of the country to Istanbul. Second, as in 
many other developing countries, in Turkey too, under the fact of the absence of sufficient 
financial resources to meet the growing need for housing, stemmed from the huge migration 
influxes, the state has generally avoided any direct intervention to the housing sector and 
often condoned, and even legalise, illegal-housing (Baharoğlu, 1996).   
Therefore, this period, just as the previous ten years, resulted in unplanned development and 
rapid population growth. In parallel with the increasing economic activities, about three 
million people migrated to Istanbul between 1960 and 1980. Since there had been no master 
plan covering the metropolitan area of the city, the new industrial areas and the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods around them emerged randomly in the periphery of the city (Tümertekin, 
2010). By the end of the 1970s, approximately three out of four of the city’s population, 
which reached approximately five million, lived in settlements that were illegally constructed. 
These areas have been somehow legalised by the authorities with various amnesties and many 
have attained district status over time (Türkün et al., 2014). Many districts, which today are 
considered the central districts of the city, were formed in that way. This unplanned 
development, which continued in the following years, is one of the important discursive 
foundations of urban transformation policies and central government intervention today (see 
Chapter 6). 
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3.4 Istanbul under Globalisation 
Declining industrial profits in older industrialised countries and crises in the postwar model of 
Fordist-Keynesian policies resulted in these countries shifting towards more market-oriented 
policies. During the 1980s and 1990s, these multidimensional polices – commonly referred to 
as ‘neoliberalism’ – were not only institutionalised in North America and Western Europe but 
also in the non-western world through structural adjustment programs (Chorev, 2018). Turkey 
followed a similar trajectory. Changing from the planned and statist economic strategies of 
the previous period with neoliberal economic policies, Turkey entered a rapid integration 
period in which Istanbul became the centre once again. 
As the economic capital and the biggest city of Turkey, Istanbul has become the gateway of 
Turkey to the globe. Even more importantly, as will be seen in the empirical chapters, in this 
phase of globalisation, the city has begun to regain much of its privileges, importance, and the 
functions, which it used to have in the nineteenth-century global-system. Nevertheless, 
although Istanbul has felt the influence of globalisation since the 1980s, it was still far from 
showing global city characteristics until the early 2000s. In the 2000s, however, Istanbul 
witnessed its rise as a global city. This period can, therefore, be best narrated through dividing 
it into two sections.  
3.4.1 On the Road to Global City (1980-2002) 
Just as 1923 was the beginning of the national period, 1980 was another milestone that 
marked the beginning of the global period. By a neoliberal structural adjustment program 
introduced in January 1980, Turkey shifted from an import-substituting industrialisation 
strategy to a market-oriented economic regime that includes liberalising global trade, 
promoting foreign capital and export-oriented growth (Türkün et al, 2014). From that time, 
Turkey has increasingly incorporated itself into the global economic order, and Istanbul, as 
the major economic centre of the country, has been the city that was most affected by this 
integration (Keyder, 1999; Tekeli, 2010). In other words, from the 1980s, globalisation has 
become one of the drivers that affects Istanbul’s political, economic, and social fabric. 
There are two key reasons why this period is identified as the global period. The first 
isTurkey’s shift to a more globalisation-oriented economy. With economic liberalisation, 
many national companies began to integrate with world markets. As the economic capital of 
the country, Istanbul, in this period, began to function as Turkey’s gateway to the global 
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economy. Moreover, foreign companies seeking to invest in the Middle East and Balkans 
gradually opened branches and regional headquarters in Turkey. Unsurprisingly, Istanbul was 
the primary location for companies investing in Turkey (Tümertekin, 2010). Second is the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and some political conflicts in the region. After the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, Istanbul began to receive increasing immigration from the Bloc 
Countries (most notably from Eastern Europe and Turkic states in Central Asia) with various 
purposes such as tourism, working, education, or trade (Kasaba, 2008). Moreover, the 
political conflicts and civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Iraq triggered different 
immigration influxes to Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular. 
Before discussing how these developments were reflected in the macro vision of Istanbul, it is 
important to briefly consider some of their social and spatial impacts. In parallel to the 
gradual expansion of global companies and increasing number of foreigners coming to the 
city, some changes in Istanbul’s cityscape partly echoed the well-known impacts of 
globalisation: the emergence of new modern offices, shopping centres and five-star hotels and 
so on. On the other hand, the growth of Istanbul in this period was deeply influenced by 
another economic dynamic contradicting the discourse of globalisation. In Istanbul, the 
growth of service sectors did not happen at the expense of industry. Contrary, there had been 
a slight increase in the industrial manufacturing of the city by virtue of newly-established 
organised industrial zones during the 1980s and 1990s (IMMCPD, 2009, see also Chapter 7). 
These two-sided economic and spatial developments have increased the immigration and 
unplanned development of the city, as in the previous period (Öktem, 2011). In the 22 years 
between 1980 and 2002, the population of Istanbul grew at an unprecedented pace with 5.6% 
annual average, which is nearly two times more than that of the world (The World Bank, 
2014). Parallel to the dizzying growth of the population, the gecekondu areas expanded 
towards Istanbul’s periphery. Further, by the various amnesties declared over time, the 
legalisation of the gecekondus continued. Thus, gecekondus have turned into multi-storey 
apartment buildings and its neighbourhoods have become large districts/towns. At the 
threshold of the new millennium, Istanbul was an enormous city with its ten million 
population, and a significant proportion of the population lived in illegally built districts. 
Despite this unplanned and uncontrolled growth, the fact that Istanbul began to regain its 
former global importance in this period promised a very attractive discourse in terms of urban 
vision. Local politicians especially have not missed this opportunity. The goal of Istanbul, or 
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its rulers, was more or less obvious: “Istanbul will be again a world centre for business, trade, 
tourism, sports culture and the arts” (Roberts, 1990: 7). This goal, which has been repeatedly 
expressed by other mayors in the post-1980 period, entered into political parlance as a popular 
campaign promise for the 1994 local elections in which Erdoğan was elected as the 
metropolitan mayor. The 1995 Master Plan prepared after the election clearly stated the goal 
of making Istanbul into a leading world city where industry was going to be replaced with 
sectors such as services, trade, and tourism. In the plan, the economic growth of Turkey and 
Istanbul depended on Istanbul achieving world city status (Öktem, 2011). In retrospect, no 
matter how it is named, the (re)making of Istanbul as a global city has been one of the 
unchanging aspirations of the local rulers since then. 
However, neither economic and political developments that globalised the city during the 
1980s and the 1990s, nor global aspirations of the local authorities, were able to transform 
Istanbul into a truly global city. Of course, there are different internal and external dynamics 
of this, yet two internal factors are especially noteworthy for the content of this thesis. As will 
be better clarified in the next section, the first and foremost is that global integration of 
Turkey has not been fully instituted until the 2000s. The economic crises that Turkey 
experienced every three to four years (between 1980 and 2001) in the neoliberal restructuring 
process also had an important role in this delay (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Yeldan, 2006). The 
second factor to be emphasised here is the reflection of Turkey’s traditional secular-
conservative conflict on the political climate of the 1990s, especially in terms of local and 
central relations (Kuyucu, 2010). 
During the 61 years preceding 1984, there had not been a significant reflection of the conflicts 
between different political parties on the central-local relations, as Istanbul was governed by 
centrally appointed governor-mayors or by military-mayors appointed by the military 
governments within most of this period.15 However, political developments since 1980 have 
changed the nature of this relationship. By a range of decentralisation reforms, from the early 
1980s the planning and administrative powers and budgets of city governments, in particular 
of the metropolitan municipalities established in 1983, have been gradually increased 
(Bayırbağ, 2013). Through these reforms, the local government of Istanbul emerged for the 
first time in the history of the Republic as a political figure and power, so to speak. 
                                                 
15Although the mayor of Istanbul has been decided by elections since 1958, this process has often been 
interrupted by military interventions. Therefore, between 1923 and 1984, it was no more than 8 years that 
Istanbul and Turkey were governed by different political parties. 
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Ideological differences, or vice versa, ideological matches, between central governments and 
metropolitan municipalities have gained more importance since then. 
Yet, as the reforms did not mean a real decentralisation in practice, the direction of this 
relationship was particularly important for the local governments. As will also be seen in the 
following pages, in Turkey, any amendment that increased local governments’ power was 
generally followed by different amendments that reinforced the central government’s hand in 
local politics (Eraydın and Tasan-Kok, 2014; cf. Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Harrison, 
2008; Jonas, 2013). Therefore, while the differences might cause tensions, often to the 
detriment of local governments, the vice-versa enhanced the policy-making capacities of local 
governments. For example, Bedrettin Dalan, the first elected metropolitan mayor of Istanbul 
after the coup, could undertake many mega-projects that exceeded his authority and budget 
owing to the political and financial support of the central government which was in the same 
party as the metropolitan municipality. In stark contrast, it is known that his successor, from 
the opposition party, had problems with the central government on some projects (Tasan-Kok, 
2004). A critical milestone in this regard was the 1994 local elections, because: 
“In 1994, when Istanbul’s first metropolitan mayor with ‘Islamic’ credentials came to 
power in the aftermath of an astounding electoral victory, a sense of radical change 
swept across nearly all strata of the city’s population. Within the circles of the 
victorious Refah Party [RP (Welfare Party)], this was a prophetic event, referred to as 
the ‘second conquest’ of Istanbul, 500 years after victorious Ottoman armies entered 
Constantinople in the sixteenth century” (Öncü, 2007: 246).  
The victory of the RP and Erdoğan and their second conquest discourse were met with 
negative reactions from secular groups, particularly central bureaucracy and military, 
triggered by the paranoia of an “Islamic takeover” (Öncü, 2007: 247). During most of 
Erdoğan’s 4.5-year term in office, Istanbul’s local government and the central government 
were in the hands of different political parties. During this period, there were serious 
problems between Erdoğan and the central government (and local bureaucrats appointed by 
the central government, e.g. the city governor), many of which also appeared in the press 
(Milliyet, 1998). The most noteworthy among these was the cancellation of the 1995 Master 
Plan by the Council of State for lack of jurisdiction (Mimdap, 2006). Even though the Welfare 
Party came to power as the coalition partner in the last year of Erdoğan’s period of office, 
they were forced to resign by the military in 1997 (the so-called Post-modern Coup). Erdoğan 
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was arrested one year after the post-modern coup and was subsequently banned from 
politics.16 
However, everything changed at the turn of the new millennium. The newly-founded AKP 
under the leadership of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, after the 2001 financial crisis which 
was the worst economic crisis Turkey had ever faced. This was to launch a new period in 
which Turkey and Istanbul were to undergo significant changes at the hands of AKP central 
and local governments. 
3.4.2 Rising Istanbul as a Global City (2002- to the Present) 
As many have said, in the 2000s, Istanbul has begun to rise again in the global order and this 
new experience has been like a regained victory for the city that experienced a great 
breakdown at the beginning of the 20th century (Walker and Taylor, 2000; Sarkis, 2009; 
Keyder, 2010; Logie and Morvan, 2014). The sociospatial (Chapter 5), political-economic 
developments (Chapters 6 and 7) that Istanbul has experienced in this period will be discussed 
in detail in the empirical chapters through the statistical indicators and the information 
gathered from the interviews. For this reason, this part, somewhat differently from the 
previous ones, concentrates on the dynamics behind the global rise of Istanbul, most notably 
the political dynamics. Considering the contents of the empirical chapters, the section is 
structured around three axes as follows: (i) from conflict to the alliance; (ii) 
institutionalisation of global integration (or neoliberalism); and (iii) decentralisation-
recentralisation. 
As the previous section has discussed, to become a global/world has been a desirable goal of 
the local governments of Istanbul since the 1990s. After the landslide victory of the AKP in 
2002, when the former mayor Erdoğan became prime minister, this goal has gained a more 
national characteristic. To make Istanbul a leading global city and a financial centre has 
become a national strategy which is framed by the central government with reference to 2023, 
the centenary of the Turkish Republic. This was stated later by Erdoğan (2009: n.p.) himself 
as follows:   
“I served as mayor in Istanbul for 4.5 years and I had a goal, an ambition in those days 
to turn Istanbul into a financial capital. Of course, because it was different politics 
ruling in the central government we couldn’t do it then. But now, we are in power in 
                                                 
16 His political ban was lifted in 2002 by the parliament. 
 54 
 
the central government, and also in Istanbul local government. We considered the pros 
and cons and decided to take prompt action to make Istanbul the financial centre.”  
Moreover, it is undoubtedly claimed that since both the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
and Turkey’s central government are in AKP control the political conflicts experienced in the 
previous period have given way to a strong alliance since 2002 (Keyder, 2008; Aksoy, 2010; 
Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Yetiskul et al., 2016). The central government has seriously 
supported Istanbul’s global city projects in this period in many various respects. As Chapter 6 
will discuss in detail, many mega projects (e.g. the Third Airport) and large-scale urban 
transformation projects that exceed the financial capabilities of the local government have 
been undertaken by the central government. Another example, in the direction of the aim of 
making Istanbul a global financial centre, which was mentioned above by Erdoğan, the 
Istanbul International Financial Centre (IFC) Project, was also put into effect by the central 
government. Nonetheless, arguably the most important contribution of the central government 
in this process was to lift all barriers to the global integration of Turkey and Istanbul: 
“AKP was fully committed to neo-liberal policies, implying that they assessed the role 
that could be played by the city in the perspective of attracting business and 
investment. This meant that the developments of the 1990s which had been tentative, 
and in some cases not fully above-board, could now be institutionalised. With the new 
legislation following the massive economic crisis of 2001, Ankara had to agree to a 
series of reforms which made the integration of the economy into global networks of 
capital flows more stable” (Keyder, 2010: 180). 
As the quote implies, the global integration process that started in the 1980s became a full 
integration with the policies implemented since the 2000s. During the early years of their rule, 
AKP enacted a series of legal and administrative reforms providing the legal frameworks for 
the country’s integration into the global economy (Kayasu and Yetiskul, 2014). In many 
ways, these reforms were consistent with the policies that the neoliberal paradigm proposes: 
lifting barriers for foreign investments; a hard privatisation; withdrawal of the state from 
many public services; flexibility for financial markets, and so on. In this way, the central 
government paved the way for the expansion of global capitalism in Turkey (the impacts of 
these policies on Istanbul will be discussed in Chapter 6).  
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Moreover, the central government has done something else that has deeply affected Istanbul 
in this period. This involves directing foreign capital, especially real-estate and construction 
capital, into the city (see below) with various legal amendments (e.g. urban regeneration 
laws). The strong capacity of the central government for directing global capital into urban 
space lies in Turkey’s centralised administrative tradition, which is skilfully used by the AKP 
to achieve their goal of positioning Istanbul in global circuits of capital and finance. This 
centralised tradition that allows the direct intervention of the central government in local 
policies also sheds light onto the exceptional neoliberalism experience of Turkey:   
“While many of the post-2002 laws are broadly consistent with what might be termed 
‘neoliberal’ reforms (such as increased financialization and marketization, and a focus 
on competition and entrepreneurship), it’s crucial to recognize that the state, and the 
central government in particular, has not been sidelined by these processes.” (Angell 
et al., 2014: 650) 
As widely accepted in the literature, what best characterises the AKP’s urban policies is an 
intensive entrepreneurialism which is generally implemented in a top-down way by the 
central government (e.g. Aksoy, 2012; Penpecioğlu and Tasan-Kok, 2016; Kuyucu; 2018). As 
a matter of fact, this can be read as a dual process in which decentralisation and 
recentralisation policies are implemented together (cf. Harrison, 2008). Namely, AKP, in their 
early years, have pursued a strong decentralisation policy and enacted various laws that 
strengthened the administrative and financial autonomy of the local governments. These laws 
gave the local governments power to prepare master plans, to privatise public lands by 
seeking profit, to declare and carry out urban transformation projects.  
On the other hand, they have simultaneously developed new state apparatuses that enable the 
proactive involvement of central government in urban policy-making (Akilli and Akilli, 2014; 
Kuyucu, 2018). Among these, especially the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization 
(MOEU), established in 2011, and Mass Housing Administration (TOKI), redesigned during 
the AKP period, are drawn to the attention as the most important central institutions having a 
role in urban policies in this era. Both will be frequently mentioned in the empirical sections 
of this thesis. This strong centralisation, along with the comfortability of controlling both the 
central and Istanbul’s local government, gave AKP a flexibility to execute the integration and 
entrepreneurial policies and enable the central government to intervene in local policies 
without confronting any tensions. As Chapter 6 will discuss, this flexibility especially 
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appeared in the projects exceeding the administrative or financial power of the Metropolitan 
Government, such as mega-projects and large-scale urban transformation projects.  
Especially TOKI has played a key role in this era. TOKI, founded in 1984 to meet the 
growing need for social housing in Turkey, has almost remained inactive until the early 
2000s. However, with the AKP coming to the power, TOKI’s financial abilities and fields of 
operation have been increased through various legal amendments, and it has transformed into 
being a super-powered institution in issues concerning urban planning and construction 
(Balaban, 2012). As such, TOKI has played a vital role in expropriation and building 
activities in urban transformation and renewal projects, and in particular in gecekondu areas 
(Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). Furthermore, it has been given the authority to build and sell 
profit-oriented real-estate projects and entering into the partnerships with the private sector 
(public-private partnerships). Under the direct supervision of the prime ministry, since the 
early 2000s, TOKI “has turned into one of the biggest property developers in the country” 
(Balaban, 2012: 28). In this way, many public lands and the districts emerging as gecekondu 
areas, both of which remained outside the capitalist circuit up to the 2000s, have rapidly 
become sites of capital accumulation. This process, which is carried out with the cooperation 
of capital groups (national and global) and the central and local state agencies, is one of the 
essential dynamics to understand the global development of Istanbul in the current period. 
3.5 Discussion: Framing Istanbul as an In-between Global City 
“Istanbul is a global city whose identity is strongly influenced by its geographic 
position. Historically it has been an ‘in-between’ city (between Europe and Asia, the 
Golden Horn and Bosphorus, the Marmara and Black Sea, Muslim and Catholic, 
Ancient and Modern), but today Istanbul’s position is beyond just geographic and 
encompasses economic, political, social and cultural spheres of global influence” 
(Boano et al., 2010: 12). 
Thus far, the chapter has concentrated on various political, economic, social and demographic 
developments of Istanbul (and Turkey) from imperial to global periods. This section discusses 
how this story of Istanbul can be conceptualised and whether this conceptualisation can 
provide an understanding of global developments in cities which have similar patterns to 
Istanbul. As will be recalled, the conclusion part of Chapter 2 discussed that ongoing calls for 
new urban theories or concepts might strengthen the polemical pluralism in global urban 
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studies. It therefore proposed to stress-test and improve existing theories. However, this does 
not mean to insist on a theory or theories that cannot adequately explain a city. That is, when 
stress-testing existing theories, it is also necessary to see whether a different conceptualisation 
can work better. Hence, the following discussion should be read as a pre-conceptualisation 
and a groundwork for the final discussion of the thesis which will be made in Chapter 8. 
This conceptualisation can be named as ‘in-between’, as the above quote emphasises. The 
term of in-between is originally coined by Sieverts (2003, he uses ‘Zwischenstadt’) to explain 
the hybrid characteristics of suburbanisation and metropolitan areas that are neither urban or 
suburban (see also Young and Keil, 2010; Addie, 2016). However, here, this term is used as a 
metaphor resonating most especially with the historical and geographical characteristics of 
Istanbul. A crucial question here is whether this term can be used to categorise some other 
cities. To answer this question, it is necessary to underline two points discussed in the 
previous section. First, theoretical arguments of the approaches discussed in the previous 
section are based on the experiences of cities in certain geographical contexts. Second, cities 
categorised within similar typologies, at the same time, follow similar historical trajectories. 
Based on these two assumptions, it can be hypothesised that cities such as Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Vienna, Budapest can be categorised within this concept. That is to say, these 
cities can be called ‘in-between’ global cities. 
Table 3.1 shows how in-between cities present different characteristics than existing city 
typologies that have been discussed in Chapter 2. First of all, in-between cities are located in a 
different geographical context than the existing categories. Whereas classical global cities are 
mostly agglomerations in the global North, especially in North America and Western Europe 
(or postcolonial cities in the global South; and developmental cities and city-states in East 
Asia), in-between cities are located in between Europe and Asia. More precisely, these cities 
sit in the intersections between Europe and Central Asia; such as Vienna and Budapest 
(between Eastern Europe and Western Europe), or Istanbul, St. Petersburg, and Moscow 
between Eastern Europe and Central Asia (or broadly Eurasia).  
Table 3.1 City Typologies 
 Identifiers  
Classical Global 
Cities 
Developmental Cities 
and City-States 
Postcolonial 
Cities 
In-between Cities 
Key Cities 
New York, 
London, Paris 
Tokyo, Seoul, 
Singapore 
Mumbai, 
Johannesburg, 
São Paulo 
Istanbul, St. Petersburg, 
Moscow, Budapest, 
Vienna 
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Location Global North East Asia Global South 
Between Central Europe 
and Central Asia 
(Eurasia) 
Historical 
Pattern 
Two Stages 
(Industrial - 
Postindustrial) 
Three Stages* 
(Colonial, National 
and Global) 
Three Stages 
(Colonial, 
National and 
Global) 
Three Stages (Imperial, 
National and Global) 
Motivation  
Become ever 
more influential 
Catch-up the West 
Catch-up the 
West 
Regain position/status 
Centre-
Local 
Relations 
Mixture 
Highly-centralised 
and bureaucratic  
Mixture 
Highly-centralised and 
political  
Functions 
in the 
Global 
Order 
Command and 
Control  
Command and 
Control for National 
Economy 
Country’s 
Gateway to the 
World 
Regional Command and 
Control 
Region’s gateway to the 
world and vice-versa 
Secondly, as the third row presents, in-between cities have followed a different historical 
trajectory. Unlike two-stages periodisation of classical global cities and three-stages 
periodisation of postcolonial cities and many developmental cities, in-between cities could be 
periodised as three-stages: imperial-national-global. In retrospect, the concept that best 
describes the status of these cities a hundred years ago is undoubtedly the imperial city (such 
a conceptualisation involving Istanbul, Vienna and St. Petersburg; see Öner, 2014). At the 
turn of the 20th century, just like Istanbul, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Budapest or Moscow were 
still the capital cities or among the biggest cities of the multi-national and multi-religious 
empires (respectively the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia). 
Table 3.2 Population of Istanbul by Years 
Years Population Years  Population 
1897 1.1 million 2000 10.0 million 
1914 0.9 million 2008 12.7 million 
1927 0.7million 2010 13.3 million 
1945 1.1 million 2012 13.9 million 
1950 1.2 million 2014 14.4 million 
1960 1.9 million 2015 14.7 million 
1970 3.0 million 2016 14.8 million 
1980 4.7 million 2017 15.0 million 
(Sources: Karpat, 1978; Tekeli, 2009b; nüfusu.com; 2018) 
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The collapse of these empires after the First World War caused a significant decline for these 
cities in many aspects. With the transition from the imperial to the national period, these cities 
lost many of the privileges as imperial cities, most important of which were their imperial 
linkages (political, social or economic). For example, as discussed throughout this chapter, 
between the years 1897 and 1927, Istanbul has lost almost half of its population, a 
considerable part of this its non-Muslim residents (Table 3.2). The following years, especially 
the post-1980 period, the city has received massive migration influxes and reached to 1.1 
million in 1950, 4.7 million in 1980, 10 million in 2000 and exceeded 15 million in 2017. 
Vienna has followed a similar pattern to Istanbul with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. While it was one of the biggest cities in Europe with its over 2 million inhabitants 
before the War, by the 1940s, Vienna's population had fallen to about 1.5 million. In other 
words, Vienna, after the First World War, “was no longer the hub of a Great Power [but] had 
become the capital of the Republic of Austria, a small country of about 6,000,000 inhabitants” 
(Hatz, 2008: 311). Some of these cities have also experienced more significant political 
changes than others. For example, while St Petersburg, as the capital of the Russian Empire, 
was one of the major political and industrial centres in Europe (Golubchikov, 2010), similar 
to Istanbul’s experience, it lost its capital city status to Moscow after the collapse of the 
Empire. 
However, with globalisation, these cities have begun to re-live the experiences that they lived 
in imperial periods but in different ways and have begun to regain their old prominence in the 
global order. It also marks a symbolic refraction in the historical patterns of these cities, 
because they often associate their global city status with their imperial histories, not their 
national periods. For example:  
“Once the capital of a multinational empire, and the crossroads of Europe before 
WWI, [...] Vienna made successive attempts to reclaim global status” (Rethinking 
Global Cities: Vienna, 2015: n.p.). 
And: 
“For some two millennia, Istanbul (in its various guises) has been one of the great 
cities of the world. It has owed its success to its location on the Bosphorus where it has 
been a cultural and economic cross-roads both between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean and between Europe and Asia. For some two centuries, Istanbul has 
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been in relative decline as world political changes have not been conducive to 
cosmopolitan centres in traditional empires. [...] With the coming of globalization, 
new transnational processes abound in which cities can exploit opportunities beyond 
their own state’s boundaries. In short, the time is ripe to reassess Istanbul as a bridge 
between East and West” (Walker and Taylor, 2000: para.1). 
The symbolic link established between the imperial period and the global period (or imperial 
city and global city) makes it necessary to evaluate the global aspirations of these cities in a 
different way. For example, for many non-western cities, ‘catch-up to the West’ is considered 
one of the important motivations that legitimise global city policies (see the fourth row). 
However, this approach is far from providing an adequate interpretation for in-between cities. 
Instead, this motivation could be made with a new term. For example, as the above quotes 
suggest, this could be identified as ‘regain’. 
As seen in the fifth row, the central-local relations in the countries hosting in-between cities 
could be identified as highly centralised, especially compared with North America and 
Western Europe. They are more like the East Asian context in which countries traditionally 
have centralised forms of governments.17 The centralised administrative tradition of Turkey 
has already been discussed in this chapter. Similarly, in Russia (Clark and Moonen, 2017; 
Kinossian, 2017), Hungary (Kovács and Grünhut, 2016) or more broadly in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Schmitt and Well, 2016) the central governments are in a strong position vis-
a-vis their local governments. For example, an interesting comparative study (Akçalı and 
Korkut, 2015) reveals the strong similarities between Hungary and Turkey in central 
governments’ involvement in local politics and the methods of legitimising these 
interventions.  
Finally, as in Istanbul, the functions and the positions of the other cities which could be 
framed as in-between are influenced by their intersection/gateway positions. The previous 
chapter has argued that whereas core global cities sitting on the top of the global urban 
hierarchy mostly function as the command and control points of the global economic system, 
global cities in the global South are generally the gateways of their countries; and 
developmental cities like Seoul or Tokyo undertake the role of command and control points 
for the international operations of their national companies (Hill and Kim, 2000). However, 
                                                 
17 Since there has not been a comparative study involving all these cities, it is difficult to predict which category 
is more centralistic. Nevertheless, they could be separated as bureaucratically-centralized (East Asian) and 
politically-centralized (In-between).  
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cities like Istanbul, Budapest or Vienna mostly function as gateways for both their countries 
and the countries around them based on their control capabilities (for detailed information 
about the gateway functions of these cities, see Taylor et al., 2002; ESPON, 2013; for Vienna 
see also Musil, 2009; for Istanbul see OECD, 2008; also Chapters 5 and 7 in this thesis). 
They could, therefore, be seen as regional command and control points in the global economy 
and could be ranked as secondary or emerging global cities. For example, in a current 
analysis, Moscow, Vienna, and Istanbul are ranked in similar positions amongst the global 
cities of the world; respectively 18th, 20th and 25th (A.T. Kearney, 2017). According to the 
report, these three cities are ranked right below the top global cities and above all cities from 
the global South. Likewise, in the world cities index published by the Globalization and 
World Cities (GaWC) research network, these three cities are ranked in the third 
categorization below Alpha++ and Alpha+ and classified as Alpha World Cities (GaWC, 
2017).  
To conclude, when considering the geographical and historical contexts of Istanbul, the city 
can be framed as an in-between city; in-between east and west, or in-between imperial and 
global, and maybe in more dimensions. Istanbul has different patterns than many other cities 
conceptualised in the literature, but at the same time, as revealed in the above paragraphs, 
there are also some other cities which follow similar trajectories. These cities demonstrate 
similar characteristics to Istanbul in terms of politics, economics, and their functions and 
positions in the global cities order and might be framed as in-between cities. Hence, although 
this section has been basically framed to conceptualise Istanbul as an in-between city so as to 
provide a theoretical framework for the empirical chapters, this concept of in-between might 
be further developed to serve as a theoretical basis of future studies involving these cities.  
3.6 Concluding Comments 
To provide a theoretical understanding of global city formation in an exceptional geographical 
and historical context, this chapter has outlined the historical trajectory of Istanbul and has 
examined the story of the city in three different periods as imperial, national and global. In 
each period, Istanbul has been the centre of developments that are different but closely related 
to each other or which are the continuation of each other. All these developments are crucial 
for understanding the political and economic characteristics of Istanbul today and its position 
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in the national and global urban order, and further why Istanbul can be conceptualised as an 
in-between city. 
Firstly, through an examination of social, economic and political patterns of Istanbul as an 
imperial capital, this chapter has demonstrated that Istanbul has followed a different pathway 
than the cities in the western and the non-western contexts. One of the most important aspects 
of this pathway is the traditional centralised administrative structure of Turkey, almost never 
changed, which has been inherited from the imperial period. This is vital for understanding 
the nature of city-state relations and central government’s involvement in local politics that 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. Furthermore, discussing its imperial period has also been 
important for understanding the continuities between imperial Istanbul, which ruled a wide 
territory from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, and global Istanbul, which is regarded as 
one of the leading cities in the same hinterland (see also Harris, 2009). 
Secondly, the chapter has also argued that the shift from the empire to the nation-state 
signalled a dramatic decline for Istanbul, in which the city lost not only its capital city status 
but also its economic powers and privileges as well as its cosmopolitan social structure. 
Therefore, unlike the other cities argued in the literature whose historical trajectories show a 
continuity like industrial/post-industrial or colonial/postcolonial, there is a significant 
diffraction in the story of Istanbul. This will shed light on two important issues which will be 
discussed in the empirical chapters, especially Chapter 7. The first is that officials link the 
global city formation of Istanbul to its imperial legacy and define their goals mostly through 
the city’s imperial past. The second, global aspirations of Istanbul and the root of its 
motivations to be a global city, should be defined as retrieving or regaining, unlike other non-
western contexts whose motivations are mostly described as catch-up the west. 
Thirdly and finally, as emphasised throughout this chapter, Istanbul is a global city whose 
identity is mostly influenced by the historical transitions between imperial and global and its 
distinctive geographical position between east and west. It could, therefore, be thought of as 
an in-between city – being ranked between top global cities and the global cities of the global 
South might be associated with this in-between notion (see previous section). Furthermore, 
the discussion above demonstrated that Istanbul is not a unique example in this regard. Cities 
like Vienna, St. Petersburg, Moscow or Budapest have similar historical and geographical 
patterns to Istanbul and there are some common political, economic and symbolic features 
between these cases and Istanbul. These common features will be briefly presented in the 
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empirical sections, but what can be said already is that the in-between concept can be 
expanded to include these cities in future research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The main interest of the thesis is the global city development of Istanbul and the historical, 
geographical and political dynamics behind this development. In this respect, and especially 
considering the focus is on the ‘making of’ Istanbul, the research adopted a qualitative 
approach whose main component was semi-structured interviews. With this design, a range of 
people such as central and local government officials, business groups, environmental and 
urban activists was interviewed. In the research, secondary data consisting of mainly official 
statistics and governmental publications were also employed to support the analysis. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (4.2) gives a brief overview of 
methodologic tendencies of existing approaches for doing global cities research, and touches 
upon current methodological perspectives for researching Istanbul. Section 4.3 explains the 
research design and clarifies the alignment between research objectives and methodology. 
Section 4.4 summarises the data collection procedures in two separate subsections as semi-
structured interviews, and secondary data use. Section 4.5 explains how the data gathered in 
the field were processed and analysed. The chapter then goes on to discuss positionality and 
ethical considerations (4.6) and ends with a brief concluding section (4.7).  
4.2 Doing Global Cities Research 
In the introduction to his edited book Researching the City, Kevin Ward (2014) states that 
there is no right way of researching cities. Instead the selection of methods is driven by what 
you want to learn about cities. Adding to that, it could also be said that researching cities is 
also depending on the context in which the city is assessed. Different geographical, political 
and/or historical patterns of cities lead the researchers to assess these cities in different 
contexts, which then form different approaches in the literature. In that sense, all four major 
approaches introduced in Chapter 2 employ various specific research methods depending on 
the nature of the knowledge that they aim to extract. 
Global and world cities researchers apply both quantitative and qualitative methods. In the 
case of world cities research, quantitative methods are often preferred as they provide a 
reliable dataset for comparing (e.g. ranking, classifying) cities on a global scale and for 
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understanding how they relate to each other (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Lüthi et al., 2018). 
Qualitative research methods are, however, applied to produce “practice-based findings on 
different intercity attributes and relationalities [and to understand] the dynamics of the world 
city network, from below” (Watson and Beaverstock, 2014: 421). The case-study approach is 
another method that global/world city researchers apply as it provides a strong local 
perspective. Researchers typically use case-studies to position specific city/cities and to 
highlight their divergent/convergent dynamics (e.g. Chubarov and Brooker, 2013; Parnreiter 
et al., 2013; Zademach and Musil, 2014), or to stress-test the central theses of the 
global/world city concept (e.g. Kleibert, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017). 
In the state rescaling approach, researchers are generally interested in geo-political-economic 
dynamics behind global city formation and therefore qualitative methods such as interviews 
with policy-makers (Li et al., 2014) or interest groups (Keating and Wilson, 2014) are much 
more in demand vis-a-vis quantitative methods. On the other hand, a more favourable and 
preferred method in this perspective is the analysis of policies and literature analysis. Such 
approaches are adopted as they are suitable to trace the neoliberal evolution of urban policies 
and/or local (city) – central (state) relations (Horak, 2013; Mackinnon, 2013; Armondi, 2017).  
In the post-colonial approach, unlike the western context, there is a general tendency towards 
the comparative and ethnographic methods (Robinson, 2011, 2016; Roy, 2016b). This is 
primarily because of the efforts to put the divergent historical, political, cultural dynamics of 
global South cities onto the agenda of global urban studies. As for the developmental 
approach, because the developmental scholars are generally interested in the political 
dynamics of global city formation, qualitative interviewing with stakeholders is a frequently 
used research method, as well as document analysis. For example, Saito (2011) interviewed 
local and national officials in Japan to examine how the developmental state structure creates 
a significant characteristic of urban politics, and Bae (2013) explored decentralisation in 
South Korea through interviewing elites.  
Regarding Istanbul, it has been discussed in the previous section that there is now a growing 
literature exploring its development in globalisation. One side of the literature consists of 
case-studies (Lelandais, 2014; Akcan, 2015) and occasionally comparative studies (Akçalı 
and Korkut, 2015), both of which are mostly based on archival research and/or secondary data 
such as policy documents and state-statistics. Moreover, albeit limited in number, scholars 
have been increasingly adopting semi-structured interviews. Interviewing is generally 
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preferred by the researchers who focus on more specific issues such as urban regeneration in a 
particular district of Istanbul (Unalan, 2010; Yetişkul et al., 2016), or public protests and 
resistance against urban policies and/or mega-projects (Abbas and Yiğit, 2015). However, 
there has not yet been a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the recent urban development 
of Istanbul through interviews with various central and local groups. In other words, this 
research contributes to the literature not only by extending the existing knowledge about 
Istanbul’s global city formation but also by means of its research methodology. 
4.3 Research Design 
This research was designed as a qualitative case study whose main data source is semi-
structured interviews. Overall, the objectives of this research are as follows: (i) to provide a 
critical conceptual insight into Istanbul’s development under globalisation; (ii) to examine the 
role distribution (and relationship) between global city-makers (in particular the central and 
local institutions) in the making of Istanbul as a global city; and finally, (iii) to situate the 
global city formation of Istanbul within the context of major global urban approaches. To 
fulfil these objectives, various research procedures were followed. The primary data consisted 
of 32 semi-structured interviews which were collected in two separate periods of fieldwork. 
Different kinds of secondary sources were also collected to support the primary data, 
strengthen the argument, and position Istanbul in comparison with other cases. The collected 
data were then transcribed, coded and interpreted.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates how these primary and secondary data are organised to achieve the 
overall aim of the research. Column 1 presents the research objectives and Column 2 
demonstrates the data types used to achieve these objectives. Column 3 gives a detailed 
breakdown of the question numbers (see Appendix 1) and the secondary sources. The column 
also shows how these sources were framed to answer a particular research objective. Finally, 
Column 4 clarifies which codes (Appendix 2) are used to answer which research questions. 
Figure 4.1 Alignment between Research Objectives and Methodology 
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4.4 Data collection 
The main data source for this thesis are semi-structured interviews. A total of 32 semi-
structured interviews were collected in two separate periods of fieldwork. The first fieldwork 
period was conducted from December 2015 to January 2016, and the second from December 
2016 to January 2017. 22 out of the 32 total interviews were completed in the first period, 
with the other 10 interviews conducted during the second period. The average length of 
interviews conducted in the first fieldwork was 60 minutes. This means 22 hours of audio data 
were collected during the first fieldwork period. In the second period, the average was 77 
minutes which corresponded to 12.8 hours of audio data. In total, approximately 35 hours of 
audio material were generated. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, some secondary 
sources were also employed in the research. Secondary data, most of which are based on a 
variety of statistical data, were principally used to support the information obtained from 
interviews. Further, some government publications have also been used to evidence the 
arguments proposed by the thesis. The following sections provide detailed information of the 
procedures being followed in the collection of both data types. 
4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviews, as per their dictionary meaning, are conversations between two or more people, 
one of which is usually asking questions to the other. Talking with people, that is 
interviewing, is one of the most popular research methods among urban researchers who 
explore the practices which make cities, and who seek to understand how theories mirror 
practice in the field (Cochrane, 2014). Interviews, in this sense, can be thought of as an 
interaction, a verbal interchange between interviewers seeking to reach the information and 
interviewee/s who are eligible to provide information on a specific topic (Longhurst, 2016). 
Such an interaction for example could be between a researcher who has theoretical knowledge 
and assumptions, and a representative of the city elite who has a good knowledge of how the 
city is planned, shaped, governed by different actors who also interact with each other, as in 
this research.  
Nevertheless, as a research methodology, an interview means more than daily conversations, 
and could be considered as “an excellent way of gathering information [but] in ways that are 
self-conscious, orderly and partially structured” (Longhurst, 2010: 103). What makes 
interviews more than a list of questions or everyday conversations is that they are purposively 
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designed by the researcher seeking to extract information about the research topic from 
experiences, beliefs, goals, expectations, etc. of individuals. Interviews, or approaches of 
interviewing, are varied depending on what researchers seeks to learn from people and/or how 
to elicit information, from more structured ones to more open-ended approaches (Cochrane, 
2014). There are three types of interviews in social research: structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured (Dunn, 2010). Depending on the focus of the research, purposes of the 
researcher, people who are interviewed, and the context in which the research is conducted, 
one or more of these interview types may be employed.  
For many reasons, semi-structured interviews are more in demand than other interview 
techniques among social science researchers (Cochrane, 2014). For example, semi-structured 
interviews “allow for an open response in the participants’ own words rather than a ‘yes or 
no’ type answer” (Longhurst, 2016: 145). This means that they allow “interviewees to 
construct their own accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in 
their own words” (Valentine, 2005: 111). In that sense, a semi-structured interview “offers the 
chance for the researcher and interviewee to have a far more wide-ranging discussion than a 
questionnaire would allow” (ibid.). Since people’s backgrounds (professional, educational, 
cultural, religious etc.) and personal experiences influence their points of views, approaches 
and terminologies that they use in such conversations might also broaden the researcher’s 
perspective on the research topic. Additionally, semi-structured interviews ease the 
information interchange and enable the researcher to get more knowledge in a particular 
interview time through creating a flexible, easy flow conversation environment in which both 
interviewer and interviewee feel more comfortable. In short, as Longhurst (2010: 106) 
reminds us: 
“[S]emi-structured interviews and focus groups are more than just ‘chats’. The 
researcher needs to formulate questions, select and recruit participants, choose a 
location and transcribe data while at the same time remaining cognizant of the ethical 
issues and power relations involved in qualitative research.” 
4.4.1.1 Interview Structure 
Interviews principally consisted of 4 major parts and 42 open-ended questions (36 questions, 
6 sub-questions). The first part of the interview (Questions 1-9) focused on Istanbul’s city 
development before and under globalisation. The second part (Questions 10-19) examined 
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Istanbul’s position within Turkey and more implicitly local-central relationship in the Turkish 
administrative tradition. In this part, the 15th question consisted of six sub-questions, directly 
asking participants about their opinions on a paragraph which was quoted from a speech of 
Erdoğan in 2009 about the making of Istanbul as a global financial centre (see p.51). The third 
part (Questions 20-27) examined the position of Istanbul in the global urban system and 
concerned issues such as city-competition, regional leadership, advantages and disadvantages 
of Istanbul. Finally, the last part (Questions 28-36) concentrated on the recent projects (e.g. 
urban transformation, mega-projects), including their impacts, participation and decision-
making processes. This part ended with a couple of closing questions asking interviewees 
about their expectations and suggestions for Istanbul’s future development. 
Even though the questions were identified before the fieldwork began, considering 
participants’ backgrounds and professions, some alternative questions were also formulated 
during the research. NGOs and activists, for example, were asked more detailed questions 
about environmental and social issues, democratic participation, or decision making on 
projects.  Likewise, some questions, or the order of questions, in some interviews were also 
revised. These revisions were sometimes done by the researcher before the interview, but they 
generally happened in response to the conversation. This is because the participants were very 
keen to talk about the issues that they had more knowledge and/or that they saw as being more 
important.  
Just a few interviewees stated that the questions, especially the questions in the first part, were 
too long and broad. Some of the interviewees also stated that they were not able to answer 
questions, because the content of the questions is not relevant for their profession. When 
faced with such a situation the researcher changed the questions as they were relevant to the 
participant’s profession. Moreover, to get more knowledge from the participant in relation to 
his/her experience, in some cases the researcher asked some questions with an extra emphasis 
or added new questions. In one interview, for example, the interviewee who had transferred 
from a central government department to a construction company was asked to explain the 
relations between central government and the business world, how his background as an 
official influenced this relation in his own experience, and differences on decision-making 
between central government and the private sector. 
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4.4.1.2 Selection and Recruitment of Interviewees 
To get a consistent and robust research output, one of the vital parts of semi-structured 
interviewing is selecting and recruiting people. As Longhurst (2016) states, unlike 
quantitative studies which generally choose a random sample, qualitative studies choose 
purposive samples, namely people are selected depending on their relevance to the aims of the 
research. Briefly stated, whereas one goal of sampling strategy is to identify the potential 
participants by taking the main interests of the research into consideration, the second 
essential goal is to cover a representative sample of all different variants of the research topic 
as far as possible. In this research, since the specific aim of the researcher was to examine the 
process of making of Istanbul as a global city, the first goal was to interview with 
stakeholders having a role in Istanbul's urban development in the recent period. The second 
aim was to identify a participant pool that enables the different views to be equally 
represented, that is, to involve all possible stakeholder groups into the data collection process. 
With these purposes in mind, three core participant groups were identified before the 
fieldwork: (i) central government; (ii) local government; and (iii) other stakeholders (e.g. 
NGOs, political parties, individuals).   
Another critical aspect of selecting interviewees is that they should be able to provide rich 
data on (aspects of) the research topic. Potential participants should be selected with regard to 
their knowledge on the questions the researcher will ask (Morris, 2015). Relevant to this 
issue, two important factors were considered by the researcher in the interviewee selection 
process: (i) some questions examined the relationship between central and local governments 
when the city and the state were governed by different political parties. However, both the 
city and the state have been governed by the same political party, AKP, since 2002, (ii) some 
questions were related to the period in which Tayyip Erdoğan was the mayor which was 
between 1994 and 1998. Therefore, it was targeted to select potential local and central 
officials from among mostly executive people who have been working for many years and 
were able to compare the pre-AKP era with the AKP period. 
Considering the research questions and the factors explained above, 36 potential interviewees 
were identified before the first fieldwork. In the selection of potential interviewees importance 
was given to four different groups. The 36 interviews were distributed as 18 – officials, 9 – 
local and 9 – central, and 18 – other stakeholders, including NGOs, business groups, and 
individuals. The local officials were selected from among those who are working in the 
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relevant departments of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Istanbul Development 
Agency (IDA), both of which are the key local actors shaping urban policies of Istanbul. As 
for central government, in a similar vein, the institutions were selected in consideration of 
their roles and significances in forming urban policies, plans, and strategies. Among these, 
TOKI and the MEU were given a particular importance, as both of them play key roles in the 
recent urban development of Istanbul. Additionally, some potential interviewees from the 
central government have been identified considering their responsibilities for the major 
projects in Istanbul (such as the IFC project).  .  
The second group of stakeholders was divided into two principal groups in order to get a more 
objective and robust research output; private sector agents and the representatives of the civil 
society, especially opposition groups such as urban resistance, environmental organisations, 
labour unions, opposition parties. The potential interviewees in these groups were generally 
identified by a detailed research of published documents (academic articles, newspapers, 
reports etc.) and of internet research (forums, social media, online articles and newspapers). 
Here, in order to be sure that they have adequate knowledge to provide satisfactory answers to 
the interview questions, their backgrounds were searched, and priority was given to those who 
have active and intensive participation to the processes not only in Istanbul but throughout the 
country. Finally, a number of individual interviewees (activists, policy advisors, planning 
experts, and academics) were also identified with a similar method to that applied in the 
selection of NGOs. 
The second step was to contact the potential participants. As often stated in the literature, 
there are different ways of recruiting individuals as interviewees, which depends on context, 
time and place of the research, identity of the researcher, and local values where the field 
research is conducted (Morris, 2015). In this research, first, an invitation letter, which was 
written to the name of each potential interviewee, was sent by email before the fieldwork. The 
content of each letter was composed of a brief introduction about the research, such as title 
and main objectives, and the researcher, and an explanation of why the potential interviewee 
was regarded as the ideal participant for an interview, possible meeting time options, expected 
length of the conversation and finally a request to forward the email to relevant colleagues if 
they are not available to meet. Each email also included two attachments: (i) the researcher’s 
CV and (ii) a detailed overview of the project. 
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Private sector agents and individuals generally responded earlier than other groups. They were 
mostly recruited through the invitation emails. Whereas professionals generally had a positive 
attitude, some individuals politely refused to talk by saying that they were not available for a 
meeting. In such cases, the researcher recruited new interviewees. Here, it is worth pointing 
out that selection and recruitment of participants is a cultural process that is influenced by 
both researchers’ and participants’ identities, as well as content and context of the research 
(Morris, 2015). For example, in this research, despite the positive responses from the private 
sector and individuals, there was no response from either central or local officials.  
In such circumstances to find one or more gatekeepers who are able to remove the barriers is 
vital to be able to commence with the research (ibid.). Since the researcher lives in the city, he 
was able to find a gatekeeper, working for the Metropolitan Municipality, through his 
personal contacts. With telephone calls, the gatekeeper scheduled meetings with 6 out of 9 
officials who had previously been asked to be interviewed. Two top-level departments, 
including the mayor’s office, responded that they were not able to meet because of their heavy 
schedule, and one other department stated that the scope of the interview was not relevant to 
their department.  
As with local government, many of the central government officials too were persuaded 
through another gatekeeper, who is working in one of the biggest media holdings and has 
strong personal networks. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between the 
recruitment of local and central officials, which also influenced the success rate. Both because 
institutions’ websites were not updated and because labour turnover in those institutions was 
high, it was difficult to access correct information of who is working in the relevant 
department. Early requests therefore were sent to people who were no longer working in those 
departments. In these cases, as stated above, new interviewees who are working in targeted 
institutions and departments were replaced thanks to the gatekeepers.  
In addition to interview invitation emails and gatekeepers, snowballing was another strategy 
to recruit interviewees. A small number of interviewees were identified this way as some 
interviewees advised the researcher to talk with specific individuals who have a good 
knowledge of the issue and provided the researcher with contact details. Further to this, one of 
them arranged meetings for the researcher with two central government executive officials 
who were not in the initial list. It is worth noting that snowballing and gatekeeping worked 
most efficiently in accessing NGOs. Since these groups, especially urban resistance and 
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solidarity groups, are relatively small and informal organisations most of whose members are 
activists, freelance journalists, students rather than professionals, even though invitation mails 
were sent, there was generally no response or negative responses from them. As already seen 
in Table 4.1, the researcher thus did not have enough interview with these stakeholders, but in 
the second fieldwork period a gatekeeper, a very well-known activist who the researcher did 
not know personally before, accepted both being interviewed and providing some contacts. 
Two of the biggest environmental groups in Turkey who refused to be interviewed during the 
first fieldwork period thus accepted my invitation to participate in the second period.   
The numbers demonstrate that at the end of two different fieldwork periods, the researcher 
was able to conduct 32 interviews out of 60 requests, which is a success rate of 55%. In 
relation to numbers and breakdown of interviews, in the first fieldwork period a total of 43 
requests were sent, 22 of which turned into actual interviews. In the second fieldwork period, 
10 more interviews, mostly environmental and urban resistance organisations, were conducted 
as a response to 17 requests. As seen in Table 4.1, whereas many of the participants in the 
first fieldwork period were the central and local officials and private sector representatives, in 
the second one, it was concentrated on environmental and urban NGOs, activists, and political 
actors. 
 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Interviews by Groups 
 
Interview Numbers→ 
Participants by Groups ↓ 
First 
Fieldwork 
Second 
Fieldwork 
Total 
Central Government 6 1 7 
Local Government  8 0 8 
Individual (e.g. policy advisors, planning experts, 
academics) 
3 2 5 
Private Sector, Trade Associations 4 1 5 
NGOs (e.g. environment groups, urban solidarity groups) 1 6 7 
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4.4.1.3 Conducting the Fieldwork 
The interview data were collected in two periods of fieldwork. Although there were 
differences between the interviewee groups, there were some common procedures followed in 
both. The participants were verbally informed about the content of the interview, their right to 
stop or withdraw from the interview at any time, and anonymity and confidentiality. The 
verbal information was also supported with the informed consent form and participant 
information sheets. Since some of the participants did not speak or read English, the consent 
form and information sheet were prepared in both English and Turkish. The researcher then 
asked participants to sign the informed consent form if they confirmed to be part of this 
research. Before interviews began, the researcher also obtained consent that the conversation 
will be recorded. Interviews were only recorded after the permission which was orally granted 
by the interviewee. There was no negative response to that request.  
After the pre-conversation procedures, interviews began with a few warm-up questions. 
Conversations generally proceeded in the direction of the order of the interview questions. In 
some interviews, a more flexible order was followed depending on the course of the 
conversation. This enabled participants to lead the conversation, but under the control of the 
researcher, and created a more informal atmosphere that eased the knowledge interaction. 
Another important issue which may influence that interaction was the location in which 
interviews were conducted. Most of the interviews were conducted in participants’ offices 
where they felt most comfortable. Nevertheless, location and time of the interviews were also 
shared with a third person to ensure the researcher’s safety. During the interviews, there was 
no major issue experienced. As expected, some young interviewees had difficulty in 
answering the questions about Erdoğan's words (Question-15, see section 4.4.1.1), but in such 
cases, these questions were supported with follow-up questions. 
Despite these commonalities, since the main groups who were interviewed in each fieldwork 
period were different from each other, location, conversation atmosphere and recruitment 
strategies also demonstrated some differences. Those differences were also an opportunity 
which gave the researcher experience of conducting interviews in different cases, because the 
researcher thus could clearly compare how interviewing officials, or the private sector is 
different from interviewing activists or NGOs. In addition to what has been mentioned above, 
some personal experiences, and political circumstances in which the country found itself were 
other factors which influenced the course of research. 
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In the first period of fieldwork, whereas some individuals and private sector representatives 
gave positive responses to the invitation emails, there was no response from the officials – 
either positive or negative. Therefore, only 5-6 interviews were undertaken within the first 
week. Then, the local officials who were emailed before were reached through a gatekeeper 
and meetings were scheduled by the gatekeeper over the phone and interviews progressed at a 
steady rate over the remainder of the fieldwork. 
In addition to interview numbers, arranging interviews through gatekeepers and personal 
connections had also an obvious impact on the course of the conversations. Under normal 
circumstances, officials are expected not to be so willing to answer political and critical 
questions such as those examining the role of the central government, or local-central 
relations. However, in this research, possibly because the meetings were arranged through one 
of their colleagues (and a person who is well-known by them), the official participants did not 
hesitate to answer those kinds of questions even though they stated that the questions were 
highly political. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that reaching officials through 
gatekeepers also gave the researcher the flexibility of setting interview schedules rather than 
leaving the initiative to the interviewees. The researcher, thanks to gatekeepers, was able to 
manage the schedule in such a way that meetings at the same location were arranged on the 
same days. 
 
Political circumstances, such as refugee inflows triggered by the Syrian conflict and terrorist 
attacks, also influenced the schedule, interview numbers, and content of the conversations. 
Social and political problems stemmed from refugee inflows were unsurprisingly mentioned 
by many interviewees, notably the local officials. Furthermore, on 12 January 2016, there was 
a terrorist attack in the historical district of the city, the Historic Peninsula wherein the 
Metropolitan Municipality is located. Surprisingly, there was no direct cancellation because of 
the attack, but two interviews were re-scheduled. Finally, the interview schedule was also 
affected by personal circumstances. Since a relative of the researcher died during the 
fieldwork two arranged meetings were cancelled and could not be conducted later, as the 
participant did not respond to subsequent emails. 
The political circumstances, state of emergency and terrorist attacks were the main 
determinants of the second research period. Despite the state of emergency, the researcher 
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could have conducted more research, but two terrorist attacks, on 10th and 31st December 
2016, affected interview schedules in a negative way. 4 meetings arranged with two local 
politicians, a party representative, and a trade union representative were cancelled by the 
participants because of the attacks. On the other hand, it should be stated that neither the 
attacks nor the state of emergency had an impact on participants’ willingness to talk. 
Conversely, they were very keen to talk about their experiences and to discuss issues. This is 
the reason for the difference of the average length between interviews conducted in the first 
fieldwork period and those conducted in the second. As slightly different from the first 
research period, interviews in the second research period were rather like informal friendly 
conversations or an exchange of views.  
4.4.2 Secondary Data Usage  
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, various kind of secondary data sources were 
also utilised. Principally, these sources were employed to support the primary data and to 
strengthen the argument. The secondary data comprise of official policy documents and 
reports, national and international statistics, and various international city indexes. In terms of 
time-period, since the primary empirical concern of the research is Istanbul's urban 
development under AKP governments all the secondary data used in the research covers the 
years after 2002, when AKP came to the power. As detailed below, in relation to the which 
secondary resources to be selected and how to be used, the key factor is the context, content, 
and scope of the empirical chapters (see also Figure 4.1 above). 
In Chapter 5, various national official statistics provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute 
(e.g. GDP, GDP per capita, population data) were used to support the analysis of the 
economic, demographic and spatial development of Istanbul under globalisation. Moreover, in 
this chapter, official statistics demonstrating shares of the major Turkish cities within national 
GDP were used to provide a clear understanding of the contribution of Istanbul to the national 
economy. Similar international indexes have been used to move this comparison to the global 
scale and to provide a comparative insight into Istanbul’s position within the international 
context. To trace the political evolution and roles of the central and local state agencies on 
Istanbul’s global development in Chapter 6, national development plans, Istanbul’s master 
and strategic plans, institutional reports and official foreign direct investment statistics were 
employed. In Chapter 7, national and international indicators were used to provide 
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comparative data on sectoral breakdown and air-transport which are used to stress-test some 
central assumptions of the global city thesis.  
4.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis consisted of four main processes that partly intertwine with each other: 
transcription, coding, interpreting, and triangulation.  
4.5.1 Transcription 
The first, and possibly the most time-consuming and labour-intensive, stage in data analysis is 
to transcribe the recorded interviews (Dunn, 2010). There is no established standard of how 
the data should be transcribed, however, many researchers suggest that interviews should be 
transcribed as soon as possible after the conversations (e.g. Dunn, 2010; Flick, 2014) in order 
not to forget the nuances in the conversations, such as sarcasms, gesture and facial 
expressions of participants. In this research, the aim was to transcribe interviews immediately 
afterwards, but interviews were mostly transcribed after the end of each field-trip because a 
very busy-schedule during both periods of fieldwork meant there was not enough time to 
transcribe.  
When the researcher returned to Loughborough after each trip, 32 interviews which were fully 
recorded were transcribed and turned into text-based data ready for coding and interpreting. In 
total, the transcription process took approximately four months. In terms of word numbers, 
the shortest interview was 4323 words, while the longest was 11 298 words, and the average 
was 7320 words. That is, at the end of the transcription stage 234 265 words of text-based 
data were produced, ready to be coded and analysed.  
Transcription is considered as a part of data analysis (Flick, 2014) because it gives the 
researcher initial ideas about coding and interpretation processes, thus enabling him/her to 
interact and be familiar with the data and it may raise new questions for the research. During 
the transcription process many sentences seen as important and interesting were highlighted, 
institutions, strategies, names, and similar, were noted and therefore initial topics – themes 
began to emerge. As will be seen below, these initial themes provided the basis of the coding 
framework 
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4.5.2 Coding 
The second essential step in the data analysis process is coding. In qualitative research, coding 
enables researchers to organise and reduce their raw data, to explore the facts and beliefs 
hidden behind the words and common characteristics within many separate texts, and to build 
a theory over the sentences (Cope and Kurtz, 2016). Unfortunately, there is not one way to 
code which could be step-by-step followed by all researchers. That is, coding, like 
interviewing, is a process which may change according to the researcher and purpose and/or 
quality of research (Flick, 2014). Nevertheless, some scholars like Strauss (1987) try to 
develop techniques to standardise the coding process. Strauss, for example, recommends a 
three-stage process for coding, consisting of respectively open-coding, axial coding, and 
selective coding. Coding, from this perspective, is a process which begins with descriptive 
codes, identifying general patterns and categories, and then continues with more analytic 
codes, which are more intensive and in-depth and include various sub-codes, however these 
codes often overlap in practice (Cope and Kurtz, 2016).  
Selecting the coding method also depends on how the researcher analyses his/her data; whilst 
the researchers preferring content analysis generate codes often based on the theory that they 
apply, the researchers who adopt a grounded theory approach might prefer coding which 
emerges directly from the data (for more detail see Flick, 2014).  As the researcher adopted a 
thematic approach to interpret his data, the coding was done in a way similar to what Strauss 
called open and axial coding. That is, the researcher built descriptive codes and sub-codes 
through consulting research questions to construct a number of general codes, reading all 
documents with a critical eye and identifying some concepts and categories for common facts, 
beliefs and patterns.  
No matter which coding method is applied, researchers might form a “qualitative codebook, a 
table that contains a list of predetermined codes that researchers use for coding data” 
(Creswell, 2014: 199). Such a codebook is useful for researchers because it makes coding 
more systematic and eases multiple-coding. In the researcher’s case too, a coding framework 
which consists of both predetermined and in-process built codes and sub-codes was provided 
(Appendix-2). The predetermined codes, and sub-codes, were developed during, and right 
after, the transcription process through reviewing field notes, transcription notes and also 
revisiting research questions. In this way, an initial framework, includes 12 codes and 80 sub-
codes, was established. While 5 codes (6-Geography, 7-Govern/Governance, 11-Relationship 
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between Local and Central Governments, 13-Stakeholders’ Integration, 15-
Strategies/Goals/Policies) and 50 sub-codes emerged from research questions, the rest of the 
pre-determined codes/sub-codes were generated during the fieldwork. In addition, as coding is 
a dynamic and text-based process, new codes and sub-codes appeared during the data analysis 
period, and so 2 codes and 30 sub-codes were added to the coding framework. In total, the 
data were coded into 15 codes and 110 sub-codes. 
Finally, coding in this research was done using coding software - NVivo - although there are 
some reservations in the literature on qualitative data analysis (QDA) software usage (Flick, 
2014). Using the software program was a tool which made coding more systematic and easier, 
and significantly reduced the time to complete coding. Over and above these practical 
benefits, software coding was adopted by the researcher because it strengthens transparency, 
validity and ultimately the quality of the research (Flick, 2014).  
4.5.3 Interpreting  
Although coding and transcribing are essential parts of data analysis, it is not the ultimate 
stage of data analysis. This is because codes only help researcher to organise, and be familiar 
with, the data. Codes themselves do not answer research questions (Cope and Kurtz, 2016). 
However: 
“Working with qualitative data is mainly about interpreting and getting a good 
understanding of the words, stories, accounts and explanations of our research 
respondents” (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 373). 
Like coding, data interpretation is a process too, which depends on what researchers seek to 
learn from the data and the methods researchers applied to analyse their data.  As briefly 
mentioned above, thematic analysis is an inductive method in comparison to more deductive 
content analysis (Ezzy, 2002). Indeed, there is no agreed way of how themes are constructed. 
Yet it is often suggested in the literature that themes could be built before, during and after 
data collection through which researchers read all material case by case – interviews in this 
case – compare individual cases to see differences and similarities on specific topics and then 
group around these specific topics (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Cope and Kurtz, 2016). That is, 
instead of only a theory-based interpretation, themes can be generated based on the research 
questions and/or built from data by bringing together a range of codes addressing similar 
issues. In this research both methods were applied. 
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Once some themes were built, it was also important to revisit the research questions and to re-
interpret the findings. This is because, building themes based on only codes may sometimes 
be misleading or time-wasting, because, for example, even if they are interesting or seem 
important within texts, they may not be essential to addressing the research aim and questions. 
To consider research questions throughout the theme building process enables the researcher 
to keep the process under his/her control. On the other hand, this is also a bilateral interaction: 
considering research questions helps the researcher to engage with his/her own data, themes 
too may provide new connections between questions, may provide new ideas about them, and 
perhaps may lead the researcher to refine or change them. In other words, this interaction 
between research questions and themes is crucial in framing empirical chapters. 
Although theme building is an essential part of data interpretation, interpreting data is more 
than building or identifying themes (Bazeley, 2009). Interpretation data is indeed a process 
which turns case-based data to topic-based. Interpretation is to compare individual statements 
on specific issues, to explore the dynamics behind these statements, to categorise actors and to 
argue the interaction between actors (ibid.). In this research, for example, there are different 
groups of stakeholders from central government to opponent NGOs who were interviewed. 
All these different stakeholders were using different terminologies, were approaching similar 
issues from different perspectives and had different points of view on similar facts. 
Consequently, interpreting in this research was identifying the rationales behind the individual 
statements and reviewing the data by thinking about the questions of who said what and why.   
4.5.4 Triangulation 
One of the essential issues in qualitative studies is to ensure validity and reliability of 
research. In comparison to quantitative studies, qualitative studies are more open to the 
interaction between research, data and the researcher, so qualitative research contains an 
increased risk that researchers might be affected by the research (and vice versa). To ensure 
validity and reliability of their research, qualitative researchers might apply some extra 
procedures such as triangulation:  
“Triangulation allows scholars to document consistency in findings using different 
means of obtaining those findings, increasing our confidence that the findings are not 
driven by a particular method or data source” (Gibson, 2017: 203). 
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To strengthen the validity and reliability of qualitative research through triangulation can be 
done in different ways or in different stages of the research. According to Winchester and 
Rofe (2010), there are four different types of triangulation: multiple sources, multiple 
methods, multiple investigators and multiple themes. In this research, triangulation was 
adopted in three different stages: in the selection and recruitment of interviewees, during 
coding and data analysis, and in code selection and the design of empirical sections. In 
selection and recruitment of potential participants, to provide a balance between different 
stakeholders, the aim was to give equal importance to each group of stakeholders (e.g. 
national and local) and to have equal numbers of interviews with each group. This was not 
always possible but in analysing and presenting the empirical material attempts were made to 
remain conscious about which groups are more or less represented in the interview data. 
Moreover, in coding and interpreting the data, the codes were reviewed various times and the 
researcher approached individual statements with a critical eye, rather than accepting these as 
‘truths’. Finally, the criteria of quote selection were not only driven by how interesting or 
relevant to the research questions they were, but effort was made to identity which 
interviewee the quote came from and what their position within the debate is. Wherever 
possible equal importance in quote selection was given to each group and the empirical 
chapters were designed to give equal place to different views, which is essential for producing 
objective knowledge. Alongside this, wherever possible checks were made to validate claims 
made in the interviews (e.g. through secondary data, or by looking at other interviews). 
4.6 Positionality and Ethical Considerations 
As Bourke (2014: 2-3) reminds us, “qualitative research seeks to provide an understanding of 
a problem through the experiences of individuals, and the particular details of their lived 
experience.” Therefore, qualitative methods always contain the danger that the identity of the 
researcher may affect the course of the research (Smith, 2016). In such research, to be aware 
of positionality, reflexivity and power relations is vitally important for achieving the goal of 
the research: 
“It is crucial in any research that we consider our positionality and what that might 
mean in relation to the ways in which we do our research, and how the people we 
work with perceive us. By positionality I mean things like our ‘race’ and gender as 
discussed above, but also our class experiences, our levels of education, our sexuality, 
our age, our ableness whether we are a parent or not. All these have a bearing upon 
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who we are how our identities are formed and how we do our research” (Skelton, 
2001: 89). 
It is essential that any researcher who applies qualitative methods in his/her research should 
ask questions of who he/she is and how this affects the interactions between the researcher 
and the people who are talked to and/observed himself/herself before beginning fieldwork 
(Smith, 2016). Any answer given to those questions also defines where the researcher stands 
in relation to the participants; whether inside or outside. Whilst being an insider may help the 
researcher with easy access to the research and participants they could lead the interview to be 
conducted more informally, whereas an outsider could gain some advantages – particularly 
interviews with business groups, professionals, environmental NGOs – if they are seen to be 
more formal.   
Yet, on many occasions, or in research practice in another saying, the boundaries between 
insider and outsider status are not so clear, but rather, they are often blurred and switchable. 
The researcher, if aware, can use both insider and outsider identities, and even switch from 
one to another, so that he/she extracts more information from the interviews. In this study, the 
researcher, coming from a British university, could be regarded as an outsider to the context 
in which he conducts the field-research; on the other hand, as a Turkish person living in 
Istanbul for over thirty years, he could be regarded as an insider. This positionality was 
further strengthened by the fact that he had a good knowledge of different political groups, 
jargons, and discourses and had strong personal contacts from a wide range of political, social 
and academic groups. The researcher was, therefore, able to take advantages of both being an 
outsider and insider.  
As was partially mentioned above, the most positive contribution of being an insider to this 
research was on the recruitment of the interviewees. Most of the official interviews were 
arranged through the researcher's personal contacts. Thanks to this, despite the fact that the 
fieldworks were conducted at a time when security issues were prioritised because of terrorist 
attacks and a failed coup , he was able to easily persuade the officials to talk about highly 
critical issues and to arrange the meetings without encountering bureaucratic procedures such 
as official permissions and security investigations. Similarly, personal contacts helped the 
researcher to be readily accepted by opposition groups. In spite of being under the state of 
emergency, since the researcher reached to them through persons whom they knew well they 
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agreed to talk with confidence. That means that the researcher was not regarded as an outsider 
coming from a different country, but actually an insider whom they might trust. 
However, sometimes the outsider status of the researcher as an unfamiliar individual who is 
seeking information affected knowledge interaction in a positive way. For example, one thing 
observed during the interviews conducted with individual activists or environmental groups 
was that interviewees were taking pleasure in explaining issues they think very important to a 
person who comes from another country. Finally, the researcher’s institution, Loughborough 
University, and the GaWC research network influenced the course of research in a positive 
way, which helped the researcher not only in meeting arrangements but also balancing power-
relations in interviews with executive officials and business people. Many interviewees, in 
particular officials, have knowledge about the world cities index published by GaWC, they 
approached the researcher in a very positive way, some of them even asked questions such as 
what is GaWC, how do they classify cities and publish indexes, and so on. This raised the 
profile of the researcher and gave him a more prestigious position in the eyes of those 
interviewees.  
In terms of research ethics, social science projects, including human geography projects, are 
subject to ethical considerations as their research involves human participants. Outcomes of 
social science research may cause different impacts on individuals, or societies. Researchers, 
therefore, should think about ethical issues which are relevant to their research. In addition to 
essential moral issues, there are several practical reasons why it is important to consider 
ethical issues: (i) to do research without harming individuals and/or communities which may 
be affected by the research; (ii) to protect the researcher and the institution against any legal 
action; and (iii) to ensure the trustability of research within both society and research 
communities (Hay, 2016). 
Ethical approval for this research was ensured by the researcher’s institution, whereby the 
research was planned with the guidance of ethical practices guidelines and approved by 
Loughborough University Ethics Advisory Committee. Ethical issues were strictly considered 
by the researcher in every part of both periods of data collection and analysis. The 
“Participants Information Sheets”, both English and Turkish versions, were provided before 
interviews and the participants were informed, both in writing and verbally, about the contents 
of the research and interviews, their rights to withdraw from the interview without providing 
reasons, contact details of the Loughborough University Ethical Approval Committee for 
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complaints if they were not happy. Participants were asked prior to the interview taking place 
to fill out an “Informed Consent Form” (Appendix-3), to confirm they understood the content 
and purpose of the interview and that they accepted to take part. 
Aside from the issues explained above, it is also essential to inform participants that their 
identities would be concealed by the researcher, and that confidentiality, anonymity and data 
protection would be strictly regarded throughout the research and later (Longhurst, 2016). In 
this sense, it was stated by the researcher and ensured through the signing of informed consent 
forms that records of the interviews would only be listened to by the researcher, and that all 
data gathered, including transcripts, would be secured and protected from third parties’ 
access. Participants were also assured that their names would not appear in any part of the 
thesis itself and in future papers based on this thesis, and that quotes would be used 
anonymously. To this end, all names of interviewees have been replaced by an affiliated 
name, with a full list of these to be found in Appendix 4. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodological approach adopted in this thesis and demonstrated 
how, and why, semi-structured interviews, as a qualitative research method, were employed to 
obtain the main body of empirical data, which the following chapters are based on. As has 
been identified above, the methods adopted address the research aims which are: to situate 
global city formation of Istanbul in current global urban literatures; to examine the roles of the 
central and local governments in developing Istanbul as a global city; to assess the 
relationship between Istanbul, as the city, and Turkey, as the country.  
The rationale behind interviewing different stakeholders was that interviews with individuals 
who have a role in shaping urban policies can illumine various issues such as current 
developments and problems, decision-making practices, relations between stakeholders, and 
so on. In other words, individual statements, after an interpreting and analysis process, can 
enable the researcher to develop his own arguments on why, and how Istanbul followed a 
different trajectory from the other cases argued in the existing literature; how central 
government, to a larger extent, and local government, to a lesser extent, shape urban policies, 
particularly those which are relevant to mega-projects and urban transformation; how the 
relationship between central and local governments can be assessed. 
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Aside from explaining why semi-structured interviews were employed as the main 
methodological component in this research, the chapter also shed light on how interviewees 
were recruited, and how interviews were conducted, in two different fieldwork periods. 
Unexpected developments such as terrorist attacks and political instability emerged from the 
failed coup and the declaration of the state of emergency, which had partly affected the course 
of the fieldwork, and cultural issues such as language selection, adopting gateway methods in 
both recruitment and conversations were also explained.  
The chapter then continued with the data analysis process and explained in detail how the 
gathered data was transcribed, coded and analysed. The strategies such as open-coding, theme 
building and the reasons of why these strategies were adopted were argued in these sections. 
Finally, the issues how the researcher positioned himself, and how he conducted an ethical 
research were explained. In terms of positionality, the researcher, both an inhabitant of the 
city and a postgraduate researcher from abroad, embodied two different identities, insider and 
outsider, however the course of the research demonstrated that these identities could be 
blurred in different interview contexts and could also be drawn on strategically. The ethical 
considerations section demonstrated that as the researcher was aware of the necessity of 
conducting an ethically approved research to protect himself, his institution and the 
individuals interviewed, he considered ethical issues from beginning to end and designed his 
research under the guidelines of the ethical clearance checklist approved by his institution’s 
ethical committee.    
The subsequent chapters answer the research questions based on the data whose collection 
and analysis procedures have been explained in this chapter. Chapter 5 provides a conceptual 
understanding of the global development of Istanbul and discusses how this development is 
different from - and similar to - theses of the existing approaches. Chapter 6 identifies the 
distribution of roles between local and central agencies as global city makers and argues the 
relationship between different actors on this global city-making, with a particular focus on the 
central and local governments. Finally, Chapter 7 assesses the global development of Istanbul 
through the lenses of the four existing approaches in global urban studies. Apart from 
explaining Istanbul, this chapter also acts as a stress-test for fundamental assumptions of these 
approaches. 
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CHAPTER 5 
An In-Between City Under Globalisation: Positioning Istanbul’s Development within 
National and International Urban Systems 
 
“It is a city like no other and yet it is a city that has things in common with many other 
cities, even if it does not always recognise it” (Sudjic, 2009: 4). 
5.1 Introduction: An In-between City Under Globalisation  
This chapter explores how the urban development of Istanbul under globalisation might be 
conceptualised and positioned within national and international urban systems. The primary 
interest behind such an exploration is the notion that the globalisation experience of Istanbul 
might be different to that of other cities identified as global, postcolonial, or something else 
(without ignoring similarities). As discussed in Chapter 2, besides being a planetary-scale 
phenomenon which all cities have been operating in to some degrees for decades, 
globalisation is also a local experience in which each city has been following its own 
trajectory. Owing to its distinctive geographical, historical and political patterns, Istanbul is 
one of the cities where this local characteristic is the most visible. 
Through the analyses of interviews and secondary data, this chapter identifies Istanbul’s own 
pathway as an in-between city and links the city’s experiences to the broader debates outlined 
in Chapter 2. To do this, the chapter is structured as three sections, excluding introduction and 
conclusion. Section 5.2 offers a critical appraisal of three major aspects of globalisation in 
Istanbul: economic, social and environmental. Then Section 5.3 discusses the relationship 
between Istanbul and the nation-state of Turkey and its relation to other cities in the country. 
A key question that will be asked in this section is if and how globalisation has changed these 
relations. The chapter finally moves its focus from the national to the global and, in Section 
5.4, discusses the economic position and functions of Istanbul in the international urban 
system. 
5.2 Janus in Istanbul: Economy versus City  
It is widely accepted that Istanbul has been subject to the economic, social and spatial impacts 
of globalisation since the 1980s (Keyder, 2008). As from the 2000s, these impacts have begun 
to be felt more intensely with the proactive involvement of Turkey’s central, and Istanbul’s 
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local, governments to the global integration process (Aksoy, 2010; Islam, 2010; Kizildere and 
Chiodelli, 2018). How globalisation influences Istanbul can be described with the two-faced 
Janus metaphor. One face of globalisation offers Istanbul substantial and rapid economic 
growth and an opportunity to reclaim its global position, lost over a hundred years ago, which 
is one of the important motivations that fuel global aspirations in Istanbul. The other face, 
however, irreversibly changes the social and environmental fabric of the city: 
“With globalisation, Istanbul has begun to regain its power, in the global sense, that it 
had in Ottoman and Byzantine [times], and foreign investments have increased. Global 
investments have brought more industrialisation, and this too has triggered 
immigration and has led to a huge pressure on Istanbul to grow. In this sense, this 
pressure has shown itself through a development that has totally changed the 
traditional settlement fabric and has led to serious urbanisation in the east, west and 
north of the city. This is, of course, totally my own view. I would say, this is also a 
process that leads to serious deterioration of the features [historical and cultural that 
make Istanbul is Istanbul” (MHA#3). 
Colic-Peisker (2014: 446) argues that “hyper-competitive capitalist globalisation inevitably 
creates winners and losers”. Given the economic performance it has shown as of the 2000s, 
Istanbul is one of the biggest winners of this competitive globalisation (GaWC, 2000; 201718; 
Parilla et al., 2015; A.T. Kearney, 2017). In this regard, it was no surprise that many business 
people and officials see globalisation as an opportunity for economic growth, new markets or 
attracting capital and that they have quite optimistic views about the economic impacts of 
globalisation on Istanbul (e.g. MOD#1, ISPAT#1, BSR#2, BSR#4, BSR#5). As Figure 5.1 
demonstrate, Istanbul has caught a significant economic growth trend between 2004 and 
2014, with an annual average of 25.9%. In this period, the GDP of Istanbul grew from 170 
million TL in 2004 to 622 million TL in 2014 (Figure 5.1). In 2015, the city’s economy was 
bigger than that of many European countries such as Austria, Denmark or Greece with its 
$450 billion GDP (Trujillo and Parilla, 2016). 
Figure 5.1 Economic Growth and Sectoral Distribution in Istanbul 
                                                 
18 Calculated based on the ranking changes of cities on the lists of ‘the World According to GaWC 2000’ and 
‘the World According to GaWC 2016’. 
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(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015b) 
A thorough analysis of the sectoral variations of this economic growth will be undertaken in 
Chapter 7, however, in summary, it can be said that the sectoral change of Istanbul’s economy 
is partly in contradiction to, and partly fits, global city assumptions. The contradictory side is 
that there is no industrial decline in Istanbul, but rather a steady growth in both the industry 
and service sectors. Figure 5.1 shows that there is no significant change in the shares of 
industrial and service sectors in Istanbul within the analysed years. This means that the 
economy of Istanbul has been growing in both sectoral basis and total economic production. 
What is very compatible with global city and neoliberal urbanisation assumptions is the use of 
urban land as a means of capital accumulation and production, excessive growth in the real-
estate sector, and active intervention of the state in these processes. Current developments in 
Istanbul’s real-estate market and the state’s interventions in this market support these theses.  
The real-estate sector in Istanbul has boomed in the post-2000 period and has become one of 
the key sectors behind the miraculous growth of the city (Keyder, 2009; Logie and Morvan, 
2014; Le Galès, 2016). Only 5% of the buildings in Istanbul are over 50 years old, and most 
of them have been built within the last thirty years (Boysan, 2011). In this sense, Istanbul has 
literally been undergoing a creative destruction process (Mills, 2014). Further, the central and 
local governments strongly support and even shape this growth with public-private 
partnerships, mega-projects, urban transformation projects (Karaman, 2013a/b, see also 
Chapter 6). For example, according to a report published by the World Bank Group, Turkey, 
in 2015, was in the first place in the world with a total investment of 44.7 billion US$ public-
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private partnership investments, which is equal to 40% of the total public-private partnership 
investments in the world (Kasper et al., 2015). 
This growth in the real estate sector was one of the most critical issues that caused differences 
of opinions between the interviewees about the economic growth of Istanbul. As noted above, 
some interviewees were quite pleased with the growth that globalisation brings, but a 
considerable number of interviewees, among which there are few officials, expressed that 
they are extremely uncomfortable with these developments. They, for example, thought that 
the real-estate production is no longer shaped by housing demand of people but by economic 
motivations (MOEU#1) and that it goes beyond the controllable limits, almost reaching the 
level of ‘madness’ (NGOR#1, NGOR#4). As another urban activist stated like a slogan: 
“Istanbul becomes the SimCity of global capitalism” (ACT#1). Interviewees were, therefore, 
quite sceptical about the sustainability of this real-estate based economic growth (e.g. AA#2), 
although market reports say that Istanbul is one of the biggest and the fastest growing real-
estate markets in Europe (PwC and the Urban Land Institute, 2013). One of the interviewees, 
for example, mentioned that there is a housing oversupply of more than one million in the city 
(NGOR#3, also see Logie and Morvan, 2014).  
As the chapter has outlined thus far, one of the meanings of globalisation for Istanbul is 
doubtlessly economic growth. Despite a strong opposition, this economic growth is already 
one of the main factors shaping global aspirations of Istanbul, or its rulers. However, it has 
also been irreversibly changing the social and environmental fabrics of the city, which is the 
second face of the Janus: 
“The main dilemma is that the socio-cultural and environmental characteristics of the 
city and the mega-scale investments and projects, necessities of globalisation, conflict 
with each other. If you want to be a global city, for example, you should create new 
settlements and develop mega-scale infrastructure projects, linking with these 
settlements” (MHA#3). 
Or, as another local government official confessed: 
“We can clearly say that globalisation has affected the planned development 
negatively. It is not possible to make everything sustainable or to keep them under 
control. There is an economic competition and people (cities) are competing with each 
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other in globalisation. This competition pushes ecological or social factors into the 
background” (IMM#3).  
The interview questions exploring the social impacts of globalisation on Istanbul received 
similar answers. The primary concerns of the interviewees were, unsurprisingly, migration 
and population growth. Almost all participants, even those who were optimistic on 
globalisation, thought that Istanbul has been growing at a dizzying rate and stated that they 
are unhappy with this growth. A central government official, for example, admitted: “Istanbul 
is a city that has overtaken all estimates in the last 15 years. I think no one has forecasted that 
the population of Istanbul will be growing as much” (MHA#2).  
Istanbul, with its 14.8 million population, holds one-fifth of Turkey’s total population and this 
number has increased by about three hundred thousand annually (GDIPFC, 2016).The city is 
already 15th of the 31 mega-cities of the world and is the most rapidly growing city in Europe 
with 4 percent annual growth, which is however lower than many major cities in the global 
South (UNDESA-PD, 2016). One of the most striking examples how this development is 
reflected in the urban space was given by an academic interviewee: 
“If you draw a 60 km circle whose centre is the Eminönü [a district in the Historical 
Peninsula] which might be regarded as the core of the city until recently, in 1990 7.4 
million people lived within this circle. This rose to 12 million in 2000, and 14-15 
million in 2011. That is, almost all of the population growth has happened within this 
60-km circle and 7 million new people have been added to an area with seven million 
population in 1990” (AA#2). 
As Chapter 3 has noted, the city has always received migration and has constantly grown, 
outside of a short period in the early last century. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much 
of this growth has been triggered by globalisation, but nevertheless, there is no doubt that 
globalisation is closely linked to this development: 
“While on the one side globalisation makes Istanbul into an aspirational city on the 
world scale, on the other side Istanbul is growing because of developments like 
urbanisation, declining rural population, migration, declining agricultural employment. 
For me, these are not so contradictory to each other” (MHA#2). 
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For most interviewees, the primary reason for this internal migration is the economic 
opportunities that no other city in the country can offer (MHA#1, MHA#2, BSR#3, 
NGOR#3). Along with this, the city offers other advantages such as education or health and 
therefore continues to attract people from the rest of the country (MOEU#1, NGOR#3). For 
example, according to an interviewee who migrated to Istanbul 50 years ago, people are still 
“coming to Istanbul [from other cities of the country] to find a job, to find a good school or 
for similar things” (NGOR#3). In terms of external migration, there has been a migration 
trend that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Chapter 3). This trend continues 
and Istanbul still receives migration from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East (UCLG#1, LUR#1).  
In the most recent context, the city especially “attracts people from the Middle East and there 
is a considerable migration from the East” (MOEU#1). Some interviewees too touched upon 
the recent conflicts in Syria, which are another factor that has triggered immigration influxes 
(ISPAT#1, BAR#2, MM#5, UCLG#1). Istanbul is hosting about 600,000 Syrians today, 
which is one-sixth of the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Along with the Bosnia 
and Bulgaria examples mentioned in Chapter 3, the Syria case also reveals that there is a 
distinctive external migration phenomenon in Istanbul in comparison to other global cities. 
What these developments brought to the city in the spatial and environmental sense is a 
dramatic expansion. There was a consensus among the interviewees on that Istanbul, in the 
last three decades, has remarkably expanded toward its periphery in which most of the city’s 
forests and green zones are located. As an NGO member complained “Today’s Istanbul has 
been losing its spatial ties with the Historical Peninsula [the old city centre] day by day” 
(NGOR#4) (see Image 5.1). Indeed, while this historical core was about 1440 hectares, today, 
Istanbul covers an area with about 200,000 hectares (Akpınar, 2011). One of the most 
important milestones accelerating and shaping this expansion is the bridges over the 
Bosporus, in particular the Second Bridge (this was also stated by some interviewees: IDA#1, 
PA#1, AA#2, IMM#6). For an urban planner, 8 million people have settled around the rural 
areas on route of the Second Bridge (PA#1). In a different aspect, the city has begun to reach 
its natural borders in the east-west axis and began to expand towards the Northern side in the 
post-1990s period (Image 5.1). As will be seen in the next chapter, this expansion of the city 
was one of the main concerns of the people who were sceptical and critical against the mega-
projects, especially the Third Bridge.  
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Image 5.1 Urbanisation Patterns of Istanbul  
 
(Source: TMMOB and KOS, 2015) 
This expansion necessarily raises another question: What does this ongoing expansion mean 
in terms of its spatial and environmental impacts? Some interviewees explicitly or implicitly 
critically pointed out a kind of regionalisation in terms of environment and politics. For the 
first one, it meant, at least in the eyes of the interviewees, a kind of colonisation. As an NGO 
representative said, “Istanbul is spreading to its surroundings like an octopus, drawing water 
from Melen River, drawing energy sources” (NGOR#2). In this sense, this process implies 
much more than disappearing of the green zones. It can be described as a period of 
environmental creative destruction in which Istanbul has been consuming its and even 
neighbouring cities natural resources, forests, underground waters, energy resources, for the 
sake of economic development:  
“We always talk about Istanbul as a city, but it used to have a rural periphery that 
feeds the city. Now, for example, with the policies pursued by the governments have 
swept it. The city is exploiting Trakya [the region which covers the lands of Turkey in 
Europe], Yalova [city], Bursa [city] for food; it has finished its own resources” 
(NGOR#4). 
Furthermore, as mentioned by some interviewees, the city is thought to go beyond its 
administrative boundaries in the near future. In 2004, planning powers of the local 
government were increased in a way that covers the periphery of the city. In other words, the 
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rural side of the city has been included in the metropolitan area. However, if this happens, the 
city might transform into a region including more than a city. As a central official said: 
“To me, Istanbul [urban development] has almost reached its administrative borders, 
then we will not be talking about current administrative borders in Istanbul in a near 
future. […] These mega-projects, bridges, are uniting Istanbul with Marmara [the 
Region], Bursa, for example. This growth trend, development trend is, like an octopus, 
involving other cities by going beyond lands and seas” (MHA#3). 
5.3 Istanbul in National Context: Is the Global City Really versus the Country? 
The first observation to make is the political, economic and demographic hegemony of 
Istanbul in Turkey. This hegemony necessarily makes Istanbul the main place of any central 
intervention seeking for national economic development. Second, unlike what the 
globalisation thesis assumes, there is no asymmetric relationship between the global economic 
development of Istanbul and the development of other parts of Turkey. Considering the data, 
Turkey’s experience of globalisation, at least until now, is a process in which all the major 
cities benefit economically, some even more than Istanbul. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the political and economic upheavals over time, Istanbul 
has always been the largest city in Turkey. Today, the city is a major centre in many aspects 
“such as the financial centre, cultural heritage, cultural capital” (BSR#4). Of course, the 
economy is an important determinant of this position, yet, there are also demographic and 
political aspects which affect the relationship between Istanbul and the remainder of the 
country. In terms of population, Istanbul is far and away the biggest city in Turkey. For 
example, it is about three times bigger than Ankara, which is the capital and the second 
biggest city. What makes this data interesting and important is the internal migration 
dynamics of Turkey. According to the 2014 census, approximately 12 million people in the 
city of 14 million were people who emigrated from other cities of the country (Akşam, 2015). 
Therefore, as said by a local politician who migrated to Istanbul from another city: “There are 
the cultures of 81 cities here: both the city’s own culture and the local cultures of 81 cities in 
food, drinks or views on social life” (LPL#1).  
As the above quote implies, Istanbul hosts people from all over the country and it literally 
reflects the social mosaic of the country. This means that Istanbul has strong political, social 
and most importantly economic ties with the remainder of the country. Therefore, many 
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interviewees thought that economic development in Istanbul will create a positive leverage 
effect for the rest of the country (see Chapter 7). For now, it should be mentioned that this 
demographic characteristic of Istanbul also makes it the primary political centre of the 
country. As a business executive said, “even the political things, results in Istanbul reflect the 
average of Turkey; because there are people here from many parts of Turkey” (BSR#2). In 
other words, as said by an academic, “considering the voting dynamics, everything should be 
read from here” (AA#1). Furthermore, an NGO representative explained: 
“The importance of Istanbul is that who wins Istanbul rules Turkey. Istanbul 
determines Turkey’s politics. For example, where did Tayyip Erdoğan come from? 
From the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality” (NGOR#3). 
In a recent speech, President Erdoğan also used similar expressions and complained that the 
votes his party received in Istanbul in the last referendum were below the average of the 
country. The following quote reveals the significance of Istanbul in this sense: 
“Istanbul is Turkey and Turkey is Istanbul. We have to give what this city deserves. 
[…] Nobody who does not understand the greatness of Istanbul can serve neither 
Istanbul nor the AKP. […] If we lose in Istanbul, we lose more in Turkey. If Istanbul 
falls below the average of Turkey [in terms of voting], we would be sad, suffer” 
(Erdoğan, 2017b, n.p.). 
As for the economic position of the city, Istanbul is evidently the major economic centre of 
Turkey. Istanbul is, by far, the city that creates the most employment in Turkey, contributing 
most to the national economy, giving the most taxes, making the most import and export, 
holding the most financial assets, and so on (TURKSTAT, 2014). The city is also the main 
command and control centre of Turkey (Yıldırım and Mullineux, 2015). In short, as stated by 
a businessman, “Istanbul is like half of the national economy; most tax is collected here, most 
trade is done here” (BSR#2). Therefore, it was not surprising that many interviewees from 
different institutions or different views used similar words like ‘brain’ (MOD#2, IMM#6, 
LPL#1) or ‘heart’ (BSR#2, NGOR#1, IMM#5, IMM#6, AA#1) to define the economic 
position of Istanbul in the country.  
To provide an understanding of where this importance of Istanbul in the Turkish economy 
stands in the global context, Table 5.1 compares Istanbul with selected cities in terms of their 
contribution to their national economies. With an overall assessment, Istanbul, creating one-
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third of the total national economic production, can be positioned between the developmental 
states and classical global cities (except Paris) and global Southern cities. Nevertheless, with a 
closer look, the share of Istanbul can be said to more resemble to the developmental cases. 
While the contribution of London, New York, and Paris to their national economies remain 
generally limited with the service sectors, Istanbul, as similar to the indicators of Seoul and 
Tokyo, still make a considerable economic contribution to its national economy in both 
industrial and service sectors. Another noteworthy indicator in the table is that Moscow, 
which is thought of as a potential case for the suggested in-between conceptualisation, has 
similar characteristics to Istanbul in terms of the service sector and total production. 
Table 5.1 Global Cities’ Share of National Economic Output 
Cities 
% of national 
GDP 
% of National Share of 
Service Sector 
% of National Share of 
Manufacturing Sector 
Seoul 46 67 32 
Tokyo 32 44 24 
Paris 31 40 19 
Istanbul 30 35 29 
Moscow  30 38 14 
London 28 44 16 
São Paulo 18 27 21 
New York  8 11 3 
Mumbai 7,50 6 4 
(Sources: Istrate and Nadeau, 2012 in Clark and Moonen 2017; TURKSTAT, 2015b) 
Turning to another discussion, many participants used this ‘economic capital’ term to explain 
the dominant economic position of Istanbul in the country (e.g. IMM#4, BSR#2, NGOR#1). 
Figure 5.2 affirms the accuracy of these views. According to the figure, Istanbul alone 
produces approximately 30% of the total national GDP of Turkey. The share of Istanbul is 
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about three times more than that of Ankara, the second biggest city of Turkey, and almost 
equal to the sum of all other cities in the table. However, in a different aspect, there is an 
interesting duality in the Turkish urban system, similar to the USA example. Different from 
many European examples, where the first-tier cities are also the capital cities (Cardoso and 
Meijers, 2016), and from the developmental states of which capital cities are also the 
economic capitals, Turkey’s global city or economic capital, Istanbul, is not the political 
capital. That is, with the well-suited words of a central government official: “Yes, Ankara 
seems as the capital, but we are ruled completely from Istanbul in terms of finance and 
economy” (MOEU#1). 
Figure 5.2 The share of National GDP by provinces (2004-2014) 
(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015b) 
A crucial issue raised here is how globalisation influences other national cities, namely 
whether the emergence of Istanbul as the country’s primary global city damages the position 
of Ankara and other Turkish cities. The commonly-held view in the literature is that 
globalisation causes unequal economic development and regional inequality, and therefore 
increases the existing hierarchies in national urban systems in favour of first-tier cities 
(Brenner, 2004b; Sassen, 2005; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012). In other words, second-tier cities 
are generally assumed to be losers of globalisation in many aspects (BBSR, 2011; Parkinson 
et al., 2012; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012). In particular, “in highly centralized countries where 
a ‘winner-takes-all approach’ tends to favour the cities which are already more successful at 
the cost of other places” (Cardoso and Meijer, 2016: 999).  
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Ankara should be given a special importance in this discussion because it is the political 
capital and Turkey’s second-biggest city by both demographic and economic indicators. 
Therefore, when it is thought together with the discussions in Chapter 3, there are both 
economic and important political aspects of the relationship between these two cities. An 
academic interviewee prominently highlighted this point with the following words: “The 
golden age of Ankara is the pre-globalisation [national period in this thesis]. With the 
globalisation process, Ankara has experienced a big disappointment” (AA#2). However, 
interestingly, with a few exceptions (MHA#2, AA#2, NGOR#2) there was little to suggest 
that Ankara would be negatively affected by globalisation or that globalisation would cause 
tension between the two cities. This might be because of two reasons. First, people generally 
see Ankara as the capital city and associate it with the central government, not with its local 
government (e.g. LPL#1). Second, as will be seen in the next section, political identities are 
an important variable in Turkish politics, and Ankara’s local government is ruled by the same 
political party. Hence this gives a reasonable cause to expect harmony, rather than tension, 
between Ankara and Istanbul. 
Moreover, even in economic terms, Turkey’s experience of globalisation presents an 
interesting trajectory for Ankara and other second-tier cities (Figures 5.2 and 5.3), which is 
quite different from the general assumptions in the literature: 
“In Turkey, [...] Istanbul has been amongst the highest in the country [in terms of 
GDP] [...]. Ankara, however, is unusual in that it is one ‘second tier’ city in an OECD 
country that has experienced faster growth than its ‘first tier’ rival” (Harding, 2007: 
56). 
Figure 5.3, along with Figure 5.2, suggests that globalisation has no significant impact on the 
existing economic disparities between Istanbul and other major national metropolises, neither 
positive nor negative. As mentioned above, the existing inequalities between Istanbul and 
other Turkish cities are clearly visible in Figure 5.2. Istanbul is by far the city which makes 
the most contribution to the national economy. Yet, there is almost no change in the share of 
Istanbul’s and other five major cities’ contribution to the national GDP over the analysed 
period. Given the fact that Istanbul’s economy has grown about three times between 2004 and 
2014 (see Figure 5.1), one can assume that these cities have experienced a similar trend of 
economic growth. Likewise, as can be seen in Figure 5.3, the GDP per capita by the major 
provinces presents a similar trend. While the GDP per capita of all major cities in the table 
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has been increasing, there is no substantial change between the rates of increase. In almost all 
cities, per capita GDP has nearly doubled in the period. Therefore, in terms of the economy, it 
can be said that globalisation, in the Turkish context, is not a zero-sum game which creates 
one winner and many losers. On the contrary, all major Turkish cities seem to have made an 
economic profit from globalisation. 
Figure 5.3 GDP Per Capita by Provinces (2004-2014, US$) 
 
(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015a) 
Another interesting debate is the relationship between the development of Istanbul and the 
development of the country. This discussion will, first, make Istanbul’s position within 
Turkey even more obvious, and second, provide background information for discussions in 
Chapter 7, especially for why (and with which motivations), the central government is 
involved in the local projects of Istanbul. As can be remembered, one of the discussions about 
developmental states is that the emergence of global cities in these states relates to national 
economic developments of the countries. In the case of Turkey, it might be said that a similar 
mission is given to Istanbul, at least in the eyes of the officials. This corresponds, in a sense, 
with what Crouch and Le Galès (2012: 411) call a new economic patriotism: 
“National governments have shifted policies in order to strengthen their capital cities 
as national champion of economic growth; evidence that this occurs indicates that this 
new form of economic patriotism has been adopted.” 
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If Istanbul is taken as the economic capital, the words below of an IDA official share strong 
similarity with the above quote:  
“You can see that many mega infrastructure investments are generally made in 
Istanbul. This demonstrates that Ankara is already conscious of the importance of 
Istanbul and of that if only Istanbul’s economy develops we can reach this goal. I 
think, precisely because of this Ankara makes the majority of the investments in 
Istanbul” (IDA#1). 
One part of the participants, mostly officials and the private sector representatives, believed 
that the economic development of Istanbul makes a very positive impact on Turkey’s national 
economic growth. Many of them were also very optimistic that this trend will continue. This 
notion was being combined with the ‘locomotive’ metaphor (IDA#1, UCLG#1, MOEU#1, 
CCP#1, MHA#2, MOD#1). That is, “if Istanbul grows, Turkey grows. Istanbul is a 
locomotive city” (MOD#1). They also thought that Istanbul’s growth might be beneficial to 
the other cities: “It’s not harmful. If we position [Istanbul] as the locomotive; when the 
locomotive pulls, the other wagons too come after” (IDA#1). More obviously, an interviewee 
from the central government pointed out that “the growth of Istanbul causes an increase in 
national wealth, and therefore, other cities get their pieces of the pie” (MOD#1). Further, 
some of the interviewees stated that Istanbul, and its economic development, might be a role 
model to other cities in Turkey (MHA#2) and even to some other cities outside Turkey such 
as Sarajevo or Baghdad (IMM#2). A businessman exemplified this as follows:  
“There are many successful administrators in the local governments of Anatolian cities 
who transferred experiences and know-how which they gained while they had been 
working in Istanbul’s local government” (BSR#2). 
On the other side, a far greater number of interviewees were thinking that such a development 
includes some risks and may lead to negative results for other cities and the entire country too. 
According to an interviewee, “if an earthquake occurs in Istanbul, Turkey collapses, […] 
cannot recover itself” (NGOR#3). Some officials too expressed that they are dissatisfied with 
such a development. Though not as direct as the previous quote, a local official said: “If 
Istanbul is damaged by a disaster, Turkey is much more damaged” (IMM#3). Another point 
relevant to this issue is that some interviewees criticised the allocation of most of the central 
investments to Istanbul (e.g. NGOR#4, IMM#1, PA#1). Their point was that this necessarily 
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causes a decrease in other cities’ shares from the central government funds, and therefore, 
triggers regional economic inequalities. However, as discussed above, the statistics show that 
economic inequality between the major cities in Turkey has not increased, at least until now.  
5.4 Istanbul in International Context: An Emerging Gateway between East and West 
As for where Istanbul is situated in the global urban order, many interviewees found 
comparing Istanbul with other cities is difficult. The first limitation is to diagnose where the 
city actually stands, as stated by a local bureaucrat during the interview: “We are categorised 
in various geographies by different international authorities. Some of them consider us Middle 
Eastern, others European or Eurasian” (UCLG#1). This complicates the criteria with which 
Istanbul (or Turkey) is assessed and the cases they are compared to. Moreover, several 
interviewees thought that it is very difficult to compare Istanbul to other cities due to 
geographical, historical or social dynamics because “dynamics of Istanbul is so different than 
anywhere else. You cannot compare Istanbul with Dubai or Cairo, or even London” (PA#2; 
c.f. Peck, 2015). 
The diversity of cities listed during the interviews for comparing Istanbul might nevertheless 
give an idea of this issue. London, New York, Paris (mentioned respectively 146, 88 and 70 
times) were top of the list. About half of the interviewees were thinking that Istanbul should 
compete with these cities, at least in the future. Rome was mentioned 45 times, mostly 
because of historical analogies. Moscow was mentioned 28 times, over geographic and 
political similarities. Other cities such as Tokyo, Singapore and Frankfurt were mentioned 
less than 25 times. Further, global South cities were mentioned no more than 5-6 times, which 
will be discussed below. With 67 mentions, Dubai was one of the most cited cities (arguably 
another in-between city). Aside from its competition with Istanbul for attracting investments 
leading to the Middle East (ISPAT#1, MOD#1, MOD#2, BSR#5), Dubai was often given as a 
negative example (BSR#2, IMM#4, CCP#1, MOD#2) or a pattern that Istanbul should not 
follow (AA#1, MHA#3, NGOR#2, NGOR#1): 
“It is an insult to Istanbul that to fill the city with skyscrapers or artificial projects like 
Disneyland which may be found acceptable for Dubai which is a city with no 
historical background” (NGOR#2). 
Here is an interesting but not surprising point: officials and people from the business world 
were more optimistic than other interviewees on the position of Istanbul in the global urban 
 102 
 
system. The interviewees in the second group assessed Istanbul mostly through the following 
criteria: demographic (CCP#1, AA#1), socio-economic (AA#1) or political (democratic 
participation) (ACT#1), or involvement of the central government (LUR#1, AA#2, PA#1). To 
those, Istanbul and Turkey were more like the cases in the global South (LUR#1, ACT#1, 
CCP#1) such as Mexico-City (AA#1) or to cases where the central government has a strong 
authority over local governments such as Russia or China (AA#2) or “somewhere between 
global South and Europe” (ACT#1). To be more precise, as one of the interviewees in this 
group said: 
“There is no city in Europe whose population increased from a million to fifteen 
million in fifty years. There is no city in Europe which has such a big informality 
phenomenon. There is no city in Europe whose GDP per capita is as low as Istanbul. İt 
can’t be compared to any of them. […] Mexico City, Buenos Aires, maybe. Istanbul is 
stronger than Buenos Aires in economic indicators, Mexico City is very close, 
possibly.  It should be compared to cities like Johannesburg. […] Istanbul maybe 
compared with the capital cities, or leading cities, of the Third World Countries” 
(AA#1). 
However, to the officials and most of the business groups, Istanbul should be assessed 
together with the top cities of the world (e.g. IMM#4, BSR#2, MOD#1). The common view in 
this group was “Istanbul is much ahead of Warsaw, Dubai, and Moscow” (MOD#2) and 
“should be in the first league of cities” (MHA#2). A different example of this view, with 
almost similar words, was given by a local official from the Metropolitan Municipality: 
“Paris, London, New York; if there is a league for cities, Istanbul should be there” (IMM#2). 
Although this group of participants thought Istanbul should compete with the top global cities, 
some of them also admitted that “Istanbul has a long way to go, in comparison to the 
developed countries” (MOD#1). The justification of this view will be better understood in the 
following paragraph, but especially with the starting-up of the IFC Project (see Chapter 6) 
many believe that “Istanbul will be one step closer to London, Tokyo, New York triangle” 
(IMM#6).  
For the officials and some individuals (e.g. LUR#1, AA#1, PA#1, NGOR#2), there is a 
difference between where Istanbul actually is and where Istanbul should be. To many 
interviewees, what makes this difference is lack of planning, poor physical and legal 
infrastructure, and other ongoing problems such as rapid and irregular urbanisation and 
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population increase. For the central and local authorities, unsurprisingly, false policies and 
strategies that were pursued in previous eras were also among the reasons. The common view, 
in this respect, was that “Istanbul is a very valuable ore, but very badly processed” (BSR#2). 
Another participant from the central government said: “I am not sure if Istanbul gets the value 
it deserves” (MHA#2). The following quote of Erdoğan (2017a) demonstrates that this view 
was not only shared by interviewees but also by many major politicians: “We did not know 
the value of this city, we have betrayed it, are still betraying it, and I am too responsible for 
this”. This constant emphasis on ‘we’ is a useful reminder that city dynamism cannot be 
explained solely by the geo-economics of global urbanisation, but by geopolitical and 
geohistorical factors which are often specific to national and regional context (Brenner, 
2004a; Jonas, 2013; Jonas and Moisio, 2018). 
Regarding the position of Istanbul within the close supranational region, Istanbul has often 
been assumed as the leading city of the region covering the Middle East, the Balkans, and the 
Caucasus, thanks to its privileged features given by history and geography and its functions in 
the global order. Almost all interviewees, even those with generally critical views, referred to 
its regional leadership capability, which was well-stated by an urban planner: “Istanbul is the 
centre in this region, surrounding the Balkans and other neighbour geographies” (CCP#1). In 
other words, even though it is not able to compete with New York, London, Tokyo, for now 
(CCP#1), it was thought that Istanbul “is very strong in terms of regional control capacity” 
(AA#1). A participant from the Development Agency made a similar point with more 
strategic terms: “Istanbul is a hub. For now, it might be a regional hub between the Middle 
East and Balkans, but it is also on the way of being a more global hub” (IDA#1). As will be 
seen in the next chapter, this statement is one of the most-used themes in the promotion of 
many mega-projects, most notably the IFC Project. 
Another relevant issue that this research explores was the potential roles that the city might 
undertake in the global order. Chapters 2 and 3 discussed that geographical and historical 
patterns are among the major determinants of their positions and functions in globalisation. 
The general opinions of the participants were compatible with this view. Most of the 
interviewees believed that these two aspects, especially the geographical one, shape how 
Turkey and Istanbul incorporate into the global system. The interviewees who brought the 
historical features of Istanbul to the forefront insistently emphasised the links between its 
former status as the imperial capital and the current status as the leading global city of the 
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region. To understand this view, which will be discussed in Chapter 7 in more detail, it is 
worth quoting from an executive urban planner: 
“Istanbul is a global city. Why? Because as an imperial capital it ruled the Caucasus, 
Balkans, the Black Sea. Also because of its geography, there is no chance of not being 
global. What did Napoleon say? ‘If the world were only one country, Istanbul 
would be its capital’. İt is so right. It is gate of East and West, or North, from Africa to 
Europe. It is a global city even if you do not do anything. It is more global than 
Moscow” (PA#1). 
The ‘gate’ metaphor was furthered by another participant with the following words:  
“Istanbul is one of three ‘gateway cities’ in Europe, together with three cities in the 
North-Mediterranean, Marseilles, Venice, Milan” (AA#2).  
Indeed, Istanbul has always functioned as a cultural and economic gateway between East and 
West, thanks to the advantages provided by its geographical location (Walker and Taylor, 
2000; Boyar and Fleet, 2010; Madden; 2016; Swanson, 2016). As also indicated by a recent 
report exploring the European gateways, Istanbul, today too, strengthens this function and 
fulfils it in various forms (ESPON, 2013). This was one of the issues that participants, 
especially officials and private sector representatives, often emphasised. For example, in the 
words of one of them: “Istanbul is gate of the region opens up to the world and the gate of the 
region opens up to the region” (ISPAT#1). He exemplified this as follows: “the Japanese 
come here to open up to Europe and America and others come to open up the Middle East or 
Central Asia” (ISPAT#1). This view also points out the regional command and control 
function of Istanbul, which was mentioned by many interviewees (e.g. AA#1, NGOR#4, 
IDA#1, MHA#1, MOD#1). However, this will be discussed in Chapter 7. For now, the 
following quote is a good example how the central government market this gateway position 
of Istanbul and associate this position with command and control functions: 
“While we are launching Istanbul, we emphasise that Istanbul sits in the centre of the 
world. I mean, Istanbul is a transfer point for many international destinations. It has 
many advantages compared to other transfer points, such as Amsterdam or Frankfurt, 
in Europe. We cover more than one-third of the world within three hours flight 
including major cities both in the east and the west. […] This leads to many 
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international companies establishing their regional and global headquarters in 
Istanbul” (MOD#1). 
Another function of Istanbul (and Turkey) related to this gateway position might be explained 
through the following quote of Khanna (2016: 7): “Turkey has been called the country where 
continents collide; now it is the country where continents connect”. In Khanna’s account, with 
the Marmaray tunnel in Istanbul (see next chapter), Turkey strengthens its position of being “a 
key corridor between Europe and China” (Ibid.: 7). In this sense, Turkey and Istanbul also 
play a very strategic role in China’s New Silk Road Initiative that is planned to connect 
Beijing with London (Ergunsu, 2017). Turkey is one of the main partners of this initiative, 
and Istanbul, which “was where the land and sea routes of the [historical] Silk Road met” (Ni 
et al., 2017; 124), will revive its old status in a new way through the project. For example, in 
addition to Marmaray, the third Bosporus bridge which has a railroad is thought to be one of 
the most important steps of the route connecting China with the UK (Ünal, 2017). 
Finally, as Sassen (2018) points out, Istanbul sits in the centre of diverse flows such as capital, 
human or political between East (Asia) and West (Europe) and between global North and 
global South. This can be read as a different interpretation of the connectivity function that 
Khanna mentions. For example, in terms of global connectivity calculated by different 
indicators such as economic connection and the number of air routes, Istanbul is among the 
ten cities which have the most global connections (see Ni et al., 2017). One of the tools 
through which this connectivity can be most obviously shown is the airline traffic. Istanbul is 
an important node in the global airline network.19 As stated by an interviewee “after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, [Istanbul] has become a major transfer point for the airways 
from Europe to the Central Asia” (AA#2). Therefore, all participants without exception 
shared the view that thanks to its geographical location Istanbul has great advantages over 
cities which are assumed to compete with it. That is, “in terms of airline traffic, neither 
Bulgaria, nor Greece, or Russia, or Lebanon, or another city can surpass Istanbul” (AA#1). 
It is worth underlining one more point before finishing the discussion. This global 
connectivity is one of the principal elements that both the central and the local governments 
emphasise and aim to improve (e.g. MOD#1, ISPAT#1, IMM#4, IMM#5, MHA#3, IDA#1). 
THY, the official airline company of Turkey, is a good example of these efforts. As stated by 
an IDA official, the company, which is headquartered in Istanbul, “connects Istanbul with 
                                                 
19 I will return to this discussion on another occasion in Chapter 7. 
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more than 140 countries and this is quite compatible to the global city strategy of the city” 
(IDA#1). Moreover, it was believed that this connectivity will be much increased with the 
starting-up of the Third Airport (ISPAT#1, BSR#4, UCLG#1, IMM#4). The main airport of 
the city., Istanbul Atatürk Airport, currently ranks fifth in Europe by passenger connectivity 
(OAG, 2016), and the officials thought that the new airport will surpass Frankfurt Airport and 
will hit the top spot in Europe (e.g. ISPAT#1, IDA#1, IMM#4):  
“There are currently two international airports in Istanbul, and, with the Third Airport, 
Istanbul will be one of the most important ‘hubs’ in the world. In this way, people will 
also save 3-4 hours in their daily lives by using Istanbul as a transfer point when they 
fly from the Far East to Africa, Europe or further destinations. [...] When the Third 
Airport is active, both Frankfurt and London Airports will lose their seats and Istanbul 
will take their places” (UCLG#1).  
5.5 Conclusion 
There has been a long debate on how globalisation plays a role in cities’ development and on 
their position and functions in national and international networks. From the scope of this 
study, and with a geographic outlook, these debates could be gathered under two contexts: 
western and non-western. Going back to the discussions in Chapter 2 once again, while global 
cities and state rescaling theories have developed their arguments mostly over the experiences 
of western cities, more clearly western European and North American, postcolonial and 
developmental approaches focus on non-western contexts. However, as highlighted in the 
introduction of this chapter, Istanbul is not easily categorised as either West or East. The 
experiences of Istanbul therefore demonstrate some similarities with others but at the same 
time also show some unique characteristics.  
The purpose of this chapter has been to critically conceptualise the development of Istanbul 
under globalisation and to position this development within Turkey’s national and 
international contexts. With this aim, the chapter has been structured into three subsections: 
(i) Istanbul’s own development under globalisation; (ii) situating this development within the 
national context: and (iii) the position and functions of Istanbul in the international urban 
system. 
The first question this chapter has addressed is how the development of Istanbul can be 
narrated. The chapter has demonstrated that the urban development of Istanbul has various 
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divergent and convergent dynamics with the many other global and globalising cities. 
Economically speaking, globalisation has brought a remarkable economic growth to the city. 
However, in terms of its sectoral distribution, this economic growth does not conform with 
the overall hypotheses in the literature claiming that, in global cities, industrial manufacturing 
is replaced with service sectors (Friedmann, 1988; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Sassen, 2001; 
2005). The finance and service sectors in Istanbul have been growing significantly but 
nevertheless there has been no decline in industry. As some interviewees mentioned, and 
confirmed by statistical data, there has been an economic growth in Istanbul involving 
different sectors and subsectors except agriculture.  
Just as in the economy, in spatial and demographic developments too, Istanbul has 
experienced rapid and mostly uncontrolled changes. In terms of urban population, growth 
rates of Istanbul in the global period are close to, but lower than, the prominent cities of the 
global South (UNDESA-PD, 2016). As for spatial developments, it is possible to read what is 
happening in Istanbul through a well-known phenomenon of contemporary global capitalism, 
the commodification of urban space (e.g. Shatkin, 2011b; Le Galès, 2016). As in many global 
cities, in Istanbul too, urban land has become a tool of capital accumulation today. Public 
spaces, green-fields and forests have begun to be opened to zoning operations with the 
motives of feeding the ongoing growth in construction and real-estate sectors (e.g. ACT#1, 
LPL#1, NGOR#1, NGOR#3, NGOR#4, MOEU#1, PA#2, IMM#6).  
The second concern of this chapter is the position of Istanbul within the national urban system 
and how this position is affected by globalisation. The agreement of all interviewees has 
demonstrated that Istanbul is the predominant city of Turkey, not only from an economic but 
also from many other aspects. Although the global cities literature assumes that globalisation 
weakens the ties between global cities and other cities within their national urban networks, 
Istanbul is in an intense cultural, economic and political relationship with the remainder of the 
country (also see Chapter 7). Additionally, another interesting finding is that there has been 
no negative relationship between the economic development of Istanbul and of the other 
Turkish cities. Contrary to the well-known assumption that globalisation increases the 
economic inequalities between global cities and other cities in the national context in favour 
of the former (Sassen, 2007; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012; Cardoso and Meijer, 2016), there 
has been no decline in the economic indicators of the second-tier metropolitan cities of the 
country. 
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Finally, this chapter has also discussed the position and functions of Istanbul within the global 
urban order. For the position of Istanbul, there has been an interesting difference between the 
views of officials and business people and of other participants. Whereas those in the first 
group generally positioned Istanbul among the top global cities, participants in the second 
group often underlined its dynamics resembling the global Southern cities. In fact, both views 
can be accepted as partly true in the wider context since the city bears the characteristics of 
both global North and global South (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). Yet, there was a consensus 
that owing to its geographical and historical characteristics Istanbul is in a unique position. 
There was also another consensus that Istanbul has undeniable advantages in comparison to 
other cities in the region covering the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even 
Central Asia. Once again, these advantages were believed to be the inherent consequences of 
the city’s location between Europe and Asia, and its imperial background. 
In terms of the functions of the city, the interviewees mostly referenced the same point, that is 
the city’s geographical position. Thanks to this position the city might serve as a gateway 
between its East and its West for different purposes such as trade routes, energy lines or 
intercontinental transportation systems (Khanna, 2016). Istanbul functions as a gateway for 
global companies that brings investors from both East and West to the region (ISPAT#1, 
BSR#5). At the same time Istanbul functions as a gateway for global capitalism and attracts 
European and Asian companies seeking to open up to (and to manage their operations in) the 
regions mentioned above (Sassen, 2009). Finally, Istanbul also serves as a global transport 
hub connecting the East with the West and North with the South. 
Overall, this chapter has discussed some impacts of globalisation on the local scale of 
Istanbul. It has revealed that the city has been experiencing this phenomenon in an 
exceptional way - at least in comparison to some other well-known examples argued in the 
literature - in some respects, which are embedded in the city’s distinctive geographic and 
historical patterns. This not only shapes the city’s urban development under globalisation but 
also how the city integrates into subnational and supranational systems and functions in these 
networks. On the other hand, although this chapter has concentrated on the influences of 
globalisation, it is also known that such developments are closely related to political factors. 
Therefore, the next chapter will discuss how the developments discussed in this chapter have 
been shaped by local and central governments and how the economic growth and 
development of Turkey has been built on the above functions of Istanbul. What will also be 
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discussed in the next chapter is the relationship between local and central political actors and 
other stakeholders in Istanbul’s urban development.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Governments as Global City Makers 
6.1. Introduction  
Global cities are often viewed as political entities that have gradually had more say in 
deciding their own destinies, even if these are disadvantageous to their host states. This means 
that global cities around the world increasingly seek their own interests, pursue their own 
global agendas, operate beyond their national boundaries, and are more connected to the 
global urban system than to their national urban system (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Sassen, 
2005; 2018). However, the counter approaches (especially state rescaling and developmental 
approaches) have demonstrated that these assumptions need to be approached with caution 
since the central governments, in many different countries, still have a significant role in 
orchestrating city development and their strategies (Brenner, 2004a; Jonas, 2013). Moreover, 
as will be seen below, not only in emerging global cities but also in some top global cities, the 
role of central governments is much more important than it is sometimes assumed; or in other 
words, administrative and financial capabilities of city governments are not often as high as 
the global cities literature asserts (Therborn, 2011; Kantor et al, 2012).  
Secondly, the arguments that local governments, especially in global cities, have been gaining 
more power vis-a-vis their central governments also imply that global cities have become 
spaces in which local and national powers conflict with each other for political-economic 
interests, so that the relationship between cities and their host states are necessarily in tension 
(Peck, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill; 2003; Barber, 2013). Yet, there are also 
counterexamples (cf. Khanna, 2016); for example, developmental states in which city-state 
relations can be identified as integration rather than separation (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 
2003), and city-states that are not faced with intergovernmental conflicts (Old and Yeung, 
2004). From a different angle too, it is also open to debate how much of the relations between 
cities and their host states are shaped by rational motivations, such as struggles for the scales 
of political power or for economic interests. Or, more explicitly, as this chapter seeks to 
understand, how influential political differences between local governments and regional or 
national governments are in the intergovernmental relations is an important question to be 
answered. 
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The empirical arguments of the previous chapter have concentrated on Istanbul’s development 
in the era of globalisation, and the city’s position in national and global urban systems. In 
short, the debate has been more about the characteristics of Istanbul as an emerging global 
city. This chapter aims to develop an understanding of how political actors shape the city’s 
development and how the relations between them can be assessed. The chapter consists of two 
different parts, each of which makes a different argument. To begin, Section 6.2 explores the 
role of Turkey’s national government and Istanbul’s local government in the emergence of 
Istanbul as a global city. The primary argument in this section is that the central government 
has been the main driver of this development, and the local government has generally played 
a secondary role acting within the limits drawn by the central government. 
Second, although the literature often assumes the reverse, the relationship between local and 
central governments in Turkey could be assessed as being much more harmonious – akin to a 
city-state – which is driven by both rational and political factors. Nevertheless, this harmony 
between different tiers of government does not mean total harmony. There are, of course, 
some contested points, conflicts or objections raised by different groups of stakeholders. To 
develop these arguments, the rest of the chapter is divided into two sections. Section 6.2 
highlights the roles of the central and local authorities respectively for Istanbul’s current 
development. Section 6.3 assesses relations between the city and the state, and sheds light on 
both rational and political harmony between them and areas of contestations.  
6.2. Who Makes Istanbul as a Global City? 
One of the controversial debates about global cities is undoubtedly how global cities emerge. 
For many global and world-city researchers, the answer to this question is primarily the global 
economic system. On the other hand, by echoing Beauregard (1995: 242) who argued “the 
global only comes into being through the integration of numerous locally based actors and 
activities”, it might be said that central and local governments can pursue a number of 
strategies to strengthen their cities’ positions in the global order. Given the various definitions 
– or functions – of global cities, it is possible to prepare a basic list of these options: for 
example, an accessible major airport that increases the global connectivity of the city (Frug 
and Barron, 2008), an efficient infrastructure and transportation system (Kantor et al., 2012), 
but most importantly a favourable investment environment to attract global companies to the 
city. 
 112 
 
In this study, interviewees were generally reflective of the above options in their answers. In 
other words, as stated by an interviewee from the central government: 
“In relation to these policies, all minds think alike. There is nothing that we know but 
they do not know, or that they know but we do not know. These are things that are 
more or less the same in all corners of the world” (ISPAT#1).  
This implies an almost identikit development plan for cities in globalisation, something which 
is perhaps unsurprising given the rise of a strong policy mobilities literature in global urban 
studies, itself a reflection of how ideas and policies for ‘success’ in globalisation are being 
circulated by a cadre of international consultants, thinktanks and policy entrepreneurs 
(McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2014; Crivello, 2015, Kennedy, 2016; Ward, 
2018; for Istanbul see Kizildere and Chiodelli, 2018). 
The second and more difficult question is who the main actor is in orchestrating and 
implementing strategies, policies, and projects for Istanbul: is it Turkey’s central government, 
is it Istanbul’s local government. or do both have equal influence? This question is very 
important because some arguments (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3.1) have referred to a process in 
which some of the regulatory powers of nation-states have been transferring to local and/or 
regional governments (Brenner, 2004b, 2018b; Keating, 2009; Harrison and Hoyler, 2014; 
Harrison, 2015). Hence, the discussions in this chapter will be the basis for discussions in the 
next chapter that compares the case of Istanbul to the existing global urban studies literature.  
Moreover, clarifying the roles of the central and the local governments will also help to 
explain how Istanbul, as a city in-between the East and the West, fits into the global urban 
system in which very different patterns of government and governance exist (Herrschel, 2014; 
Vogel et al., 2010). Even though decentralisation is often supposed to be a universal 
phenomenon (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), many existing studies demonstrate that the 
extent of decentralisation is varied from case to case (Jonas, 2013). For example, the 
intergovernmental system in Europe is more centralised than in the USA (Herrschel, 2014), 
the Central and Eastern EU countries are more centralised than other parts of the EU (Schmitt 
and Well, 2016), or the East Asian developmental states are much more centralised than the 
Western states (Hill and Kim, 2000). The discussions below will allow a better understanding 
of where Istanbul can be positioned among these different examples. 
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The interviews pointed out that both the central and the local governments have an important 
role in transforming Istanbul into a global city. However, the interviews revealed that the 
central government is much further ahead of the local government in shaping the city’s 
strategies and policies. For example, whereas the central government is responsible for 
developing national, regional and local strategic plans, including national development plans, 
environment plans, etc., municipalities and metropolitan municipalities are responsible for 
local master plans which must be in coordination with the national plans (Yılmaz Bakır et al., 
2018). As will again be mentioned below, the master plans prepared by local governments 
must also be approved by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Local government 
are also stakeholders of the local projects developed by the central government institutions as 
in the IFC Project. It is therefore possible to define central and local government’s roles as 
respectively leading and supporting actors, as summarised by one interviewee from the 
Ministry of Development:   
“The first actor is central government […] Because of our state tradition we cannot 
develop separate administrative strategies (e.g. different procedures as in free trade 
zones) […] The most important one here is the state tradition.  The second is the local 
actor. You know, the annual budget of the IstanbulIstanbul Metropolitan Municipality is 
higher than that of 17 ministries20. It is indeed a huge financial power, but they still 
aren’t the main actor because of the central government’s strategy. To give a proportion, 
central government’s role on Istanbul is about 70%. For example, the local authority 
cannot decide the Third Bridge, it must get approval from central government” 
(MOD#1). 
6.2.1. Governing for Istanbul: Role of the Central Government  
All interviewees without exception believe that there has been a crucial role of the central 
government, ruling since 2002, on transforming Istanbul from a national leading city to a 
global city. Only a few interviewees referred the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as the 
main actor, but they also stated, between the lines, that the central government takes the main 
role in practice. Even the groups who criticise this transformation accepted this dominant 
position of the central government and stated their opposition to the irresistible central 
intervention to the city. That is to say, there is no doubt in any of the interviewees that it is the 
                                                 
20 The 2017 budget of the IMM is about 5,5 billion US dollars, which is higher than that of 18 ministries such as 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization.  
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central government who is performing the main tasks. Those tasks can be categorised under 
three headings: (i) Planning for Istanbul, (ii) Setting the Scene, (iii) Building for Istanbul.  
6.2.1.1 Planning for Istanbul: National Plans – Local Projects  
As was touched upon before, Turkey is a country in which the planning system is highly 
centralised and complex (Kayasu and Yetişkul, 2014; Tasan-Kok, 2015). As stated by an 
interviewee, “the main planning authority is the central administration, that is, the central 
government draws the main framework and sets the main strategy” (MHA#3). At the top of 
the planning hierarchy, there is a national development plan which provides a set of national 
planning policies for Turkey including economic, social and environmental aspects. This 
national plan is prepared by the Ministry of Development. Apart from the national plans, 
Turkey’s main national strategy is defined as the 2023 Vision, also known as the 2023 Targets 
(Sabah, 2012). The vision consists of 100 goals which Turkey aims to achieve by 2023, which 
marks the centennial of the Turkish Republic. The overall aim of the vision, most of whose 
points are economic targets and large-scale infrastructure projects, is to make Turkey into one 
of the top ten economies in the world. The main “2023 Goals of Turkey” are stated as 
follows: 
• To become one of the 10 largest economies in the world  
• To have a GDP of 2 trillion US dollars 
• To have an export volume of 500 billion US dollars 
• To build a total of 1 million houses.  
• To make Istanbul one of the top ten financial centres in the world by 2023. 
• To complete the Canal Istanbul Project. 
• Urban transformation and regeneration projects will spread to the Aegean and 
Eastern Anatolian regions after Istanbul (Deloitte-Turkey, 2013; MoD, 2014). 
The 2023 Vision is, however, neither a policy framework nor a detailed plan; it is a strategic 
guide for all tiers of governments which must be considered in preparing both national and 
local plans. Many interviewees, including some central government bureaucrats, thought that 
some of the goals were unrealistic or at least difficult to achieve (e.g. MOD#1; BSR#2). 
Indeed, considering Turkey’s current GDP, US$857 billion, the country must catch up to an 
annual average growth rate of nearly 20% per year to achieve its 2023 targets, which is almost 
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five times the world average. Even those who find the aims realistic believed that achieving 
the targets strictly depends on the economic development of Istanbul: 
“If only Istanbul performs its task in line with the targets, Turkey can reach those 
goals. If Istanbul does not perform, Turkey too cannot reach them” (IDA#1).  
It is therefore clear that many of the goals in the 2023 vision are directly relevant to Istanbul, 
such as the Third Bridge Project, the Third Airport Project, the Strait Road Tube Crossing 
Project, known as Eurasia Tunnel. Istanbul is aiming to become a regional, and then global, 
financial centre and an international transfer hub for air transport and maintenance and repair 
centre (MoD, 2014). The former is conceptualised as the IFC Project, undertaken by the 
MoD, and the latter is directly conceived over the Third Airport Project by the Ministry of 
Transportation. Istanbul International Financial Centre Project aims to make Istanbul as one 
of the top 25 financial centres of the world by 2018 (and one of the top 10 by 2023) and to 
move Turkey into the top 30 in the Financial Development Index (MoD, 2014). The following 
quote taken from the interview with a specialist working on the project shows how central 
government approaches the project which is actually a local issue:  
“Indeed, the projects we conceive for Istanbul are actually relevant to Turkey. As I 
said before, all these targets are targets of Turkey. (…) When we develop Istanbul and 
make it a leading global financial centre, Turkey will already be one of the top fifteen 
economies indeed” (MOD#1). 
This sentiment was shared by many of the public officials and business sector representatives 
interviewed, although they approached the issue from different perspectives. Some 
interviewees, for example, expressed that the project could not be a local project because of 
Istanbul’s dominant position in Turkey’s economy (BSR#5). The second approach is that the 
making of a financial centre requires special regulations such as new laws, institutions, 
incentives and infrastructure investments, which the local government cannot implement 
(IMM#3, BSR#1). To understand why the central government administers the project, it is 
worth quoting from an interview with one of the representatives of the private sector:   
“It is right. Because the idea that making Istanbul a financial centre must be in 
accordance with the central government’s idea. Istanbul cannot be a financial centre 
unless the central government adopts [this strategy]. Because the central bank, state 
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banks, are still in Ankara, the capital, and they must be moved to Istanbul and this is 
impossible without central government’s will” (BSR#2). 
As will be seen in the following paragraphs, not only the planning of these projects, but also 
zoning and construction activities, are mostly undertaken by central government. However, 
this does not mean that all decisions are taken by central government. There are various 
formal (for example Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is one of the six stakeholders of the 
Financial Centre Project) and informal ways in which local administrators can participate in 
the processes (see Section 6.3.2.). Thus, local governments play a role in commenting on 
planning applications that affect their area, meeting local requirements of projects such as 
underground and some other infrastructure projects (IMM#3), or providing business and 
construction permits (BSR#1). Yet it is worth stating here that both financial and 
administrative dependency of the local government allows the central government to be more 
active in decision making and conducting projects.  
6.2.1.2 Setting the Scene for Istanbul  
Concepts such as ‘global city’, ‘world city’ or ‘attraction centre’ are often explained with 
economic factors such as a city’s integration into the global economy. It could be said that the 
central government is seen as the main actor who sets the legal framework for this economic 
integration. Unsurprisingly, all public officials and business sector representatives almost 
agree on how the government could provide this integration and ensure its continuity. To be 
more precise, what is expected from the central government is, for example, “banking 
legislation, other legislation, allowing foreigners to buy properties, and so on” (BSR#1). 
Likewise, another business sector representative stated that considering global competition, 
the central government should regulate the legal framework which reduces investment 
procedures, and wanted, as an example, the central government to change the law of 
citizenship for foreign investors (BSR#4). Indeed, it is also worth noticing that the law was 
changed in January 2017. The new law grants citizenship to foreigners who buy a one-
million-dollar property or who found/buy a company with two-million-dollar capital (ISPAT, 
2017). 
The central government’s approach is by and large similar to that of the private sector. For 
example, an interviewee from the Investment Promoting Agency, defining Istanbul as a major 
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centre for the finance sector, expressed that they seek to attract investments from all corners 
of the world (ISPAT#1). He also added: 
“The state has some strategies [to attract FDIs] of course and we are carrying out these 
strategies. One of the most important strategies is, for example, the incentive system 
which offers different incentives depending on sectors or regions” (ISPAT#1). 
Central government’s approach and role could be better interpreted if this process is tackled 
within a holistic view. Namely, this has indeed begun with legal amendments and continues 
with the latest amendment in citizenship law. The AKP government enacted two new laws 
after they came to power in 2002: (i) the Law no. 4875 on Direct Foreign Investments; and, 
(ii) the Law no. 4916 on Property Acquisition. These new laws abrogated the permission and 
approval system for foreign direct investments, eased property acquisition for foreign real 
persons and companies, and so allowed foreign companies to open new branches, offices, 
production centres without facing strict bureaucratic permission procedures. Figures 6.1 and 
6.2 demonstrate how these laws have affected the amount of foreign direct investments and 
the numbers of foreign companies in Turkey. There is no doubt that Istanbul is the city that is 
mostly affected by these developments. 
Figure 6.1 shows that while total investment for the 23 years before the law was introduced in 
2003 was around US$15 billion, after the law, the annual average total of foreign investment 
increased to about US$12.5 billion. Although there is no official statistic which shows how 
much of this investment comes to the city, relevant experts interviewed pointed out that 
Istanbul has attracted more than half of the total investment (ISPAT#1, BSR#5). The numbers 
in Figure 6.2 support what the interviewees said. The graph shows the number of active firms 
in the country and the city and highlights the difference before and after 2003. Although there 
were only approximately 5500 foreign companies in the county in 2002, almost 50,000 
companies were active in 2015 and unsurprisingly more than half of these companies were 
located in Istanbul. 
Figure 6.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inwards in Turkey  
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(Sources: TURKSTAT, 2014; GDIPFC, 2017) 
Figure 6.2 Active Foreign Companies in Turkey 
 
(Sources: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy Annual FDI Reports between 2004-2016)  
6.2.1.3 Building for Istanbul: Mega-Projects  
As in many other cities around the world, in Istanbul too, global aspirations become visible in 
urban space through physical projects, that is, mega-projects such as an international airport, 
and large-scale property projects (Fainstein, 2008; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008; Shatkin, 2011; 
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Kanai, 2013; Jonas et al., 2014; Shen and Kee, 2017; for Istanbul see Dogan and Stupar, 
2017). Therefore, mega-projects in Istanbul were one of the most discussed and most 
important topics of the interviews. Unsurprisingly there was a strong disagreement between 
representatives of civil society, officials, and the private sector on the necessity of these 
projects; but this disagreement disappeared when the interviewees were asked who undertakes 
these investments. All interviewees without any exception said the central government is the 
main authority which undertakes the projects. For example, a central government official 
stated: “The mega-projects of Istanbul [see Table 6.1 below]; Marmaray, […], the Third 
Bridge, the New Airport, all these are under Ministry of Transport’s responsibility” 
(MHA#3). The interviewees’ answers also shed light on different aspects of why the central 
government takes on this responsibility: macro framework, legislation and finance.  
First and the foremost, in macro scale, these projects (see Table 6.1) are planned and built 
within the scope of Turkey's national, regional and global economic and political strategies. 
They, therefore, often gain a national character rather than local in the eyes of the central 
government, and even of the local government. For example, as will be recalled from the 
previous chapter, the railroad, to be built, over the Third Bosporus Bridge aims to integrate 
the rail-route between Asia and Europe (New Silk Road Project), which will strengthen 
Turkey's central position in this project. Similarly, the Third Airport and the IFC projects are 
compatible with Turkey's national goals of becoming a major regional (then global) hub for 
the airline networks (ISPAT#1, IMM#4) and financial markets (IDA#1, MHA#3). As stated 
by the former minister of the MOD, though its main base is in Istanbul, IFC projects indeed 
has broader targets such as ensuring national economic development, making of Turkey as a 
global and regional attraction centre and to expand its economic prestige beyond the national 
boundaries (Yılmaz, 2015). In brief, with his words: “The IFC is not a local project of a 
particular city, but a project of Turkey” (ibid; n.p.). 
As a different example, Marmaray and Istanbul Strait Road Tube Crossing Project (named as 
Eurasia Tunnel Project), a 14.6 km motorway route, including 5.4 km tunnel crossing the 
Bosporus over the seabed, both aim to alleviate the traffic pressure of Istanbul, and, in the 
broader sense, serve for Turkey's national strategy of connecting East with West. Perhaps 
most striking among these projects is the Canal Istanbul Project, also known as the Crazy 
Project, as it shows how national economic and political strategies are shaped in a compatible 
way. The project will be used for transit shipping passes between the Black Sea and the Sea of 
Marmara by linking two seas with a new canal. By doing this, the central government aims to 
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by-pass the Montreux Agreement and to regain its political and economic power on the 
intercontinental maritime traffic across the Bosporus (Hurriyetdailynews, 2018). The project 
also includes the New City Project, a new residential area hosting about 500,000 population 
on the edge of the Canal. According to a market report prepared under the coordination of the 
ISPAT, the New City project, together with other real-estate and mega projects, is expected to 
create lucrative business opportunities for global investors (Deloitte-Turkey, 2013). To 
summarise, these projects, in one aspect, aim to a construction-based economic growth, in 
both local and national scale, through public-private partnerships, and, in another aspect, are 
planned and developed as a part of Turkey's national strategies of increasing its political and 
economic dominance in the region. 
 
Table 6.1 Mega-Projects and Urban Transformation Projects in Istanbul  
Project 
Name 
Project 
Type 
Relevant 
Institutions 
Cost 
(US$) 
Definition Current 
Status 
The 3rd 
Bosporus 
Bridge 
Transport MOTI 2.5 
billion  
A new bridge across the Bosporus. It 
is the biggest suspension bridge that 
has a railway network in the world 
(Image 6.1). 
Completed 
in 2015 
The 3rd 
Airport 
Transport MOTI 
TOKI 
22 billion  Planned to be one of the largest 
airports in the world, with a yearly 
capacity of 150 million passengers. 
Under 
Construction 
International 
Financial 
Center 
Commercial 
 
MOD 
MOEU 
IMM 
2 billion  The aim is: Istanbul shall first become 
a regional financial centre, and 
ultimately a global financial centre. 
Under 
Construction 
Marmaray 
Project 
Transport MOTI 2.3 
billion  
A 76,3km metro route between 
Asian and European sides of the city, 
with a 13,5km undersea tunnel. 
Completed 
Canal Istanbul Commercial 
/  
Transport 
Upcoming 15 billion  42 km artificial sea-level waterway 
between the Black Sea and Marmara 
Upcoming 
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New City 
Project  
Commercial 
/  
Culture 
MOEU 
TOKI 
MOTI 
30 billion  It will cover a 244 km² land and host 
500000 population.  
Upcoming 
(Sources: Deloitte-Turkey, 2013; IstanbulSMD, 2018) 
Alongside with the strategic dimension of mega-projects planning, the implementation of 
such projects requires the direct intervention of the central government in the legal sense 
(IMM#1, IMM#2, IMM#3, MOD#1, MOD#2, MHA#2, MHA#3). For example, some 
projects, such as the Third Bridge, require the expropriation of large amount of land, which is 
depending on approval by the Council of Ministries (MOD#1). Likewise, some projects 
require treasury guarantees to attract global investors and these guarantees can only be given 
by the central government (IMM#1). Further, some of the mega-projects are located within 
the administrative boundaries of more than one city, even though those are directly relevant to 
Istanbul. In such a case, these projects can only be conducted under the coordination of the 
central authorities (MHA#2). On the other hand, central intervention on mega-projects is not 
only an inherent requirement stemming from the distribution of authority between local and 
central governments but also the conclusion of a process developed by the central government 
who is seeking to allocate investments in line with the national plans. An NGO representative 
drew attention to this issue as follows:  
“Especially with the article 8021 decision power on a certain amount of investment is 
given to the Council of Ministries. They can offer exemptions including 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures” (NGOR#3).  
The third aspect of the issue is about finance. Moving from the above expropriation example, 
the amount of expropriation for the Third Bosporus Bridge and The North Marmara 
Motorway alone (see Image 6.1) is approximately 1.5 billion Turkish Liras and the total cost 
of the projects is more than 7 billion Turkish Liras which is approximately one sixth of the 
city’s annual budget22. Likewise, as Table 6.1 shows, the Third Airport (see Image 6.2), 
which will be one of the biggest in the world, believed to increase Istanbul’s position in the 
global cities hierarchy by making it a global air transportation hub, is estimated to cost US$22 
billion, which is much more than the Metropolitan Municipality can afford. Given their costs 
                                                 
21 Article 80 of the Law No. 6745, passed in August 2016, provides power to Council of Ministers to give 
incentives, financial and bureaucratic such as exemptions from licences or permissions, to investment projects. 
NGOs concerns are that the article eases up the Environment Impact Assesment Process (See Env.net, 2016). 
22 For other mega-projects in Istanbul see http://megaprojeleristanbul.com 
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and nation-wide effects, decision-making in and funding of airports is a process in which 
central governments are heavily involved, even in cities like London (Department for 
Transport, 2017) and Tokyo (OECD/ITF, 2014), which have much greater financial 
possibilities than Istanbul. 
As has been mentioned before, many interviewees agree that Turkey is a very centralised 
country in terms of local government finance too. Local governments have no autonomous 
revenue sources and are heavily dependent on the funds allocated by the central government 
(AA#1). They, therefore, “cannot cover these investments with their own budgets; they cannot 
do such big investments” (BSR#2). Consequently, these projects being undertaken by the 
central government is welcomed by all local officials interviewed, as one of them explicitly 
expressed: 
“The central government also has a very important role indeed. Although local 
government has a big budget, it is not always enough. [...] Because we cannot do all 
these projects ourselves, we are waiting for support from the central government. […] 
The support of the central government in mega-projects such as the 3rd Bridge, the 3rd 
Airport or Canal Istanbul, paves the way for us” (IMM#4). 
Image 6.1 The Third Bosporus Bridge 
 
(Source: Sabah, 2016) 
6.2.2. Governing in Istanbul: Role of the Local Government 
There is no doubt that one of the most controversial issues arising from the interviews was 
about the functions of local government. Although the Metropolitan Municipality is seen as 
the main authority on paper, most of the interviewees thought that local government has a 
secondary position behind the central government. In that sense, it is highly possible to 
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assume that there is a kind of hierarchic distribution of roles between the central and the local 
governments. This vertical relationship was harshly stated by an academic as follows: “the 
role of the central [government] is to make decisions, and role of the local [government] is to 
enforce decisions” (AA#1). Or, with a different statement:  
“We position ourselves according to these strategies. For example, the central 
government prepares development plans, or the Ministry of Development tells the 
Istanbul Development Agency: In relation to the 2023 Goals, 10th Development Plan 
is published. They [the Ministry] say what should be done to reach the 2023 goals. We 
should do some investments relevant to economy or environment, for example. This is 
the central government’s duty. So, central government is planning everything in line 
with the 2023 goals, what we should do is to fulfil these duties” (IMM#4).  
As understood from the above quote, some of the primary roles of the local government in 
this hierarchic distribution are, for example, “to solve local problems [of the projects]” 
(BSR#2), “to follow licences procedures in relation to the Finance Centre Project” (BSR#1), 
and “to point central government the way on mega-projects” (IMM#3). The Metropolitan 
Municipality is in one sense acting as the local implementer of the central policies, and like 
the other local governments in the country, it must act within the legal frameworks and 
strategies drawn up by the central government. On the other hand, thanks to its financial 
capacity and the political/economic importance, Istanbul’s local government is also able to 
carry out planning and building activities which are highly difficult for other cities.  
6.2.2.1 Planning in Istanbul  
In the planning scheme of Turkey, there are two different kinds of local plan: master plans 
and strategy plans. In Istanbul too, therefore, there is both a spatial plan, the Environment 
Plan, prepared by the Metropolitan Municipality (IMMCPD, 2009); and a strategic plan, 
Istanbul Region Plan, prepared by the Istanbul Development Agency (IDA, 2014). Both are 
local plans that provide a set of policies for the city covering economic, social and spatial 
aspects of what the city is aiming to achieve by 2023. There is, moreover, a hierarchy between 
the plans in the planning framework, in favour of the strategic plan.  It is therefore that the 
Regional Plan must be considered in preparing the Environment plan.  
In relation to spatial planning, in 2004 the central government published a new planning 
framework, the law No. 5216, and gave planning power for whole administrative boundaries 
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to local governments. Before that law, according to urban planners in the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality, the Metropolitan Government had a limited planning power which 
did not cover the whole metropolitan area (IMM#1, IMM#2). After the amendment, two 
different plans were prepared, 2006 and 2009 (Revised version of the 2006 plan) Istanbul 
Environment Plans, by the Metropolitan Municipality.  
What is important here is that an urban planner from local government, who was one of the 
planners who prepared the master plans in the 1990s, said that the current plans (2006 and 
2009) show a consistency with the previous plans, or rather, are built on those prepared during 
Erdoğan’s period of office. It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the 1995 master plan had a 
vision of making Istanbul as a world city in which service, trade, and tourism sectors are 
agglomerated. There is a similar vision in the 2009 master plan: making Istanbul a world city 
and strengthening the city’s global competitiveness, especially in finance, trade, and tourism 
(IMMCPD, 2009). Likewise, as echoed by an interviewee (CCP#1), Ali Müfit Gürtuna, the 
successor mayor of Erdoğan, used a similar discourse: to revive the global identity of 
Istanbul, which has been the capital of three empires. A similar consistency can also be seen 
in the emphasises on the historical, cultural and geopolitical importance of the city.  For 
example, the 2009 Master Plan highlights: 
“Istanbul, the point where East meets West and blends, has a synthesis coloured with 
the cultural accumulation that different civilisations have formed throughout history. 
In addition, Istanbul, located at the intersections of the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, 
Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, is one of the important world 
cities that provides service to these regions, owing to its strategic and geographical 
location and cultural connections” (IMMCPD, 2009: i).  
Another issue in relation to the latest plan, 2009, which is also essential to see the hierarchical 
relationship between the local and the central, is that the plan did not include two of the most 
popular mega-projects, the Third Airport and the Third Bridge. This plan was prepared by the 
Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Centre, which was later closed. An executive who used to 
work for this institution expressed: “Our plan was working very well without the airport and 
the bridge” (PA#1). Another urban planner from the Metropolitan Municipality, who took a 
role in preparing the plan, used a similar statement:  
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“While we were preparing the 2009 Environment Plan, I have thought the Third 
Airport in a different location, which might be discussed whether it was right or 
wrong, but our central government decided on a different location [current site]” 
(IMM#3). 
Image 6.2 The New Airport of Istanbul 
 
(Source: Grimshaw Architects, 2015) 
The same interviewee then pointed to another aspect of the matter:   
“We are the institution that are responsible for preparing the urban plan within the 
metropolitan municipal borders, but in legal frame there could be many other 
institutions which have a plan-making power” (IMM#3). 
Within the traditional centralised state structure of Turkey, there are several tools through 
which the central government can directly influence the local plans. For example, in the 2009 
plan, the plan was revised by the local government following a direct request of the central 
government, and the airport and the bridge were included. Moreover, there are various central 
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government institutions which have planning powers in certain locations (e.g. Ministry of 
Tourism in tourism areas). The place-specific plans prepared by the relevant central 
government institutions take precedence in practice over plans prepared by the local 
governments. In other words, the local governments must either take the central government’s 
priorities into account or must revise the plan in line with their priorities as in the 2009 plan. 
This enables the central government to intervene in city planning, and causes a messy and 
complicated local planning framework, which many interviewees from all groups complained 
about (e.g. IMM#1, IMM#3, MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR#2, CCP#1, PA#2, UCLG#1, NGOR#1).  
Further, the central government established a new planning framework after the foundation of 
the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in 2011 and further centralised this planning 
hierarchy. With this amendment, the master plans prepared by the local governments must be 
approved by the ministry. Another change to the planning frame came with the establishment 
of the Development Agencies, for this research Istanbul Development Agency, in 2009, as a 
part of the EU accession process. After it was established, the Agency identified itself as an 
agency working for transforming Istanbul into a global city and was given power and 
responsibility to prepare local vision plans for the city (IDA, 2014). The Istanbul Region Plan 
2014-2023 is the recent strategic plan prepared by the agency. As its name implies, the plan 
was prepared in compliance with the 2023 Goals, and its primary goal is to set the local 
strategies for the 2023 targets (IDA, 2014). Briefly stated, it draws a set of economic, social 
and spatial strategies “to transform Istanbul into a global attraction centre for science people, 
global capital, for the economy” (IDA#1). There is, therefore, a strong discursive consensus 
between national development plans and the Region Plan.  
6.2.2.2 Building in Istanbul 
Bearing the global aspirations of the city in mind, both people who rule the city and the 
people who live in the city were asked about the problems that stand in the city’s way of 
becoming a leading global city and about disadvantages of Istanbul compared with other 
cities. The answers given to those questions point to similar issues; one is non-earthquake 
resistant buildings based on unplanned urbanisation and the other one is traffic and 
infrastructure problems.  In particular, the local authorities stated that they have serious 
complaints from both local people and national or global investors that there is not a sufficient 
and well-functioning public transport system, especially no adequate underground network. 
So indeed, compared to cities that are assumed to be competing with Istanbul, such as 
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Moscow, Istanbul’s underground network is not well developed. The information obtained 
either through the interviews with local officials or from official documents show that these 
two issues are directly under the responsibilities of the local government.  
The local officials who were interviewed emphasised that the local government gives 
particular importance to improving Istanbul’s underground system. The local authorities 
interviewed emphasised that the local government attaches special importance to improving 
the underground system of Istanbul. Indeed, since 2004, Istanbul’s underground network has 
increased from 45 km to 150 km (IMM, 2016). This will reach to 330 km when the ongoing 
projects will be completed. As a local bureaucrat said: “only in Istanbul, all underground 
investments are carried out by the Metropolitan Municipality” (UCLG#1). There is no doubt 
that the local government either considers central government’s aims or decides in 
coordination with them, or both.  
This is also a kind of task sharing, written or unwritten, between local and central 
governments, as stated by a local government executive: “We create the local infrastructure of 
the IFC Project, in line with the central government needs” (IMM#3). Another executive 
official from Institutional Development and Governance Systems Department of the 
Metropolitan Municipality also said on this issue that as a part of the local and national 2023 
Goals the central government assigns improving public transportation system (IMM#4). Some 
– ongoing or completed – underground routes are directly on the locations where the central 
government is conducting mega projects like the Financial Centre Project or the Third Airport 
Project.  
Another important and controversial issue is the urban transformation. Essentially, there was a 
consensus between interviewees that urban transformation is an obligation for Istanbul, due to 
unplanned urbanisation, skewed settlement, and therefore poor conditions of existing 
buildings, and earthquake hazard. For example, a board member of one of the largest 
construction companies in the country said: “There are about 5 million houses in Istanbul, 
1.5-2 million of them, that is 50 per cent, must be renewed” (BSR#4). However, this 
consensus disappeared when people were talking about how this transformation should be 
done. Until recently, the local government has been the main authority on urban 
transformation issues. They even staged competitions and undertook some mega-scale 
projects in cooperation with district municipalities. Yet, many interviewees, especially central 
government officials and private sector agents, were thinking that because of the number of 
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buildings to be transformed, of the number of people to be affected by this transformation, 
and of the cost of this transformation, the local government alone could not overcome this 
issue. 
It is necessary to mention here that urban transformation is also an opportunity for investment 
or attracting investment. Actors from the private sector, for example, were thinking that to 
accelerate the process, urban transformation projects might be made more attractive for the 
private sector through introducing legal changes, such as vat incentives, tax cuts or obligating 
city-block based transformation (rather than parcel based), and so were advocating that 
although the Metropolitan Municipality is the main authority in this issue, the central 
government should step in when it is needed. Some central government officials too 
mentioned that they attempt to attract foreign capital through using rent-sharing methods in 
urban transformation projects. An interviewee, for example, stated that they are keeping in 
touch with an international construction company relating to a transformation project in one 
of the city’s districts (ISPAT#1).  
Therefore, it is possible to say here that the central government, through its institutions, has 
also become an actor of urban transformation, together with the private sector. Especially, the 
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization gained the power to conduct urban transformation 
projects, if district municipalities demand, and/or if it sees it as necessary. An official from 
the Ministry, who actively participated in one of the largest urban transformation projects in 
the city, Fikirtepe Urban Transformation Project, justified their interventions in the project by 
saying that because of populism or financial abilities local government could not do that 
(MOEU#1). She also said that they regard local authorities as the main authority responsible 
for urban transformation and that they would like to transfer their power to them in the near 
future. In short, although the local government is the main authority for urban transformation, 
many different institutions may get involved in the projects. It therefore becomes a messier 
situation and has become one of the issues that the local authorities are dissatisfied with:  
“There is a chaos indeed in relation to our duties. I mean urban transformation: The 
main actor is the ministry, particularly after the law no. 6306. To the law, the ministry 
gives the power to metropolitan municipalities, yet they can give power to district 
municipalities if they think it is necessary. After the law, a lot of district municipalities 
applied to the ministry and were empowered. So, although the metropolitan 
municipality is given the main role to manage urban transformation and to organise 
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the district municipalities in urban transformation projects, it is also like being by-
passed” (IMM#6).  
6.3. Relationship between the City and the State 
One of the much-discussed issues in the global cities literature is how globalisation influences 
the relationship between global/globalising cities and their nation-states (Jonas and Wilson, 
2018). Much of the literature assumes that cities and states lost their mutuality of interests and 
that the local governments of global cities might have different interests and agendas from 
that of their national governments (Taylor, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Barber, 
2013). A potential result of this is that the relationship between national and sub-national 
scales of government tend to be in tension (Brenner, 1998; Peck, 2002; Barber, 2013), as 
noted by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003: 334):  
“[T]he interests of subnational and national governments tend to be at odds . . . 
Although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve 
responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments with as few 
accompanying resources as possible, the subnational governments would prefer the 
opposite case. The balance between these extremes will depend upon the relative 
strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government.”  
On the other hand, some other studies too, mainly from non-western contexts, say that city-
state relationships need to be assessed within the internal context of each state and contend 
that they are not necessarily in tension (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003). In a similar vein, 
another argument in this issue is that considering their financial and political limitations, the 
cities might enjoy the support of their national governments to raise their positions in global 
cities hierarchy (Frug and Barron, 2008; Clark and Moonen, 2017). In the light of the 
discussions that have been made until now and will be made below, it can be said that the case 
of Istanbul demonstrates a similar characteristic to the approaches that assume the 
intergovernmental relations might be more harmonious than conflict ridden politics of scale 
which dominates much contemporary thinking in global urban studies. To be more precise, 
there is an obvious harmony between Istanbul, as the city, and Turkey, as the country that is 
more similar to the developmental city-state approach of East Asia than the state rescaling 
literature of North American and Western Europe. This harmony stems from different 
dynamics such as common interests, mutual dependencies, and political identities. However, 
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it does not mean that there is an exact harmony or that there is no area of contestation. For 
example, over-centralisation, or lack of participation in decision-making are some of the 
issues leading to complaints of urban and environmental groups, and even by a few local and 
central officials.  
6.3.1. Rational Harmony – Interests and Obligations 
As noted above, the Istanbul example demonstrates that there might be an intergovernmental 
relationship which is different to that assumed in much of the literature on the politics of 
global city formation. First of all, there are rational reasons for this relationship to be in 
harmony for both local government and central government. For Istanbul’s local government, 
to receive the support of the central government, especially in mega-projects, is beneficial for 
raising the city’s position in the global cities hierarchy. From the point of the central 
government, to support the global desires of the city and to steer its policies and investments 
in line with this goal mean economic growth as it will bring more investment to the city. 
Nevertheless, this harmony is, of course, mostly between governments and private sectors. 
Almost all NGOs representatives and other individual interviewees – with a few exceptions 
(AA#1, LPL#1) – were against what the discourse of and policies about the global city or its 
derivatives will bring to Istanbul (see 6.3.3. below). 
Different dimensions of the rationality, or mutual obligations between different tiers of 
governments will be discussed below, but before that, it should be answered whether, or not, 
there is a consensus on the goals and interests of Istanbul. Despite the rising discourse that 
cities, especially those who are global, have different interests than that of their national states 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Barber, 2013), the Istanbul case offers a different example. 
Though defined with different terms such as global city, financial centre, attraction centre, 
odak şehir (attractive city) 23, many people interviewed, either national or local, seemed to 
agree that it was necessary to reach these targets and that this would be beneficial to Istanbul 
and Turkey. To demonstrate this harmony between central and local administrations, it is 
worth quoting from three different interviews: 
“We are planning Istanbul to serve as a service city or congress and tourism city. So, 
in that sense, there is a consensus between central government and the local authority” 
(IMM#3).  
                                                 
23 The Mayor, Kadir Topbaş, describes ‘odak şehir’ as a city in which all companies desire to be located 
(Topbaş, 2016). 
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“So, I think there is a consensus between central government and the municipal 
government and the development agency on making of Istanbul as a global centre, an 
attraction centre, or a transport hub” (IDA#1). 
“Both central and local administrations share the same vision, they are working to 
make Istanbul into a global brand. Metropolitan Municipality, district municipalities, 
and the central administrations, including us, aim to make Istanbul as a global city” 
(MHA#3). 
As pointed out earlier, one of the dimensions of globalisation that must be associated with the 
emergence of global cities is that cities become a tool for capital accumulation not only for 
local governments but also national governments (Brenner, 1998). In this sense, global cities 
are viewed as the engines of national – or regional – economic development, and national 
governments from all corners of the world are more involved in the emergence of global cities 
(Hill and Kim, 2000; Zhang, 2013; Herrschel, 2014). The interviews demonstrate that the case 
of Istanbul is consistent with this assumption. The central government believes that to 
increase the global position of Istanbul, which produces half of the national economic 
production, will be beneficial to the country’s economic development. In other words, as an 
interviewee explained: “The development of Turkey is going parallel with the development of 
Istanbul, [and the government] encourages this development in some ways” (CCP#1). It is 
observed by some central government officials during interviews that the central government 
was approaching these local issues in terms of national achievements (MOD#1, MOD#2, 
ISPAT#1). Perhaps because of this, as quoted when the 2023 goals were discussed above, the 
IFC Project is seen as a national rather than local project. 
A similar national approach in relation to projects was also observed with some local officials, 
which was useful to think once again about the local-central relationship. A new airport, for 
example, was argued over its contribution to the country’s economy (IMM#4), or the finance 
centre project was mentioned how tax incomes of the central government will increase 
(IMM#3). In brief, as an IDA official said:   
“No, I think it is so harmonic. We can already see when we look at the central 
investments: There are many investments in Istanbul. I think, this already shows that 
Ankara (the central government) is conscious of the importance of Istanbul and of that 
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we can achieve our goals only if Istanbul’s economy develops. That is why they 
mainly invest in Istanbul” (IDA#1). 
Even though it is often mentioned that Turkey is a highly centralised state, it should not be 
forgotten that owing to its economic and political importance, Istanbul’s metropolitan 
government is not an ordinary local administration that the central government could easily 
neglect or discard (MOD#1). Therefore, to work in harmony with the local government and to 
thoroughly share the tasks is crucial for the central government. This is because, the 
underground investments, for example, and some other infrastructure investments are 
undertaken by the local authority in coordination with the central government considering 
macro projects (IMM#3). Otherwise, as some interviewees pointed out, the local government 
may endeavour to prevent a project (MHA#1), go to court to cancel a project (BSR#4), create 
a strong opposition through involving NGOs and the public (NGOR#3), not logistically 
support the projects which affects investors’ decisions (UCLG#1), that is somehow prevent 
(MHA#1), or at least delay (IMM#2), the projects. From a different aspect, on an occasion of 
disagreement: 
“When we consider the local government’s budget, unless they use the budget in line 
with the central government’s goals, the central government stands by with folded 
arms. I mean, the central government can’t set a separate budget to invest in Istanbul 
itself” (MOD#2). 
Likewise,    
“Now, of course, being a national financial centre is not something that only a mayor 
can do by himself. I mean, it is a very big project indeed. I think, it necessitates an 
adoption in central [government] as well, so being in different views or different 
parties are a valid reason not to make it real. But after being the same party on both 
sides, and agreements, it is easier to achieve” (IDA#1). 
Therefore, even though it is often assumed in the literature that “the economic fortunes of 
these (global) cities become increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even 
their national economies” (Sassen, 2005: 30), what is clear is that the cities, at least some of 
them, still need the support of their national governments to gain these fortunes (Wang and 
Huang, 2009; Clark and Moonen, 2017). It might even be said that, in more centralised states, 
global cities fall behind in the global competition when they lose the support of their national 
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governments (Wang and Huang, 2009). In such cases in which Istanbul too could be included, 
working in harmony with the central governments becomes more crucial for local 
governments. Hence, rather than assuming that “the interests of cities and of the nations 
which they belong [...] are often necessarily in tension” (Barber, 2013: 9), it seems to be quite 
rational, at least in the case of Istanbul, to give ear to what a former local bureaucrat said: 
“If the metropolitan municipalities, so called local governments or local parliaments, 
and central governments are governed with harmony, and stability, those cities, 
countries easily develop, achieve the goals” (UCLG#1). 
This study demonstrates that it is crucial to receive the central government’s financial and 
political support if Istanbul wants to raise its ranking in the global order. In that sense, it is 
quite rational for the local government too to work in harmony with the central government. 
As many interviewees agreed, it is almost impossible to make global aspirations come true, if 
those aspirations are different from those of the central government (BSR#2, IMM#3, 
IMM#6, MOD#1). One of those interviewees, a local government executive, for example, 
confessed: “We cannot achieve the goal we aspire. We can achieve them in 3-4 years by 
support of central government, otherwise it takes 50-100 years” (IMM#3). This harmony is 
crucial not only for the city’s global targets but also for other infrastructure investments and 
day-to-day municipal services. An example given by a local official on this topic was quite 
interesting: “Some parts of underground constructions are undertaken by the state, so we are 
able to focus on different fields in local” (IMM#6). It must be said here that, as the quotation 
at the beginning of the paragraph emphasises, even though this harmony is seen as an 
obligation, political identities of these governments have an important role in this harmony 
too.  
6.3.2. Political Harmony – Values  
In a country such as Turkey where political polarisation is remarkably high, for local and 
central governments being controlled by the same political party could be a key for working 
in harmony. The answers given to the questions which are seeking to explore local-central 
relations already demonstrated that being the same ruling party in both tiers of governments is 
seen by most interviewees as an important factor for them to work in harmony. In addition to 
this, the answers also provide a better understanding of the levels of polarisation. Three of the 
main interview groups - local and central officials and private sector representatives - were 
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very pleased that both the city and the state are being ruled by the same party. The 
interviewees working for the Metropolitan Municipality said that they are unwilling to work 
with a different party in central government. On the other hand, another group of interviewees 
complained that this close relationship, together with many other reasons, decreases their 
involvement in decision-making processes.  
Political polarisation is both a reason and a consequence of why political belongings or 
identities are felt in more depth. The words that local and central authorities used when they 
mentioned each other could be thought of as a reflection of this feeling: “there is a harmony; 
think of them like sons of a family” (IMM#6). This quote from a local metropolitan 
government executive is not a singular statement. Similar views from other officials were 
observed during the interviews. These mutual feelings are at the same time one of the most 
important barriers which stand in front of potential conflicts between different authorities, as a 
metropolitan executive highlighted: “Because both the central and the local government are in 
the same hand, there is no disagreement” (IMM#5). Another important factor that the 
interviewee highlighted was that if the local and central authorities are in the same party, they 
can easily stay focused on the same targets (IMM#5). It could be given as example that local 
interviewees adopted the 2023 targets as local targets. Central officials’ approaches at this 
point were not so different, six of them speaking of central local relations explicitly expressed 
that they see working with the same party in local governments as a key factor for working in 
harmony and achieving targets faster. As an example:   
“What I see after I started to work here is that working with the same party in local 
government is an advantage for me. I have witnessed because they share a common 
vision they can work in harmony and give decisions faster” (MHA#3). 
It is worth quoting from two different interviewees, one from the metropolitan government 
and one from a ministry, to demonstrate how this political harmony eases the process towards 
achieving targets:  
“There is no conflict now. For example, the municipality might approve and conduct a 
project that our prime minister, our president wants to do in Istanbul, it might not have 
done if there was a different party in the metropolitan municipality” (IMM#5). 
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“It is parallel with central government. I mean, government supports the metropolitan 
municipality’s projects, but the municipality too share their projects and consulted 
with the central authorities” (MOEU#1). 
It is possible to understand from the interviews with the authorities how being from the same 
party eases the policy-making processes. There are various formal and informal ways in 
which local authorities can meet with central officials and negotiate about solutions of their 
problems, and of course, being from the same party significantly increases these ways 
(IDA#1, IMM#4, MOEU#1, MHA#2). Istanbul is much more advantageous in this regard 
compared to other cities, because: “In Ankara [the central government], there are many top-
level bureaucrats and politicians, who had previously worked in the Metropolitan 
Municipality”24 (MOEU#1). Probably also thanks to this, many local government officials 
were thinking that they have various opportunities to meet with the central government 
institutions and that they could easily express their opinions and objections to the projects that 
interest them (IMM#1, IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#5). By emphasising on being from the same 
party, some of the respondents also stated that they can directly contact the relevant ministries 
and receive their support for their municipal debts and other financial problems (IMM#3, 
IMM#4). One of them even pointed out that another AKP metropolitan government requested 
from the relevant minister that the ministry undertake an underground investment which the 
local government started but could not complete because of the financial problems 
(UCLG#1). In brief:  
“[In Turkey] All local governments would want to receive the central government’s 
support. I mean, all of them want to walk [with the central government] in the same 
direction, in both the material and nonmaterial sense” (IMM#1). 
One of the issues that this study explores is whether being local and central governments in 
different parties might create a tension. As discussed in the Chapter 2, one criticism of the 
global cities concept is that the economic significance of global cities is often exaggerated. 
Given this significance as a fact, a clear assumption would be that the central governments 
necessarily support their cities who want to be global. However, in Istanbul, as one private 
sector representor remembered:  
                                                 
24 As an anecdote supporting the quote, two interviewees from central government have transferred from the 
local bodies to central institutions. 
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“In the past, we had seen different examples such as cutting local governments 
budgets, disapprove the projects. I mean, it is a fact in Turkish political tradition, state 
administrative tradition” (BSR#1). 
Although there is not much emphasis on this in the literature, there are many examples how 
political differences between city governments and state governments cause tensions, such as 
the conflicts between a Labour governed Greater London Authority and the Conservative UK 
Central Government (Brenner, 2004b; Hijino, 2017) or between the Socialist Paris Regional 
Government and the French Central Government (Fouchier, 2013; Kipfer et al, 2017). Since 
city-state relations are embedded in wider historical, cultural and political contexts, extents 
and contents of the tensions differ from country to country. Nevertheless, as the state becomes 
more centralised, so this conflict seems to become more destructive for local governments 
than for central governments. For example, in one of the few studies in the literature, Wang 
and Huang (2009) demonstrate that the disagreements between central government and local 
government, which are different parties, negatively affected Taipei’s world city position.  
In Turkey, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, it is not difficult to guess that such a conflict is 
more dangerous for Istanbul than for Turkey. That view was clearly articulated in the 
responses given by the local officials, based on their own experiences in the 1990s or what 
they heard from their colleagues. For example, some local officials who used to work with a 
different central government mentioned that the central government had broken out of the 
routine inspection regime and had sent many inspectors (IMM#5), that their master plans 
prepared under Erdoğan’s period were not approved by the central government (IMM#1), or 
that some projects were stopped by the central government (IMM#6; UCLG#1). A central 
government official who used to work for the Metropolitan Municipality in the past stated that 
while he was in the local government he heard from his colleagues that some of Erdoğan’s 
projects were stymied by the central government when he was the mayor (MHA#3). Another 
said: 
“In our youth, that is the 1990s, these conflicts had cost cities, or society a lot, but I 
think we are heading towards a different Turkey with the harmony achieved for last 
10-15 years, since 2002” (MHA#2).  
Almost all officials interviewed underlined the point that the above quotation also highlights: 
the harmony achieved since 2002. Therefore, neither local nor central officials wanted to 
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experience a different political process that might end this harmony. Local officials for 
example thought that they might have difficulty in working, if a different political party rules 
the country, because, as one of them explained: “a different party in local, I mean differences 
between governments, gets something slower willy-nilly” (IMM#6). A metropolitan executive 
too explicitly stated that possibility of a coalition government, after the general election on 7 
June 2015, worried them because of the risk of losing a thirteen-year stability (IMM#4). A 
central official defined this possibility as a ‘problem’ and stated that this affects Istanbul in a 
negative way (MHA#2). He also added that “there is a harmony now under the leadership of 
our president”.  
Some groups, NGOs and critical individuals, approach this harmony from a different 
perspective. They too agreed there is a harmony between the municipal authority and the 
central government, but they also claim that this harmony just reduces time on decision-
making. According to this group of interviewees, the neoliberal mind-set is a dominant 
ideology which is shared by all major parties to different degrees, so all these parties 
implement more or less similar policies in different cities that they govern. Hence, from this 
perspective, there is no significant difference between opposition parties and the ruling party, 
as an executive planner from the Chambers of City Planners noted:  
“In Izmir, for example, CHP municipality implements similar policies. The 
metropolitan municipalities governed by MHP such as Manisa, Mersin implement 
similar policies. There is no difference in local politics indeed, so I don’t think there 
might be a problem or a conflict between local authorities and central government” 
(CCP#1). 
Nevertheless, what all critical interviewees agreed on was that this harmony affects the 
policy-making processes. They told that they cannot participate in bidding processes. An 
academic complained that “they are working in an excellent harmony. There might be some 
disagreements, but nobody could hear that” (AA#2). Some NGO representatives noted that 
they could not hear anything about the plans until they came to the local council because they 
generally carry this process with central government behind closed doors, but they can 
relatively easily find a possibility to participate in the projects carried out by the local 
government ruled by opposition parties (NGOR#3; NGOR#4).  
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6.3.3. Conflicts and Areas of Contestation  
Although local government authorities interviewed enjoyed central government’s support and 
their relationship with the central government, and so there was no complaint on that issue, a 
limited number of local officials raised some minor objections to the way in which central 
government approaches urban issues. For example, an interviewee complained that “the 
Metropolitan Municipality is bypassed” (IMM#6) by the central government when he was 
talking about the urban transformation. Another one highlighted that “local governments 
might have different priorities from the central government but the multiplicity of institutions 
that have planning power might cause some disagreements” (IMM#3). 
It is possible to find similar objections in between the lines of the interviews done with the 
central officials and private sector representatives. For example, a TOKI official had a similar 
thought from a different perspective: “central government’s priorities might be different to 
that of the local, and in such a case local’s decisions might be pushed aside” (MHA#3). 
Another bureaucrat, who used to work for various central institutions and the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality, pointed out that “central government should only focus on the 
national plans and leave local planning to local authorities” (UCLG#1). Furthermore, a central 
government bureaucrat confessed: “It is not easy to govern Istanbul from Ankara. Now, you 
cannot see the needs of Istanbul from Ankara” (MOD#1). For that reason, about half of the 
central government officials believed that central government should be more involved in 
decision-making processes and their role be strengthened. 
However, there are some different arguments too in central government’s side that legitimate 
their interventions. To some central officials, local administrations are such election-oriented 
institutions that if the central government do not intervene in urban policies, they prefer short-
term and populist investments rather than long-term, risky, and expensive investments 
(MEU#1, MOD#1). Likewise, there was a further opinion on the central government side 
which is that local administrations lack a sufficient number of qualified technical or executive 
personnel (MHA#1, MOEU#1, MOD#1). This view was also shared by some interviewees 
from different groups (NGOR#4, BSR#2, BSR#5, IMM#5). Those who share these views, 
therefore, thought that central intervention is one of the crucial factors to ensure the continuity 
of local politics. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that because of the political and rational harmony between 
local and central governments, none of these objections created a conflict between them. 
Hence, the main objections come from non-official actors, that is private sector 
representatives and opposition groups. Private sector objections are more about planning and 
governing processes, such as the existence of many authorities which have planning power 
(BSR#1), uncertainty in legislation or bureaucratic processes (BSR#4), or coordination 
problems between different authorities (BSR#2). Private sector representatives thought that to 
overcome these problems the municipal government should be more autonomous (BSR#1), or 
the city should be governed with a different administrative structure than other metropolitan 
cities (BSR#2). It should be noted here that since they have no difficulty in participation and 
communication about their problems and expectations, as was exemplified above, they voiced 
their critiques quite slightly.  
Unsurprisingly, opposition groups’ outlooks on the issues argued are much more radical than 
those of the private sector. Specifically, civil society representatives interviewed were highly 
critical of their involvement in the policy-making processes. All interviewees in this group 
claimed that they are not included in decision-making mechanisms. A well-placed critique on 
participation, for example, came from an urban activist (ACT#1). She stated that there are 
many projects which seek to transform Istanbul into a global city, but they do not hear 
anything until they are brought to local parliament, because these policies are decided behind 
closed doors with the private sector, both national and global (ACT#1). Another interviewee, 
who is the leader of a solidarity group in one of the city’s districts where the Third Bridge is 
located, pointed out local government’s populism:  
“We cannot involve in the local decisions. They [local politicians] come before the 
elections and mention their projects to influence our preferences, but [after the 
elections] they govern as they wish” (NGOR#3). 
Moreover, an interviewee from a national environmental organisation made an interesting 
comparison, which is also important to see the city’s position in the national urban order. He 
stated that in Anatolian cities they can participate in policy-making processes, but in Istanbul, 
the private sector, together with the central government, is more dominant in these processes 
(NGOR#4).   
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Now their comments on policy-making processes are very critical because many officials 
thought that the government are so far as possible open to other stakeholders’ involvement in 
policy-making (IMM#1, IMM#6, MHA#2, MOD#2, ISPAT#1, MOEU#1). According to an 
interviewee, the central government organises many workshops and meetings to increase 
participation (MOEU#1). Likewise, a Head of a Department in the Metropolitan Government 
stated that when they work on a project, they invite various occupational groups to get their 
comments on the project (IMM#1). Here is a point that none of the officials who mentioned 
civil stakeholders’ integration could give a specific example of how these stakeholders 
participate, at which stage they are able to get involved and who these stakeholders are, they 
rather made implicit or superficial statements. As an exception, an official at the IFC Project 
stated that various national professional associations related to the finance sector were 
included in the project (MOD#2).  
When the above views of the authorities were asked to NGO representatives, another 
interesting aspect of the issue also appeared. Namely, some activists expressed that the local 
and the central governments encourage the people who share similar views with them to 
establish associations and then include this groups in policy-making processes to prevent a 
potential opposition (NGOR#2, NGOR#3, ACT#1). It was even stated that local governments 
start such kind of NGOs [or GONGOs, government-oriented NGOs] (ACT#1). Moreover, 
some interviewees from these groups accused the local government of pretending. According 
to them, local administrators sometimes arrange meetings with the NGOs and various local 
solidarity groups in order to share their projects, most notably urban transformation projects. 
However, these meetings are often set after decisions are made, that is, they do not go beyond 
the information stage. Yet, nevertheless, the authorities sell these meetings as if they are 
practices of participative local governance (ACT#1, PAD#2, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, NGOR#4). 
Another and particularly important contestation point is the negative impact of current 
policies and projects, in particular mega-projects, on the social fabric and the urban 
environment. The NGOs representatives interviewed claimed that urban policies are not 
shaped considering the needs of the city and its people but with the profit and rent motivations 
fuelled by global aspirations (NGOR#2, NGOR#3, NGOR#4, LUR#1, ACT#1). According to 
one of the urban activists from Istanbul Urban Defence: 
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“Istanbul is the place that this economic-oriented mentality at most shows itself. This 
mentality transforms any and every part of the city, green zones such as the Northern 
Forests, parks, public spaces, and neighbourhoods, into investment areas” (NGOR#2). 
Another frequently expressed concern was that with mega projects expansion of the city will 
move from the existing east-west axis towards the northern side, including the Northern 
Forests of Istanbul. The most important reason for this concern was that, as touched upon in 
the previous chapter, after the construction of the Second Bosporus Bridge, the city quickly 
expanded towards rural areas and forestlands on the line of the Bridge (PA#1, AA#2). 
Moreover, the developments justify these concerns. As Image 6.3 reveals, the primary mega-
projects of Istanbul –The Third Bosporus Bridge (1), The Third Airport Project (2), Canal 
Istanbul (3), and The New City Project (4) – are in the periphery of Istanbul, in particular in 
the villages and the forests on the northern side of the city.  
Image 6.3 Mega-Projects of Istanbul 
 
(Source: IstanbulSMD, 2018) 
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When officials are asked what they think about this matter, it was observed that their answers 
reflected their economic-entrepreneurial mentality which is highly criticised by opponents. 
Many interviewees working for government agencies spoke out time and again that they are 
conscious of adverse changes on society and environment brought by globalisation and 
sensitive to that issue (MHA#1, MHA#2, MOD#1, IMM#4, IMM#5). However, their general 
opinion was that those damages could not be avoided but must be minimised. One of them for 
example said that both local authorities and relevant ministries make most of technological 
opportunities on mega-projects to minimise environmental damages (IMM#3). Yet another 
one remembered that they consider environmental impact assessment reports of mega-projects 
(IMM#1). On the other hand, although they thought they are sensitive to the environment, 
nevertheless a considerable number of officials expressed that they often prioritise economic 
growth and development and sometimes tolerate negative side-effects of projects. For 
example, an interviewee from the central government exemplified this as follows:  
“One would wish that they protect cultural fabric, historical items, but a developing 
country could be forced to push something into the background. Of course, we should 
protect our forests, but I have never heard any country that succeeded in both 
economic development and environmental protection.” (MOD#1) 
6.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the current phase of globalisation can be seen to bring new 
territorialities or boundaries, new networks of cities, new functions and opportunities for 
cities (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Sassen, 2018). Along with this, what globalisation also 
generates is a new distribution of power between cities and their host states in favour of the 
former, and therefore, new forms of relations which are negotiated. More globalist accounts 
claim that nation states are day by day losing their administrative power against the cities 
within their own territorial boundaries, and that cities, at least some of them, gradually gain 
more power to determine their own destinies (e.g. Ohmae, 2005; Khanna, 2016; Sassen, 
2018). Such assumptions also consciously or unconsciously imply a tension between these 
two governing bodies, both seeking their own interests (Barber, 2013). To contribute to these 
discussions, the chapter has touched upon three important issues; central government’s role in 
determining Istanbul’s policies, power and responsibilities of the local bodies, and the nature 
of the relationship between the city and the state. In order to understand how and why the 
central government has a role in local issues and what the motivations are that determine 
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relations between the local and the central state, it aims to bring opinions of many different 
stakeholders together and to identify the reasons shaped by distinctive, if not unique, 
dynamics of the country. 
The first contribution of this chapter is pertaining to duties, functions, powers and 
responsibilities of central and local institutions in the city and distribution of their roles. The 
results show that the central government has been playing a crucial role in the city’s current 
development: from setting local goals and political priorities in line with the national plans to 
undertaking almost all mega-projects in the city. In addition to these Istanbul-specific 
interventions, the central government has further made various legal amendments that 
reinforce Turkey’s, and Istanbul’s, global integration. This dominant role of the central 
government is often considered as a necessity by the many interviewees except the NGO 
representatives. Also remembering centralisation discussions in Chapter 3, it could be said 
that lack of financial sources in addition to local government’s limits of power underlie this 
necessity. In other words, although the municipality has a massive budget, compared with 
other cities, it has not always enough to do all the investments required to achieve their goals.    
The chapter has also drawn attention to the functions of the local administrations, the 
Metropolitan Municipality and the Development Agency. It was highlighted that the local 
government has a secondary role in shaping the city’s development vis-à-vis the central 
government. Their roles are giving local support to projects which are determined by national 
policies, participating in decision-making mechanisms, and of course other day-to-day 
municipal services. Nevertheless, the city today can make their own master and strategic plans 
and set its own priorities even though it must take national plans into account. Furthermore, 
both urban transformation projects, covering a considerable part of the city, and underground 
investments, almost impossible for other cities when their budgets are considered, are also 
carried out by the Metropolitan Municipality. However, this does not mean that the local 
government is not the only authority which are able to do those. There are many central 
institutions that have similar powers as, or more powers than, the metropolitan government on 
either city-planning or specific zone planning. This situation, as in the urban transformation 
issue, may sometimes lead to messy problems in the planning of the city and thus to 
complaints of, at least some, local officials. 
Another contribution of the research presented in this chapter exists in the form of the 
development of current knowledge on city-state relationship. It is often argued in the literature 
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that the global cities are increasingly operating within their own networks by looking out for 
their own interests and these interests might be different than that of their host states 
(Langley, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Taylor, 2007, 2013; Pincetl, 2018). This 
might cause tensions, or conflicts, between those cities and their host states (Barber, 2013). 
However, what is discussed above proves that considering a city’s economic importance for 
the country, working in harmony with one another is something that is beneficial to both 
administrations. This is because, otherwise, neither local government can make their global 
aspirations come true nor the central government, itself, could reach their national targets of 
2023, most of which are directly relevant for Istanbul. Moreover, this harmony is not 
something that only arises from rational motives. For all officials, being from the same party 
is another and an especially important reason for working constructively between the central 
and local governments.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, there is an ongoing political polarisation in Turkey between secular 
and conservative groups, the roots of which can be traced back to the collapse of the Empire. 
Again, as remembered from the same chapter, Istanbul is one of the cities wherein this 
polarisation is the most visible. It is therefore that being ruled by different political parties 
might be an occasion of a conflict between Istanbul’s local government and Turkey’s central 
government, as the opposite might be an occasion of harmony. In fact, many local authorities 
interviewed (IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#5, IMM#6), and central government officials 
too (MHA#1, MHA#2, ISPAT#1), stated that they are pleased with the current situation and 
are unwilling to work in a different political party, neither in local nor in central government.  
This harmony or conflict mostly based on the political identity is both a result of and an 
indicator of the political polarisation. In essence, as was stated above, there are also some 
problems between the city and the central governments, but these problems do not cause any 
conflict between them. Even when the local authorities complain about something, they drop 
the subject by telling that this kind of disagreement might happen in the family. However, it 
was possible to observe serious indications of tension or conflict in interviews with those who 
have different political roots. The urban opposition and environmental organisations voiced 
serious criticisms of the government on issues such as lack of political participation, negative 
social and environmental impacts of urban policies, and so on (ACT#1, AA#1, AA#2, 
NGO#1, NGO#2, NGO#3, LUR#1, CCP#1).  
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On the other hand, some of these interviewees, perhaps with an ideological attitude, 
associated these policies with only the AKP governments by ignoring or only briefly 
mentioning the neoliberal mindset lying behind these policies (AA#1, NGOR#1, NGOR#3, 
LPL#1). Unsurprisingly, the sides who were criticised, that is the authorities, generally 
approached these criticisms with an ideological attitude (ISPAT#1, IMM#2, IMM#4, 
MHA#1, MHA#2). Such an attitude, so to speak, strengthens ideological belongings and leads 
to political polarisation. Therefore, the disagreements between the local and the central 
governments, both of which have the same political views, do not turn into tensions or a 
conflict since the political identities become more dominant. 
To conclude, the issues discussed in this chapter provide a better understanding of central and 
local governments’ roles in shaping urban policies, and local dynamics that make harmony 
between the city and the state essential. However, the findings presented in this chapter are 
most useful because they cause us to consider that the relationship between cities and states 
do not always have to be in tension but might be in harmony stemming from many different 
motives. Both this and the earlier chapters moreover form a basis for the discussion in the 
next chapter. This brings many issues together and seeks to find Istanbul a place in the current 
body of the global urban literature.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Is There a Place for Istanbul? Positioning Istanbul within Global Urban Studies 
7.1 Introduction  
The emergence – or making – of global cities is not a singular global process, but rather a 
pluralistic process that is deeply rooted in local characteristics of cities, regions and nations. 
At one level, global urban research is dominated by studies researching cities in certain 
geographical categories, such as the global North, global South, or East Asia. However, as 
argued in Chapter 3, owing to distinctive dynamics such as imperial heritance, the centralised 
state tradition and geographical location, Istanbul falls outside (maybe more accurately, falls 
between the gaps of) the conceptual map of existing approaches. The empirically supported 
arguments of earlier chapters have concentrated on providing a conceptual understanding of 
how these dynamics have shaped the emergence of Istanbul as a global city.  
With the contention that Istanbul does not fully fit into any of the existing approaches in 
global urban studies, this chapter seeks to position the characteristics of Istanbul within the 
existing body of global urban research. By doing this, the chapter also serves a wider 
academic purpose, which is to stress-test all these approaches in a single case study. By 
looking at Istanbul through the lenses of four leading approaches to global urban research 
(global cities research, state rescaling approach, developmental state approach, postcolonial 
theory), it critically examines the applicability of these approaches to Istanbul. The argument 
in this chapter demonstrates that although these approaches can provide partial insights into 
Istanbul, there are strong divergences in Istanbul which these theories fail to explain. Finally, 
the chapter also provides the final step before the concluding discussion whether the existing 
approaches can be utilised in a blended form to explain cases like Istanbul. 
To these ends, the chapter starts with an examination of Istanbul’s global development 
through a global city lens. In Section 7.2, the source of global city formation, sectoral 
turnabout, command-and-control functions of Istanbul and the city’s national and 
international connections will be respectively analysed to understand if and how the global 
city concept is capable of explaining global city formation of Istanbul. Section 7.3 
interrogates the applicability of the state rescaling approach to Istanbul by tracing 
administrative decentralisation practices in Turkey and entrepreneurial governance. The 
section reveals that while the geopolitical economic approach offers a helpful theoretical 
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insight for understanding rising entrepreneurialism in urban politics, it is far from adequate 
for explaining the vertical nature of the central-local relationship in a highly centralised 
country. 
Then, Section 7.4 turns to the developmental state approach and argues that Turkey and 
Istanbul have some similarities to developmental states in terms of the centralised structure of 
city-state relations and national urban systems based on the dominance of one particular city. 
The section also reveals that the developmental approach fails to fully explain the case of 
Istanbul, as Turkey lacks the key apparatuses of developmental states that are at the core of 
the developmental state approaches. Section 7.5 examines how postcolonial urban theory 
provides insight into Istanbul, which has a different historical background from that of most 
global southern cities, by examining the validity of postcolonial critiques of global cities 
research (city rankings, exemplars/followers duality, and catch-up) in Istanbul. The last 
section of the chapter summarises the key argument and, more importantly, poses the question 
whether the case of Istanbul needs a new explanatory concept or is more usefully explained 
by bringing together aspects of existing approaches in form of bricolage.  
7.2 An Exceptional Global City: Istanbul through the Lens of Global Cities Research  
This part assesses the global development of Istanbul by using the assumptions of global 
cities research. To do that, four of the best-known assumptions of the global city concept on 
the political, economic, functional and relational aspects will be used as a lens to make sense 
of the development of Istanbul under globalisation.  
7.2.1 Source of Global City Formation: Global Economy or the State? 
Within the literature, one of the hotly debated topics is the role of political factors in the 
emergence of global cities. In very general terms, the foundational argument of global cities 
research is that changes in the global economic system make global cities. This hypothesis of 
the research has been extensively criticised for its neglect of the role of the state in global city 
formation (Ancien, 2011; Therborn, 2011; Derudder and Parnreiter, 2014). Addressing this 
deficit, numerous studies argue how governments pursue a series of policies to make their 
cities global (Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, focusing on the political dynamics, some scholars 
from different approaches have produced alternative hypotheses of global city formation such 
as state glocalisation (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1998) or nested interaction (Hill and 
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Fujita, 2003). Table 7.1 borrowed from Tsukamoto and Vogel (2007) demonstrates two 
contrasting views on the source of world city formation. 
Table 7.1 Alternative Hypotheses on World Cities 
Source of World City Formation 
Hypothesis 1                                                              Hypothesis 2 
The global market system 
(globalisation) creates world cities 
or  
Political agency (politics) is the primary 
factor in creation of world cities 
(Source: Tsukamoto and Vogel, 2007) 
However, it is almost impossible to determine whether globalisation or politics is the primary 
factor in global city formation. Global dynamics, of course, play a vital and undeniable role in 
global city formation, yet a global city is not only something that emerges spontaneously, but 
it is also something aimed and made. For example, considering their most basic definitions, 
global/world cities are thought as the places where the headquarters of multinational 
corporations and leading global APS firms are agglomerated (Sassen, 2016). This definition 
obviously puts the economy at the centre of global cities as a constitutive element. There is 
also an assumption behind this definition that the cities are located in an actually globally 
integrated economy and companies are more active than cities in the choice of places where 
they will establish their headquarters. However, as explicitly stated by the representatives of 
the private sector, “if there is a goal to become a global city some legal arrangements must be 
made” (BSR#1). For example, “we must ensure a political and economic stability atmosphere 
in order to create a reliable investment climate for global investors” (BSR#4). Otherwise, “if 
you do not make these arrangements, no one invests here” (BSR#1), and “you cannot 
globalise” (BSR#4). 
Hence, instead of comparing two approaches and choosing one, to highlight the importance of 
political factors without ignoring globalisation provides a better insight into the topic. This is 
because, what is also known that global city-making is a fashionable political strategy 
throughout the world (Clark and Moonen, 2017). National and local governments are pushing 
their major cities to attract more investment and global city making is a part - and a tool - of 
this process. This is also valid for Turkey and Istanbul: 
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“Istanbul is in a competition with other major cities in the region for grabbing the 
global capital coming to the region, and we develop various strategies to attract these 
foreign investments” (ISPAT#1). 
It has been mentioned before that the making of Istanbul as a leading global city is an 
aspirational goal for both Turkish national and Istanbul’s local governments (MHA#3). 
However, as many of the interviewees have expressed (e.g. MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR2, MHA#1, 
MOD#1, MOD#2, IMM#4), achieving this goal also depends on various steps that must be 
taken by national and local governments (see also Chapter 6). For example, as stated by a 
central government official: “If we want to become a global city, we must create a more 
qualified environment in Istanbul [in terms of physical infrastructure]. We work for this” 
(MHA#3). Likewise: 
“For a city to be a global city, the transportation infrastructure, the connectivity 
infrastructure must be well established, and of course, these projects should be 
supported with different working principles and legislation” (BSR#1). 
AKP governments have successfully managed this process from the very beginning. With 
neoliberal adjustment policies, which are harshly criticised by opposing interviewees 
(NGOR#1, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, LUR#1, AA#1, AA#2, ACT#1, CCP#1), they have set the 
legal ground for Turkey’s global economic integration. In this way, they have succeeded in 
positioning Istanbul as an attractive location for excess liquidity in the global economy 
(NGOR#4). What is more, through some place-based strategic projects (e.g. IFC, the Third 
Airport Project), ongoing infrastructure investments or incentives, they have also successfully 
taken steps to reinforce Istanbul’s global urban identity. All these policies have a key role in 
the development of Istanbul as a global city following the 2000s (BSR#2, BSR#4, BSR#5, 
MOD#1, MOD#2, MHA#3).  
Of course, this rise can also be explained by changes in the global economic system, however, 
in the light of the discussions above, it is hard to deny that there is also a political background 
of this uptrend. Namely, focusing only on the economic dynamics fails to explain why this 
uptrend is captured by Istanbul, not Athens or Budapest. In 2000, these cities were classified 
in similar positions to Istanbul25, so they might have been expected to be in similar positions 
                                                 
25 While Istanbul and Budapest were Beta+ cities, Athens was a Beta city.  
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today (GaWC, 2000). However, based on latest research of GaWC26, while Istanbul is 
classified as an Alpha city, there has been no significant change in these cities’ rankings27 
(GaWC, 2017). Therefore, to understand this change, it is essential to grasp the political and 
economic conditions of these countries and the policies that they have pursued in this period, 
at least as much as the global economic conjuncture.  
7.2.2 A Service City, but Still Industrial   
According to Sassen (1991: 3-4), global cities:  
“…function in four new ways: first, as highly concentrated command points in the 
organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and for 
specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic 
sectors; third, as sites of production, including the production of innovations, in these 
leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced.” 
The rise of global and world cities is often associated with the sectoral turnabout from 
manufacturing to a more service intensified economy (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 2000; 
Sassen, 2000; Parnreiter, 2013). To this assumption, global cities have appeared as the 
production spaces of certain sectors such as finance, real-estate, insurance and other advanced 
services (Sassen, 2016). Therefore, cities such as New York, London or Paris are 
characterised by a sharp decline in manufacturing employment vis-à-vis service sectors 
(Kantor et al., 2012). However, some scholars are sceptical about the validity – or at least 
strength – of this sectoral shift assumption in the geographies beyond North America and 
Western Europe, for example in Seoul and Tokyo (Hill and Kim, 2000; Ma and Timberlake, 
2013) or the global cities of China (Savitch et al., 2014). The following discussion proves that 
Istanbul too is one of the cities where this assumption is questionable:    
“What is claimed in the discourse of globalisation is a totally deindustrialised, service 
and finance intensive city, yet this is not what is happening in Istanbul. Istanbul is not 
deindustrialising but continues to industrialise. Services are also increasing, so there is 
                                                 
26 As an interesting example of how cities are interested to learn what they can do to improve their place in the 
rankings, it can be given that a few GaWC researchers were invited to deliver a presentation about the works of 
GaWC by a governmental institution (Marmara, 2018; for presentations of the GaWC's researchers, see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7KneAMTU8Y&feature=youtu.be) 
27 Both Athens and Budapest were Beta+ cities. 
 151 
 
a total development in Istanbul. GDP is also increasing, both industry, and service 
sectors are increasing” (CCP#1). 
Table 7.2 illustrates a sectoral breakdown of selected cities. According to the table, classical 
global cities (yellow boxes) share certain attributes. While the share of the manufacturing 
sector in these cities is about five percent, business and finance sectors produce more than 
40% of the total economic output. Likewise, the developmental cities (green boxes) have 
similar economic characteristics among themselves. Although finance is the leading sector in 
Seoul and Tokyo, industrial production keeps its importance. Industrial production in these 
cities is more than twice as large as that in the global cities. Especially Seoul is noteworthy 
with the highest manufacturing proportion in the table. As for Istanbul, the city’s sectoral 
composition is more like the developmental cities rather than the classical global cities. 
Istanbul, with its 15,60% manufacturing output, ranks second after Seoul. Moreover, as will 
be seen in the following paragraphs, given the sectoral distribution of Istanbul’s economy by 
years, the industry keeps its position in Istanbul (see Figure 7.1 and 7.2). For example, about 
one-third of the city’s active labour force is still employed in the manufacturing sector 
(TURKSTAT, 2014). 
On the other hand, even though developmental cities and in-between cities seem to be close to 
each other in terms of sectoral distribution of the economy, it is possible to say that there are 
considerable differences when looked at numbers of the industrial production of these cities 
and the structure of the industry. Hence, it is worth briefly mentioning the sectoral economic 
outputs of the cities in order not to be misleading (see Parilla et al., 2015). For example, the 
annual industrial output of Tokyo, the world's wealthiest city with more than $ 1.5 billion of 
annual GDP, is four times bigger than that of Istanbul, which has the highest industrial output 
among in-between cities with 226 million dollars. Similarly, Seoul produces much more 
industrial output than Istanbul, Vienna, and Moscow. In terms of numbers, the industrial 
production of in-between cities is closer to the top global cities such as New York and 
London, rather than Seoul and Tokyo. From a different aspect, while Tokyo and Seoul host to 
the leading national industrial conglomerations activating on the global scale (Hill and Kim, 
2000), Istanbul's industrial production is mainly provided by SMEs (see below). This can be 
seen as another difference between developmental cities and in-between cities. 
What is more interesting, this is also the case for Moscow and Vienna, which have similar 
geographical and historical characteristics to Istanbul. These two cities share a similar 
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composition as Istanbul. Vienna has almost the same percentages as Istanbul, excluding 
local/non-market and transportation sectors. Yet, these cities do not have sectoral 
characteristic as rigid as global or developmental cities. For example, Vienna is more like 
global cities in transportation and local/non-market sectors (yellow coloured numbers) but, in 
other sectors, is similar to developmental cities. Furthermore, these cities present some 
divergent local features that make them difficult to be categorised (blue boxes). For example, 
Moscow has a tourism rate which is much higher than any other city in the table. The same 
can be said for the transportation sector in Istanbul. Probably because of the huge-investments 
of the central government in the transportation sector (see Chapter 6), Istanbul is the city with 
the highest rate of transportation among the cities in the table.  
Table 7.2 Sectoral Composition in Selected Cities 
INDUSTRY 
Classic Global Cities In-Between Cities Developmental Cities 
New York London Paris Vienna Istanbul Moscow Seoul Tokyo  
Business/Finance 51.70% 46.90% 43.70% 28.60% 27.70% 34.40% 27.70% 31.60% 
Local/Non-
Market 
24.10% 24.50% 25.10% 26.30% 15.70% 13.70% 17.60% 15.30% 
Trade and 
Tourism 
12.90% 12.30% 13.40% 17.00% 18.00% 30.10% 14.70% 18.00% 
Manufacturing 4.60% 4.50% 6.60% 13.20% 15.60% 9.10% 23.00% 14.00% 
Transportation 2.20% 4.00% 5.30% 4.70% 15.10% 6.70% 11.20% 14.20% 
(Sources: Parilla et al., 2015) 
To state again by narrowing down the scope, contrary to globalisation discourse, a sharp 
industrial decline vis-a-vis service sectors does not appear in Istanbul. Some scholars writing 
about Istanbul claim a decline in industrial jobs in accordance with the global city rhetoric and 
that the industrial labour force has gradually moved to the city’s peripheral areas or other 
cities (Keyder, 2005; Karaman, 2013b; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). However, the figures below 
and the information obtained from the interviews contradict this view. According to Figure 
7.1, which demonstrates the economic growth in two sectors, both industrial and service 
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sectors have constantly been growing since 2004. In the period analysed, both sectors grew 
more than three times. Consequently, as shown in Figure 7.2, shares of industry and service 
sectors in Istanbul’s economy have remained almost unchanged in this period.  
Figure 7.1 The GDP Growth of Istanbul by Sectors (2004-2014, Million TL) 
 
(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015b) 
Figure 7.2 The Share of Industrial and Service Sectors to the GDP of Istanbul (2004-
2014) 
  
(Source: TURKSAT, 2015b) 
Some local (IDA#1, IMM#1, IMM#6) and central (ISPAT#1, MHA#3) officials have 
explicitly voiced that they aim to shift industrial production out of the city, but they have also 
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admitted not to have achieved this goal yet. The most important reason for this is the 
industrial pattern of Istanbul. Industrial production of the city is mostly provided by Small and 
Medium Size Enterprises, agglomerating in organised industrial zones (Kaygalak and Reid, 
2016) many of which were opened in the 1990s and the early 2000s (OSBBS, 2016). More 
than a million people in Istanbul still work in the manufacturing sector (Sabah, 2016) and 
these organised industrial zones absorb a considerable amount of this workforce (LUR#1). 
Further, some of these zones are located in the central areas of the city, not in the periphery 
(LUR#1). For example, one of the eight OIZs in the city, which is the largest of Turkey, has 
about 155,000 workers and this OIZ is only fifteen kilometres from the Historical Peninsula. 
Hence, moving these industrial zones out of the city is a huge social and economic 
transformation, which requires serious planning and organisational activity (BSR#2). Further, 
Istanbul still receives foreign direct investments in some industrial sectors such as pharma, 
mechanics, and electronics (ISPAT#1). Looking at all of these, one might say that this table, 
contradicted by the discourse of globalisation, is likely to remain stable for a while. 
7.2.3 Not Global, but Regional and National Command and Control Point  
Another key and widely debated matter in the global cities literature concerns the functions of 
global cities in the global economic system (Parnreiter, 2014; Hoyler and Taylor, 2013; 
Kleibert, 2017). Basically, the global city concept posits that global cities are the command 
and control centres of the global economy (Sassen, 1991). The argument behind this 
hypothesis is that with the concentration of headquarters of global companies in some 
advanced cities these cities emerge as the central points from which the global economy is 
commanded and controlled. Further, depending on the numbers and/or qualification of 
headquarters and other offices, in particular those of advanced producer service firms, these 
functions also determine global control capabilities of cities and their ranking in the 
global/world cities system (Taylor et al., 2014). The cities ranking at the top of the global 
cities hierarchy are host to more global headquarters of major multinational companies, 
notably global advanced service firms (Taylor and Csomós, 2012; Csomos and Derudder, 
2014). Going from top down global headquarters leave their places to the regional 
headquarters and major and minor offices (Liu et al., 2014; Lüthi et al., 2018).  
In such studies measuring city connectivity within global urban networks, Istanbul is 
generally ranked among the global cities of secondary importance (Liu et al., 2014; Yang et 
al., 2017). Accordingly, even though there has been a significant rise in Istanbul’s position in 
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global city rankings (see Chapter 5) it is still not the case that the city has a control and 
command function in the global sense. Based on its ranking, Istanbul is characterised as a 
regional and national command and control centre. The interview findings too by and large 
confirm these assumptions. As partly discussed in Chapter 5, the general view was that 
Istanbul has not had such a high level of global control capacity and service network that it 
could compete with leading global cities yet (e.g. CCP#1, AA#1). Even those thinking that 
Istanbul should have competed with top global cities have not had a contrary statement. 
However, it was a widely shared view among the interviewees that Istanbul is a national and 
regional command and control point. Since there is already an extensive discussion 
highlighting the national control capacity of Istanbul as the economic capital of Turkey, the 
emphasis here is on the regional function of the city. Yet, to give some numbers would be 
useful to better understand the national headquarter function of Istanbul. According to the 
most recent data, more than half of the national headquarters of Turkey’s top 100 holding 
companies are located in Istanbul (Fortune Turkey, 2016). Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
economic functions of Istanbul are not limited to the service sector, the city also functions as 
Turkey’s major centre for industrial activities. This is the case also for management functions. 
Today, 42 of the top 100 industrial corporate headquarters are in Istanbul (ISO, 2016). 
In the regional sense, as highlighted by some interviewees, Istanbul is “very strong in terms of 
control capacity in the region” (AA#1) and is a “regional focus/centre” (NGOR#4) for global 
corporations. This means that “a company investing in the Middle East, Eastern Europe or 
Caucasus opens a head-quarter in Istanbul to manage its operations” (AA#1). A current 
example in this regard came from an ISPAT official: “Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Intel [...] 
command their operations in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia from Turkey” 
(ISPAT#1). Further, some MNCs have moved their regional headquarters from other cities in 
the region (for example Athens) to Istanbul (ISPAT, 2011). As it is understood from the 
interviews with local and central bureaucrats, the general strategy of the state in this issue is to 
strengthen Istanbul’s position to host more MNC regional headquarters, most notably of those 
operating in service and finance sectors (e.g. IDA#1, ISPAT#1). 
These views are also supported by some researchers (Jimenez et al., 2002; Baycan-levent, 
2003; Sassen, 2009; Alvarez and Yarcan, 2010; Yıldırım and Mullineux, 2015). In an early 
study, for example, Jimenez et al. (2001: 39) identify Istanbul as a regional command and 
control point based on GaWC research and claim that: 
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“Istanbul is seen by international capital as likely to be the command and control 
centre for the Balkans, Middle East, Black Sea Region.” 
Sassen (2009) too highlights the regional control capabilities of Istanbul. According to her, 
more than half of the foreign companies coming to Turkey, many of whom come from the 
EU, established headquarters in Istanbul. Identifying Istanbul as a regional hub, more recent 
research (Bhandari and Verma, 2013) provides similar data to what the official said above. 
The authors further underline a different aspect that makes Istanbul more advantageous 
compared to other cities in the region: 
“Culture, of the country, provides locational advantages. Turkey provides locational 
advantages to MNCs to serve Central Asian and Caucasus republics of former USSR. 
Siemens, Chase Manhattan and Good Year established their regional offices in 
Istanbul to export to the entire Eurasian region. Shared religious, cultural and 
linguistic ties have made Turkey a gateway to the Muslim and Turkic-speaking 
populations of the Caucasus and Central Asian Republic. Hundreds of MNCs have 
established regional headquarters in Istanbul-Turkey’s economic capital.” (ibid.: 582) 
7.2.4 Both Globally and Nationally Connected City 
The fourth thesis is about the global relations and connections of global cities. To recap this 
argument, it is worth quoting from Sassen (2000: 54-55):   
“It seems likely that the strengthening of transnational ties between the leading 
financial and business centres is accompanied by a weakening of the linkages between 
each of these cities and its hinterland and national urban system.” 
To this hypothesis, whereas globalisation increases the cross-border relations of global cities, 
but at the same time, it has a negative impact on the national linkages of these cities. That is, 
there are various international city networks in which global cities are active and link to each 
other rather than the cities within their own national networks. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
these networks are empirically demonstrated through various indicators such as advanced 
producer service firms (Taylor et al., 2014) or some other industries (Krätke, 2014; Sigler and 
Martinus, 2017), telecommunication infrastructures (Rutherford et al, 2004), or, mainly air 
transport data. Along with the connectivity and relationality, these theses also assume that so 
long as cities become more global and their international connections increase, a new 
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hierarchical order is born between cities. In other words, the most globalised cities, that is, the 
top global cities, are the ones that have the most external connections (Derudder et al., 2010). 
There is no doubt that there is a positive relationship between globalisation and the global 
connectivity of Istanbul. Almost all interviewees confirmed this in various ways with their 
own experiences. For example, business people addressed the increasing business 
opportunities with global business circles (BSR#2, BSR#5). In the same way, many 
interviewees stated that air or maritime transport connectivities of Istanbul have increased 
significantly thanks to globalisation (MHA#2, MHA#3, IMM#4, IDA#1). Furthermore, in a 
different perspective, some interviewees from the environmental and urban solidarity groups 
expressed that globalisation increases their linkages and cooperation with international NGOs 
(NGOR#1, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, ACT#1). Officials also gave interesting examples in this 
regard. One of them touched upon the diplomatic connectivity and stated that there is an 
ongoing increase in the number of diplomatic mission representatives in Istanbul (UCLG#1). 
Some others too mentioned that they find more opportunity to communicate and to work in 
cooperation with the officials of other global cities (MHA#3, MOD#1, MOD#2).  
These experiences of the interviewees might also be empirically supported with the air 
transport statistics. According to Figure 7.3, illustrating the top 20 airports by global 
passenger traffic, Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, one of the two international airports in the city, is 
the 11th busiest airport in the world and the 3rd in Europe. Moreover, according to the global 
hub airport list on which cities are ranked by the number of transit passengers, Istanbul-
Ataturk airport is ranked 7th in the world and 2nd in Europe after Frankfurt (European 
Commission, 2017). The report also highlights that Istanbul was one of the most rapidly 
growing airports during the period 2006-2015. Therefore, given the data, one might say that 
there has been a remarkable increase in Istanbul’s connections with the globe. Likewise, 
based on the data, a further interpretation might be that Istanbul is not only the city with the 
most global connections on the national scale but also one of the cities with the most global 
connections in its own hinterland. 
Figure 7.3 Top 20 Airports in 2015 by Passenger Traffic 
  
Rank City (Airport) Passengers Numbers 
1 ATLANTA GA, US (ATL) 101,491,106 
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2 BEIJING, CN (PEK) 89,938,628 
3 DUBAI, AE (DXB) 78,014,841 
4 CHICAGO IL, US (ORD) 76,949,504 
5 TOKYO, JP (HND) 75,573,106 
6 LONDON, GB (LHR) 74,989,795 
7 LOS ANGELES CA, US (LAX) 74,937,004 
8 HONG KONG, HK (HKG) 68,283,407 
9 PARIS, FR (CDG) 65,766,986 
10 DALLAS/FORT WORTH TX, US (DFW) 65,512,163 
11 ISTANBUL, TR (IST) 61,346,229 
12 FRANKFURT, DE (FRA) 61,032,022 
13 SHANGHAI, CN (PVG) 60,098,073 
14 AMSTERDAM, NL (AMS) 58,284,864 
15 NEW YORK NY, US (JFK) 56,827,154 
16 SINGAPORE, SG (SIN) 55,449,000 
17 GUANGZHOU, CN (CAN) 55,201,915 
18 JAKARTA, ID (CGK) 54,089,062 
19 DENVER CO, US (DEN) 54,014,502 
20 BANGKOK, TH (BKK) 52,902,110 
(Source: ACI World Traffic Reports, 2015 in European Commission, 2017) 
In consideration of the above paragraph and data, there is no reason for not approving the 
validity of the argument that globalisation strengthens the global linkages of global cities for 
Istanbul. However, the second part of the argument, that is weakening national connections, 
fails to explain Istanbul. On the contrary, bearing in mind the discussions on globalisation and 
domestic migration in Chapter 5, one might claim that globalisation makes a positive 
influence on this connectivity. To support this argument, as it is done in many studies, we 
might simply refer to air transport data. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 give comparative air 
transportation statistics for Istanbul and London, as a leading global city, and allow three 
different interpretations on this issue. Firstly, Istanbul is not as globally integrated as London 
in terms of either international flights or passenger flows. Despite the fact that there has been 
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a rapid growth in both indicators, the numbers of international passengers and flights in 
Istanbul is still less than half of London’s.  
Figure 7.4 London Air Transport Data by Flights and Passenger Numbers 
 
(Source: CAA, 2017) 
Figure 7.5 Istanbul Air Transport Data by Flights and Passenger Numbers 
(Source: DHMİ, 2017) 
Secondly, London’s data show that numbers of international flights and passengers are much 
higher than domestic ones and that there is a slight decrease in domestic flights, as expected 
from a global city. However, the difference between domestic and international flights in 
Istanbul is not as high as in London, despite the city’s high-ranking position within 
international transit hubs. This demonstrates that Istanbul’s connection with cities within its 
own national system is far greater than that of London, at least in the sense of air transport. 
Finally, unlike London and contrary to what the global city concept asserts, there is a 
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remarkable growth in both domestic and international flights in Istanbul. Hence, this data can 
be interpreted that globalisation strengthens the connections of Istanbul with the cities within 
both national and international networks.  
7.3 Entrepreneurialism Without Decentralisation: The Political Economy of the Making 
of Istanbul as a Global City 
This section intends to understand the ongoing development of Istanbul and Turkey within the 
concept of state rescaling, and to stress-test the hypotheses of this approach in an atypical 
geopolitical context. In essence, the state rescaling concept refers to the spatial and structural 
reconfiguration of the advanced capitalist states of western Europe and North America that 
have undergone a series of economic and political crises in the 1970s to new subnational and 
supranational scales (Keating, 2013, 2014; Harrison, 2015). In general terms, this shift is 
reflected in urban politics as entrepreneurial, competitiveness-led and growth-oriented 
approaches, privatisation, and more importantly rising administrative and fiscal autonomy 
(Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner, 2004a; Theodore et al., 2011; Cochrane, 
2016). Moreover, this shift has not remained limited to the advanced capitalist geography but 
migrated to other parts of the world as a new economy-political paradigm titled neoliberalism, 
through mostly the impositions of institutions like IMF or World Bank (Jessop, 2002a, 
Theodore and Peck, 2012).  
However, since import levels and shapes of these policies vary depending on demands, goals 
and administrative traditions of the states, neoliberalism, as a political project, has a plural 
characteristic gaining different meanings in different geopolitical contexts (Le Galès, 2016). 
More specifically, despite the overall tendencies, state rescaling practices in non-western 
contexts differ from western examples (Park, 2013); especially in historically centralised 
states such as China (Wu, 2016; Lim, 2017), Japan (Tsukamoto, 2012), Russia (Müller, 
2011), and Turkey (Kuyucu, 2018). What is noteworthy in such states is that there is a kind of 
selectivity between economic and political variants of neoliberalism in favour of the first one, 
and a tendency to approach decentralisation reforms with a general hesitation. For example, 
Kuyucu (2018) reveals in a recent article that while the neoliberal experience of Turkey 
promotes entrepreneurial policies, it does not lead to a political decentralisation.  
With a similar standpoint to Kuyucu (2018), this study argues that neoliberalism appears in 
Turkey with a rising entrepreneurial mentality in urban politics rather than a political 
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decentralisation. In other words, despite the irresistible attraction of explaining with 
neoliberalism, and its popularity in the relevant academic circles (e.g. Can, 2013; Karaman, 
2013a; Elicin, 2014; Lelandais, 2014; Eder and Öz, 2015; Özbay et al., 2016; Kizildere and 
Chiodelli, 2018), this study advocates that neoliberal discourse (and the concept of state 
rescaling) provides only a partial understanding for Turkey. In the words of Le Galès (2016: 
13):  
“Let us take the case of Istanbul for instance. A series of papers have now argued that the 
transformation of Istanbul is all about neoliberalism. Neoliberalism explains Istanbul’s 
development (Karaman, 2013[a]; Eder and Özlem, 2015). Is that really so, however? One 
part of the story is about Istanbul’s status in the competition between large globalising 
metropolises – not really a new issue that is grounded in neoliberalism. By contrast, the 
general explanation in terms of neoliberalism is both empirically very weak and reveals a 
naive analysis of the role of ideas on policy changes or about the state.” 
This study, instead, offers to discuss this process as entrepreneurialism without 
decentralisation.  
7.3.1 Is There Anything Getting Decentralised? The Turkish Pathway to Neoliberalism 
The primary issue to strengthen the debate is the characteristic of the central-local relationship 
in Turkey, that is, how centralised the administrative structure in Turkey is. This is also 
important for shedding a light upon the debates in the following sections. The first thing that 
can be said about this issue: Depending on their positions and backgrounds, most of the 
participants remarked on the highly centralised administrative characteristic of Turkey in 
different aspects. A group of participants directly – and often carpingly – said that the Turkish 
central government is very strong vis-a-vis the local governments. Needless to say, this group 
of interviewees consisted mostly of critical non-official participants. The general view of 
these interviewees can be summarised with the quote below said by an academic advisor: 
“They are not asking local government while they are building the bridge (the 3rd 
Bridge). They are not asking local government while they are building the tunnel (the 
Eurasia Tunnel Project). Whatever is being done in Istanbul, the local government just 
serves for the projects whose decisions are made by Ankara. So, we are not talking 
about a relationship like the relationship between Westminster and London Greater, 
London Council” (AA#2). 
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Another group of participants most of which were local officials gave some examples that 
could be interpreted in such a way, even though they did not term it directly as centralisation. 
Some of them stated that “the central government has a planning power in some specific 
areas” (IMM#1), and that in such areas “central government’s decisions have more priority 
than those of the local governments” (IMM#2). Others touched upon financial issues. This 
was especially noteworthy because, in terms of financing of local governments, Turkey is 
regarded as one of the most centralised OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Relevant statements 
of the participants confirmed this assertion in a sense. According to these interviewees, huge 
debt stocks (MOD#2, IMM#4), their dependencies on centrally distributed funds (IMM#4, 
IMM#6), limited obligation authority (IMM#1, MOD#2, IMM#6) are among the major 
problems of local governments in Turkey. For the metropolitan officials, all these are also 
valid for Istanbul, even though it holds a massive budget in comparison to the other cities in 
Turkey. 
Under such conditions, local governments have to receive financial support from the central 
government for mega-projects, infrastructure investments (e.g. underground systems) and 
urban transformation projects that exceed their financial capabilities. As remembered from the 
previous chapter, the local officials stated that the local government is not able to bear the 
costs of the mega-projects by their own budget unless the central government undertakes the 
projects. Needless to say, the need for financial support of the central government also means 
in practice that the local governments must seek to receive the approval of the central 
government for such investments. In other words, unlike the advanced capitalist states where 
local governments have relatively more fiscal autonomy, this fiscal centrality gives the central 
government a superiority over the local governments. 
Yet, this is only a part of the issue. We need more for answering the question of why the 
central government does not weaken in a country which has been following neoliberal 
policies for more than three decades with a growing momentum following the 2000s. Once 
again this can be explained by the centralised tradition of Turkey and the pragmatism which is 
another imperial legacy (see also Section 7.4). As voiced by many interviewees, Turkey is not 
a country willing to develop policies that might diminish its centralised administrative 
characteristic (AA#2, CCP#1, MOD#2, MHA#2, IMM#4, IMM#6, IMM#3, NGOR#2, 
BSR#1, MHA#3, UCLG#1). More precisely, the central governments have a selective attitude 
while adopting the foreign originated policies (for a wider discussion see Le Galès, 2016). For 
example, as reminded by an urban planner, Turkey has not relinquished from this attitude 
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even for being a member of the EU, which is one of the country’s major strategic goals 
(CCP#1). Turkey has signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government by making 
reservations to many clauses most of which were about the financial and administrative 
autonomy of local governments (CCP#1).28  
Secondly, in the advanced capitalist states, through the rescaling policies, “many traditional 
functions of national states are now displaced into lower or superordinate state institutions 
that are wholly new or else have been fundamentally altered thereby” (Keil, 2003: 278). 
However, in Turkey, the reforms that strengthen the power of the local governments and gain 
them relative autonomy, either politically or financially, are often followed by new legislative 
regulations enabling the central government to regain its power in a different way (Kayasu 
and Yetişkul, 2014). To put it in another way, rescaling in Turkey can be described as a 
process in which decentralisation has gone together with re-centralisation: 
“With the establishment of the Ministry of Urbanization and Environment, the 
ministry can cancel a project which the local government wants to do or can do any 
project which the local government does not want to do. TOKI can change or modify 
the plans of urban transformation projects those are conducted by TOKI.  You can by-
pass the municipalities. There is an institution like TOKI, and a ministry like the 
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and a law like the Disaster Law. These 
three tie the hands of local governments and can by-pass municipalities” (AA#1). 
Following the reminders of the above quotation, right after coming to power, the AKP 
implemented serious rescaling reforms that have increased the autonomy of the metropolitan 
municipalities (Akilli and Akilli, 2014; Alkan, 2015; Kuyucu, 2018). Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality, for example, expanded its administrative boundary to the entire metropolitan 
region (from 1864km² to 5343 km²), gained planning power for the entire metropolitan area, 
and gained power to get into partnership with private companies. However, with the 
establishment of MoEU, the obligation that these plans have to be approved by the ministry 
was imposed. Even further, a ministry official stated that “the ministry had a power of 
preparing and conduction its own master plans if it deems necessary” (MOEU#1). There are 
about thirty institutions having a planning power for specific places and/or for the entire city, 
and most of those are central government agencies (MHA#3). This further strengthens the 
                                                 
28 As an anecdote, Turkey is the country that has made reservation to the largest number of clauses. 
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central government’s hand in local planning. The result is explicit in the words of a local 
government official: 
“There had been less plan-making power, we couldn’t make some decisions but now 
the metropolitan municipality can make or approve its own plan [in the city council]. 
Of course, this does not mean that the ministry approves, and we can implement, but 
at least, we can still make the plan” (IMM#3).  
Or, in other words, after approximately forty years of neoliberal restructuring processes:   
“What we call the real authority, or actor in Istanbul is not the Metropolitan 
Municipality as it is on paper.  It is not just the Metropolitan Municipality. Although it 
seems that the authority of planning the metropolitan cities in Turkey is largely passed 
to the municipalities, the ports, for example, are administrated by the port authority; 
train lines, transportation system are controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. I 
mean, all decisions relevant to Istanbul such as road decisions, bridge decisions, tunnel 
decisions, metro decisions, major commercial decisions, even the opening of any 
meteorological station, are given by Ankara” (AA#2). 
There is one more aspect that needs to be mentioned here. Unlike the overall tendency in the 
relevant literature associating this centralisation with the AKP and its ideology (Karaman, 
2013a; Abbas and Yiğit, 2015; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Öncü and Balkan, 2016; Kizildere 
and Chiodelli, 2018; Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018), Chapter 3 has argued that centralism is 
Turkey’s state-tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire. A considerable number of 
participants also confirms this view (e.g. NGOR#2, NGOR#3, BSR#1, CCP#1, LPL#1). For 
example, a critical urban planner said: “Since Tanzimat Period, in which the local 
administrations were first established, the centralised structure in Turkey has never been lost” 
(CCP#1). More interestingly, this was also accepted by the local chairman of an opposition 
party who was thinking that “Turkey is a country ruled by the central [government], not by 
the local [government]” (LPL#1). In brief, the centralised administrative system was not 
created by AKP, but AKP has reproduced this tradition in line with the rules of the neoliberal 
game: 
“As you too ask, it is an important problematic how much power local government 
has. So, I agree with you, the thing here which must be examined is the embedded top-
down entrepreneurial mentality. It could be said this top-down structure has always 
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been a fact in Turkey’s history from the Ottoman [period], but now entrepreneurialism 
too is also added to this. Possibly this [entrepreneurialism] is the fact which makes the 
most significant difference from previous periods” (NGOR#2).  
7.3.2 City Making as an Entrepreneurial Strategy  
While rescaling and entrepreneurial policies in urban governance are often associated with 
each other, at least in advanced capitalist states, in Turkey policy-makers have generally 
adopted an economic reading of neoliberalism rather than a political one. The entrepreneurial 
approaches to urban governance have, therefore, diffused more into the local and central 
policy-making processes in comparison to decentralisation policies. What was observed by 
the official participants was that although they were approaching the decentralisation issue 
with caution, they somehow idealised the entrepreneurial methods in shaping local policies 
(IMM#4, IMM#6, MHA#2, ISPAT#1). The following quotation from a local government 
official responsible for developing urban governance systems exemplifies this entrepreneurial 
shift in urban policy-making: 
“Local authorities should act like successful businessmen. They should govern the 
cities as they would run a private company. We can increase our tourism revenues in 
the Historical Peninsula. We should provide that visitors spend more money in the 
city” (IMM#4). 
The examples showing this entrepreneurial view of policy-makers can be increased, but the 
more important question is how these views are reflected in the urban field. This 
entrepreneurialism can be read through examinations of public-private investments, state 
response to political movements, or directly legal amendments, however, to stay in the frame 
of the study, here will be discussed how these views have been shaping local strategies, 
policies, and issues. At the macro level, as in Europe or in other non-western geographical 
contexts (see Section 7.5), these views come into existence in Istanbul as the strategies that 
enhance the global competitiveness of the city. To ensure economic development, increasing 
the city’s competitiveness has been one of the priorities of the two layers of government. The 
officials said that they considered the competitive advantages of Istanbul in policy-making 
processes and that they draw up different strategies, financial and policy frameworks to 
strengthen these advantages. 
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The macro strategies of Istanbul such as its global city, regional hub or financial centre 
visions, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, are also a reflection of this entrepreneurial 
mentality, fuelled by this competition notion. For example, despite often being stated as a 
necessity, the Third Airport Project is also supported by the officials with the expectation that 
it will strengthen the city’s position among the international air transport hubs and so will 
contribute to national and local economic growth (IMM#4). A clearer example in this issue is 
the relocation of the Central Bank from Ankara to Istanbul. This example is also noteworthy 
as it reveals how owing to its financial and administrative power the central government can 
play a role in increasing the city’s competitiveness. As said by a local policy-maker:  
“Within the framework that Istanbul is to be one of the leading financial centres of the 
world, all the central financial agencies, especially the Central Bank, are moving to 
Istanbul. Istanbul therefore makes a certain progress on the way to becoming the 
financial centre of the world.” (UCLG#1) 
However, more interestingly, more micro and local problems like urban safety, the 
underground network, infrastructural deficiencies or urban transformation are often 
mentioned in discussions about Istanbul’s global competitiveness. This means that many 
participants are looking at local problems from the global competition perspective at the same 
time. The officials, on the one hand, expressed that these are the local problems of the city to 
be solved, while on the other hand, they stated, between the lines, overcoming these 
deficiencies is a necessity for being a global city or a financial centre. In the words of a 
central government official: 
“The Third Bridge may be a new one, Marmaray, an international airport, these are 
sine qua non for becoming a global city. With these steps, Istanbul will gain an utterly 
different acceleration of growth.” (MHA#2) 
At the micro level, the rising entrepreneurial mentality can also be discussed in terms of 
looking to the city itself as a means of economic development (Cochrane, 2016, Le Galès, 
2016). In this perspective, the historical and cultural values of the cities and even further the 
urban land itself are seen as tools of capital accumulation by the administrations (Harvey, 
1989). For the first one, Istanbul undoubtedly offers a unique richness to the policy-makers 
and it was possible to understand during the interviews what this richness means to the 
official participants. As different from the other participants, officials saw this historical 
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richness at the same time as a marketing strategy that would increase the number of 
international tourism facilities and the tourists and increase the tourism revenues. Being 
referred to as “Disneyfication of the Ottoman” by an urban activist (ACT#1), this strategy is 
also explicit in the following quote: 
“The fact that the city has a rich historical and cultural heritage also attracts people 
from the outside. The number of domestic and foreign tourists; this is not on the 
desired level, but there are quite nice projects. When they are completed, Istanbul will 
both better live its own culture and reinvigorate the tourism.” (IMM#4) 
The second, commodification of urban land, brings more dramatic results for the social and 
land fabric of Istanbul. Chapter 5 has discussed this in detail through the developments of the 
housing market, and environmental impacts of this development. Here, the focus is on the 
urban transformation projects so as to better reveal the entrepreneurial approaches of the 
governmental authorities. In principle, there was no participant who thinks that urban 
transformation is not a necessity for Istanbul. On the contrary, everyone thought that this was 
a problem that had to be resolved urgently because of unplanned urbanisation and earthquake 
risk. However, no matter how urban transformation is justified, it is certainly clear that there 
is also an entrepreneurial mentality behind the urban transformation projects. In other words, 
apart from being a necessity, the urban transformation is also seen as an “important tool to 
attract foreign direct investments” (ISPAT#1) and reinvigorate the economy (PA#1, PA#2, 
BSR#2, BSR#3).  
This view, therefore, changes decision-making and participation processes on the projects. 
Although the authorities claim to the contrary, other respondents complained that the needs 
and demands of contractors, not their own, are considered and that they often only hear about 
projects after they have been decided (AA#2, NGOR#2, NGOR#3). This was confirmed in a 
different way by an official who was saying that “we are negotiating with an international 
investor on a large-scale project but cannot share the details as it has not been shared with the 
public yet” (ISPAT#1). The central government also makes these projects more profitable for 
the investors by increasing floor area ratio and offering tax exemption (PA#2). Further, 
through the institutions with the authority to enact urban transformation such as TOKI or 
MoEU (see Chapter 3), the central government acts like a market actor and gets into 
partnerships with private investors in return for profit sharing (ACT#1) or, in their own 
words, “they are paving the way for the private sector” (MHA#2). The result, therefore, is: 
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“The main areas that need urgently being transformed in Istanbul are the city’s 
peripheries. However, while there is a full mobilisation in the valuable areas of the 
city, for example in Kadıköy district, there is no scheduled project for the city’s 
periphery” (CCP#1). 
This is because: 
“The urban transformation has not made any progress for four, five years. Urban 
transformation is only in Bağdat Caddesi, Kadıköy in Istanbul. In there, contractors 
demolish an eight-storey building and build a ten-storey building instead and make the 
profit, because the rates are very high. However, in Bağcılar, in Küçükçekmece or 
Gaziosmanpaşa [peripheral districts], if you do the same in such places you go 
bankrupt” (BSR#2). 
To conclude, contrary to the urban political economy literature, the neoliberal restructuring in 
Turkey has emerged in a way that the central government has not been rescaled but has 
changed their approach to urban governance and the ways in which they intervene in local 
politics. These have been reflected in local policies as an entrepreneurial mentality in which 
the central government has been more actively involved in local politics. This entrepreneurial 
mentality has diffused from the macro strategies such as the global city or financial centre 
visions to micro policies like protecting historical values, strengthening physical infrastructure 
or urban transformation. However, although these can also be observed in non-western states, 
having undergone a similar neoliberal transformation, as will be discussed in the following 
sections, Turkey has significant differences from those states too. 
7.4 Centralisation without Effective Planning: Istanbul through Developmental Lenses 
This section discusses how the emergence of Istanbul as a global city can be explained from a 
developmental state perspective. Considering the national urban system of Turkey – and 
Istanbul’s position in this system – and the centralised nature of city-state relations, global 
city characteristics of Istanbul are more like those of state-centred cities (in East Asian 
developmental states) than global cities in the western context (Ma and Timberlake, 2013). 
Therefore, even though the developmental approach is generally thought to provide an 
explanation for a narrow geographical context (Fine, 2013; Yeung, 2017a), it can provide a 
satisfactory explanation for Istanbul around the above two similarities. However, it will be 
seen in the following parts of the discussion that the plan-rational and bureaucratic 
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characteristics of the developmental cities and city-states approach are not easily transferable 
to either Turkey or Istanbul. 
Probably due to geographical and cultural distances, cities and city-states in East Asia were 
among the least mentioned cities in the interviews conducted for this study – albeit the politics 
of state-local relations bears the closest relevance for Turkey and Istanbul out of the four 
dominant approaches in global urban studies. For example, even though the fact that Tokyo is 
often rated among the top global cities, it was mentioned much less than New York and 
London – suggesting that actors only look West and do not look both ways as might be 
expected of a city which is a gateway between East and West. Likewise, Taipei and Seoul, 
other well-known developmental cities, were almost never mentioned. Interestingly, 
Singapore, as a city-state, was mentioned 15 times. But this was usually done either to 
emphasise the importance of Istanbul for Turkey or to explain the differences between 
Istanbul and Singapore. For example, “Singapore is a city-state, Istanbul is not a city state, of 
course, there are 80 more provinces, but it has so much importance for Turkey in terms of the 
economy, in every respect” (MOD#1). Likewise, by a local government official: “Istanbul is 
not like Singapore, a city-state” (IMM#4). 
However, there are more similarities between Istanbul and these cities than it is thought. For 
example, in light of the discussion so far, possibly no one would find it strange if Istanbul 
were written in the following sentences instead of Tokyo and Seoul (and Turkey instead of 
Korea): 
“if Tokyo is defeated in the global competition between cities, the entire country will 
decline” (Masuzoe, 2015, np). 
“Korea has a long history of centralised rule and until recently the central government 
was the decisive actor in Seoul’s development” (Clark and Moonen, 2017: 69). 
Here is not the place to discuss all similarities, instead, the discussion is limited to the two 
most important factors that the above quotes imply: the national-city system and the position 
of central government. Firstly, in terms of the domestic urban systems, both in Turkey and in 
developmental states, there is a major city, dominating other cities and hosting most of the 
national economic activities. As shown in the following table, in terms of population, GDP, 
and employment, Istanbul has a similar weight in Turkey to that of Tokyo and Seoul in their 
own countries (Owing to its city-state characteristic, Singapore has a special position among 
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the cities in the table. Just like Tokyo and Seoul, Istanbul is also a major demographic and 
economic centre in its national city-system and, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, globalisation has 
no significant effect on this position. 
Table 7.3 Istanbul and the Developmental Global Cities/City-States 
Indicators – City Singapore Seoul Tokyo Istanbul 
% of National Population 100% 49.5% 28% 19.0% 
% of national GDP 100% 46% 32% 30.5% 
% of national employment 100% 47.7% 29% 20.0% 
(Sources: Clark and Moonen, 2017; TURKSTAT, 2014; 2015b; 2016)   
In the case of the existence of such a major city, to support its global competitiveness seems 
to be a reasonable strategy, especially for a country that prioritises rapid economic 
development like Turkey. This is firstly because, to improve an existing major city and to 
guide investments, both national and foreign, to this city is easier and less costly than to create 
new ones (NGOR#1). Further, Istanbul produces much more added-value than other cities in 
the country, so targeting investments to Istanbul is quite reasonable for a rapid return 
(IDA#1). Therefore, as in developmental states (see Clark and Moonen, 2017), in Turkey too, 
the central government supports the development of Istanbul as a global city to lend impetus 
to the national economic development (MOD#1, MHA#1, MHA#2, MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR#2, 
IMM#4, IMM#6, IDA#1). The main point here is, in the words of a central government 
official: 
“There is no contradiction. It is clear that the central government necessarily focuses 
on Istanbul first. If it triggers the potential in Istanbul, it can easily trigger the other 
cities’ potentials” (MOD#1). 
Further, the argument that city-state relations in developmental states are based on integration 
rather than separation (Hill and Kim, 2000; Ma and Timberlake, 2013) can also be thought to 
be valid for Turkey. As discussed earlier (Chapter 5 and Section 7.2), Istanbul has strong 
economic and social relations with the other cities in the country. Probably because of this, 
many interviewees thought that the rise of Istanbul as a global city will not create a tension 
between Istanbul and the rest of the country, on the contrary, it will be for the benefit of other 
cities (BSR#2, MHA#2, MoD#1, IMM#2, MHA#3, IDA#1). Many participants defining 
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Istanbul as a role model have claimed that Istanbul’s development positively influences the 
other cities (IMM#1, IMM#4, IMM#6, BSR#2, MHA#2). For example, as a central 
government official said: “In fact, this must be seen as a growing cake. The more the cake 
grows, the greater the share that other cities will have from this cake” (MOD#2). However, it 
should also be added that many of the participants were business groups and NGOs which 
operate on the national scale, as well as central government actors, but on the local scale, all 
participants were from Istanbul’s local government. Therefore, it is hard to guess whether the 
views would be similar if the interviews were done with the local governments of the other 
major cities. 
The third and most important similarity between developmental cases and Istanbul is the 
existence of a strong central government. The debate in the developmental approach is that 
owing to the strong capacity of the central government on governing the market, 
developmental states can relatively easily change their economic policies from creating 
national champion industries to national champion cities. Further, due to their pragmatic 
characteristics, they selectively adopt these policies and so the decentralisation discourse of 
neoliberalism has difficulty to explain the changes in the regulatory capacities of these 
countries (Park et al., 2012). As Chapter 3 discussed, in addition to a centralised state 
structure, such a pragmatism is also a key (and historical) characteristic that defines the 
approach of Turkish ruling elites regarding foreign policies. Thus, Turkey’s neoliberal 
transformation experience is similar to that of the developmental states. In both cases, 
neoliberal policies have been adopted and implemented, but, as discussed above, this has not 
caused a decentralisation in administrative structures. 
This flexibility does not only enable central government to adopt and/or change policies but 
also provides convenience in terms of implementing these policies. Therefore, support of such 
a central government is at the same time improving the global competitiveness of Istanbul 
(BSR#1, BSR#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#5, IMM#6). As in developmental states, in Turkey 
too, cities are dependent on centrally distributed funds (BSR#2, AA#1, MOD#2, PA#2, 
NGOR#3, NGOR#4) and the projects associated with global city making often exceed the 
financial capacity of the local government (MoD#1, IMM#4, IMM#6, IMM#3, MHA#3, 
IMM#1, BSR#4). However, the central government distributes the central funds and can carry 
out these projects more easily than the local government. 
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Despite all these similarities, there is a significant difference, which makes it almost 
impossible to explain Istanbul’s trajectory using this approach. Developmental states are often 
defined with the plan-rationality whose continuity is based on the existence of a bureaucratic 
elite: 
“One key dimension of state capacity is embedded autonomy through which the state 
bureaucracy is embedded in society and yet insulated from competing social interests 
and gains substantial autonomy from strong political influence in order to avoid the 
rent-seeking and predatory behaviour of certain politicians and interest groups” 
(Yeung, 2017a: 2). 
However, in Turkey, it is hard to claim the existence of such a plan-rationality and of the 
bureaucratic elite and technocrat cadre: 
“It is difficult to claim that we have a national development policy. You know, in 
reality, we have never prepared a national plan. Of course, we make development plans, 
but we cannot follow them” (CCP#1). 
“There is a discourse; there are some incremental, changeable policies. This city, of 
course, attracts investments, but there is no executive technocratic body to steer these 
investments. It was IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), such kind of body, but 
you possibly know what has happened to IMP. They all resigned, after the 2009 plan 
was changed [by influence of Central Government]” (AA#1). 
These were not just things that opposition participants said to criticise the government. 
Conversely, many central and local officials have also complained about the lack of a strong, 
qualified and efficient bureaucratic mechanism and bureaucratic cadre (and accordingly about 
the lack of efficient working and planning). Even though it was often implicitly stated, the 
lack of an efficient working mechanism is one of the main reasons for coordination problems 
between different tiers and agencies of the government and the implementing of the strategies. 
This can be seen in the following comments of a local government executive and a ministry 
official at the MOD, the institution which sets and implements the national development 
strategies: 
“Yes, that is, we have a development plan, but is there an agency that can reflect this 
plan to the local, or to control or to coordinate the plans? This was the State Planning 
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Institution before, but it was closed. Now we have the Ministry of Development, for 
example, but I don’t think this is used efficiently” (IMM#3). 
“Not only for just Istanbul, this is our main problem. We have strategies, plans, 
programs in every respect, we prepare a very good action plan, prepare a strategy, set 
2023 vision and even 2071 vision, but we have difficulties to implement them. This is 
maybe because we cannot succeed with coordination in Turkey. Since there is no 
coordination, we define one coordinator and we define the related organisations under 
it, but they never take responsibility for their responsibilities. In this case, you can get 
nowhere. I mean, the city is developing with its own capacity” (MOD#1). 
Further, the lack of such a strong bureaucratic elite weakens bureaucracy and bureaucratic 
planning against the interventions and populist demands of politicians.29 This leads to the 
problem of continuity in government policies and the problem of planning, which were the 
most complained about issues in the interviews. For example, in Istanbul – and Turkey –, a 
project approved by the predecessor can be cancelled by a new mayor (BSR#2) or the central 
government (as it was in the 2006 master plan) (AA#1), or sometimes it can be a sudden 
regulation or a zoning change with a decision from the central government (BSR#1). More 
importantly, according to the priority or purposes of the central government, legislative 
amendments can be made to facilitate its intervention in urban policy; such as giving zoning 
(BSR#2, MHA#3), and urban planning power (IMM#3) to different institutions. 
Taken all together, even though the central government makes a significant contribution to 
Istanbul’s global development, the absence of a well-functioning bureaucracy and planning 
mechanism reduces this contribution and even sometimes makes a negative impact. This is 
because either plans, goals, and projects are not realistically determined by the experts or 
there are changes in the way how these are to be achieved and/or to institutions that 
implement them. For example, the IFC project, one of the most important visionary projects 
of Istanbul, was first under the responsibility of the Metropolitan Municipality, however it 
was then given to the MoD (MHA#3). This did not only cause money, labour and time loss 
but at the same time evidently delayed the goal of Istanbul becoming a global financial centre. 
In fact, as the following quotation shows, it is also questionable how realistic this goal is: 
                                                 
29 Moreover, ties between bureaucrats (or officials) and politicians are much closer in Turkey than in East Asia.  
If these interviews would have been conducted in Japan, for example, most of the interviewees could have been 
bureaucratic elites, however, in Turkey, most of the official participants were the people who were in a direct or 
indirect relationship with the ruling party. 
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“Regarding the 2023 goals, we [central government] aim to make Istanbul one of the 
top ten financial centres. Of course, it does not always mean we achieve these goals. 
You set a goal then try to achieve these goals, but it is an ambitious goal to make it as 
one of the top ten” (MOD#2). 
The differences that make it difficult to explain Istanbul and other in-between cities through 
the developmental state perspective are not limited to these. In the conceptual sense, as well 
as efficient bureaucracy and planning, the developmental state approach is based on a specific 
historical development process and various cultural-religious elements such as Confucianism, 
social solidarity, and political unity (Saito, 2003; Hill, 2004; Hill et al., 2012; Watson, 2013).. 
For example, Saito (2003) argues that whereas there has been observed some tones of the 
intergovernmental competition between Tokyo and Japan, this has not turned into a conflict 
because of Japan's cultural and religious characteristic. Likewise, as one reason why the 
national (especially industrial) economic development is so much prioritised in the 
developmental states is showed by the historical trajectories of these countries, the so-called 
late-industrialisation (Hill and Kim, 2000). Moreover, unlike cities like Istanbul, many 
developmental states have followed a historical trajectory which is similar to the global 
Southern countries, namely that they had once been the colonies of different empires. 
However, this will be discussed below, as it is more appropriate to the nature of postcolonial 
critique.  
Moreover, as discussed above, the economic productions and the functions of the in-between 
and the developmental cities are different from each other. Albeit similar in terms of sectoral 
distribution, the industrial economic output of the cities that have been called the in-between 
cities are much lower than that of the developmental cities. Further, at least in the case of 
Istanbul, it is hard to claim the existence of such a globally operated heavy and intensive 
industrial production, which is the case for the developmental cities. Finally, as again 
discussed above, the functions of cities also differ. Whereas the developmental cities 
generally function as the headquarters for their national corporations to manage their global 
operations (Hill and Kim, 2000), Istanbul is more prominent in the regional-scale command 
and control and gateway functions. 
To conclude, the developmental approach has provided a good understanding of how global 
cities emerge in non-western contexts, especially in highly-centralised states. Istanbul can, 
therefore, be seen as closer to these cases than the other three, especially considering the 
political aspects. Nevertheless, Istanbul and Turkey are differentiated from the developmental 
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cases in terms of bureaucratic and planning mechanisms, as well as other historical, cultural 
and economic factors. This is a quite significant difference which means that this theory fails 
to fully account for the experience of Istanbul. Because, as seen above, if a well-functioning 
and effective bureaucracy in a strong central state has a positive impact on the global position 
and development of the city, as in developing states, a centralised state devoid of bureaucratic 
planning can have a negative impact on the development of the city or can delay the city 
reaching its targets. 
7.5 It’s Regaining, not Catch-up: Looking at Istanbul from the Postcolonial Perspective  
The intention of this section is to interrogate the global development of Istanbul through the 
lens of the general criticisms of the postcolonial urban theory on global cities research. This 
study finds the postcolonial challenge to global urban theories very valuable and useful 
because, above all, it provides an understanding of alternative forms of global urbanisation 
based on historical differences (Chakravorty, 2000; Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016).  
However, with reference to the starting point of the theory, this study argues that the 
postcolonial approach cannot provide an adequate understanding for Istanbul that has never 
been a colony. To carry out this discussion, some concerns of the postcolonial theory about 
the global and world cities research will be referenced: hierarchical rankings, exemplar-
imitator duality, catch-up notion (for a comprehensive and recent debate between postcolonial 
and global/world cities theories see also Robinson, 2016a; van Meeteren et al., 2016).  
One of the main concerns of postcolonial critiques of the global cities approach refers to the 
classification and ranking of cities by a few exact economic indicators (Robinson, 2002, 
2016a; Roy, 2009). These hierarchical rankings trigger the backwardness feeling for cities 
which are located at the bottom or are not located in the rankings, and more importantly, 
consciously or unconsciously, encourage them to follow certain policies if they want to rise in 
the rankings (Robinson, 2008; Goldman and Longhofer, 2009; Dupont, 2011; Goldman, 
2011). A hierarchical approach to cities, in such a way, reproduces the existing categorical 
divisions between different cities (e.g. East-West or developed-underdeveloped) and positions 
cities as those that need to be followed (cities at the top) and those that must follow (cities at 
the bottom) (Robinson, 2006; 2013). In other words: 
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“Perhaps most worrying for postcolonial urban studies, world-cities approaches have a 
strong interest in hierarchies, by placing cities in hierarchical relation to one another, 
implicitly some cities as exemplars and others as imitators” (Robinson, 2006: 94). 
Firstly, there is no doubt that the hierarchical ranking of cities is an impressive aspect for city 
rulers. It was observed during the interviews that the assumption that cities are in competition 
has been accepted and internalised by officials (UCLG#1, MHA#1, MHA#2, MHA#3, 
MOD#1, MOD#2, IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#6). For example, a central government 
official explicitly said: “Now, we live in a world in which cities compete with each other” 
(MHA#2). Furthermore, many of them stated that they hear about various global city indexes 
(e.g. GaWC’s World Cities Index, ZYen’s GFCI, or Megahubs Index). More interestingly, 
officials often explained Istanbul’s positions, developments and future goals by referencing 
these indexes (MOD#1, MOD#2, IDA#1, IMM#4). For example, a central official (MOD#2), 
working on the IFC project, said; “for 2018, our aim is to move Istanbul to the top 25 in the 
global financial centres indexes”. Another example, from the local government official: 
“Istanbul ranks 29 in the top 50 World’s Megahubs, and we are working to make that better” 
(IMM#4). 
Moreover, in accordance with the postcolonial critiques, the attempts to make Istanbul into a 
global city (even if it was sometimes named differently) and/or to raise its position in the 
rankings (for example as seen in the above quotes) have been highly advocated by the 
officials.  However, there was a significant difference in Istanbul which was contradictory to 
the postcolonial arguments. Unlike their arguments, the feelings of backwardness, 
underdevelopment and/or being off the map, have not been observed in any interviewee, even 
the opponent ones. Conversely, almost all the interviewees, whether supporters or critics of 
global city making, agreed that Istanbul has a unique history and geography. Many of the 
officials were thinking that Istanbul has always had a privileged position in the world and 
cannot be assessed in the same league as ‘underdeveloped’ or emerging cities. 
The rational here is, no doubt, the city’s imperial background. As was pointed out in the 
previous chapters, this background still defines the relations of Istanbul with its hinterland and 
with the world in the eyes of many participants (for example IMM#4, IMM#2, IMM#6, 
NGOR#2, NGOR#4, UCLG#1, IMM#5). Further, according to many interviewees, there is a 
continuity in the relationship between the global city and the imperial capital (BSR#1, 
BSR#2, MHA#2, MOD#1, IMM#2, IMM#6, IMM#3, MHA#3 MHA#1, PA#1, UCLG#1, 
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LUR#1). In other words, this imperial history has often been thought to be the main reason 
why Istanbul is a global city. Therefore, unlike many cities in the global South whose global 
characteristics and distinctive features (and catch-up motivations, see following paragraphs) 
are often explained with their colonial backgrounds (Grant and Nijman, 2002, Dupont, 2011, 
King, 2015), in Istanbul this emphasis is on its imperial history: 
“At this point, one of the main factors that have already made Istanbul an attraction 
centre is that it has hosted many empires; [and therefore] its cultural mosaic and 
historical accumulation. The city, therefore, embodies many different mosaics in social 
life, commercial life. I mean, the people are necessarily developing different skills, 
perspectives, and experiences to the life, because there are so many different factors, 
aspects here. Hence, that the city was the capital of the empires is an important role in 
that the city is so attractive today” (IMM#3).  
“Is Istanbul a global city? I think it is a global city. Istanbul, in both Ottoman and 
Byzantine periods as well, was a city in which many different cultures came together, 
in which many cultural, social and economic interactions took place. It still maintains 
this characteristic. I mean, Istanbul has always been an important city for the world; 
now it is; will be in the future too” (MHA#3). 
This debate might be deepened with the second criticism of the postcolonial approach; 
exemplars-followers duality. As introduced above, in the eyes of postcolonial theorists, the 
rankings and classifications of the global and world cities research encourage cities at the 
bottom to climb up to upper rankings (Robinson, 2002; Goldman, 2011). In other words, since 
the global city is presented as “an authorized image of city success … global cities have 
become the aspiration of many cities around the world” (Robinson, 2002; 546, 548). 
Moreover, “mega-cities, in particular, are advised and incentivised to become shiny modern 
global cities, like New York, London, Tokyo” (Sheppard et al., 2013: 894). This concept is 
bought into by city managers and policy-makers as a “paradigm model to emulate” (Dupont, 
2011: 535). In the wider context, this means that many cities around the world imitate the top 
global cities, and even take them as role models. Especially in the global South, there are 
many buyers of such rhetoric which are referencing the western global cities; for example, 
“Silicon Valley of Asia – Bangalore” (Goldman and Longhofer, 2009), “a world class city-
region – Nairobi” (Myers, 2015), “Asia’s World City – Hong Kong” (Sigler, 2016), or “the 
Global City in Asia – Singapore” (ibid). 
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In relation to these criticisms, some interview questions interrogated whether Istanbul takes a 
city (or cities) as an example/role model. Interestingly but not surprisingly, there was a 
consensus in the answers given to these questions. Almost all interviewees answered this 
question with reference to Istanbul’s historical and geographical position. First, according to 
governmental actors, there is no city or model that Istanbul follows. An executive interviewee 
responsible for institutional development and governance in the local government (IMM#4) 
stated that he reads other cities’ visions such as that of London, but their strategy is to become 
a focus/centre city30. Likewise, two bureaucrats working in the IFC project (MOD#1, 
MOD#2) mentioned that they have reviewed other well-known projects (e.g. London, 
Frankfurt, Shanghai, Dubai), but they are trying to create their own model rather than 
following a particular model. The general view shared by many of the officials was similar to 
the one expressed below: 
“Istanbul is a city to be an example; not a city that takes an example. You are asking 
this question, I think Istanbul should not take an example. Of course, there are 
problems, faults to be criticised, however, owing to power coming from its past, 
Istanbul is a city the can be an example” (IMM#2).  
It was noteworthy to see that the other interviewees had almost similar views to those of the 
officials. Most of them shared the view that Istanbul should be itself rather than following 
another city. Even opposition participants were quite critical on that the city’s authenticity, its 
historical values, were not protected by rulers but destroyed for the sake of economic return 
(PA1#, NGOR#1, ACT#1, NGOR#3, NGOR#2). On the other hand, while assessing over the 
projects appearing in urban space, some opposite interviewees stated that the city is beginning 
to resemble cities like Dubai (NGOR#2, ACT#1, PA#2) Shanghai (AA#1), or Kuala Lumpur 
(AA#1, NGOR#4, PA#2).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that these cities were not given as 
conscious examples but mentioned randomly to convey criticism and/or jokingly (see also 
Chapter 5).  
Given the above paragraphs, it is obvious that Istanbul is not seen to imitate and follow another 
city. But what is more interesting is that Istanbul itself is thought of as a role model, especially 
by the officials. The following words said by two central officials well illustrate this thought: 
                                                 
30 See the Focus City Vision in Chapter 6.  
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“Istanbul is not a city that should take others as a role model, but a city that should be 
taken as a role model. I don’t think there should be a question as which city should be 
a role model for Istanbul, because Istanbul, itself, is already a model for others” 
(MHA#2). 
For a more explicit historical emphasis: 
“Well, now, there are just a few cities like Istanbul which sits at the centre of global 
air, marine, land transports and which sits at the centre of history. I mean, there are 
just a few cities like Istanbul having lots of privileges. For me, other cities try to 
imitate Istanbul. With pros and cons, Istanbul is a role model for others. Historically, it 
is the city defining the East and the West. I mean, the East is the East of Istanbul, and 
the West is the West of Istanbul” (MHA#1). 
This imperial reference also raises the third question of the debate: How are the global 
aspirations of Istanbul being rationalised? From the postcolonial perspective, the notion that 
catch-up to the west (or climb to the top in the global urban hierarchy) is an important source of 
motivation for non-western cities that shape their global aspirations and global city making 
policies. That is well summarised by Ong (2011: 18): 
“While speculations in capital are obviously not limited to Asian cities, inter-city 
comparisons reinforce the link between economic speculation and urban aspiration. 
Speculative discourses draw together the building of impressive urban structures and the 
imagination of a city’s global future. The constant allusion to other cities energizes 
efforts to assemble ideas, forms, and alliances in order to ‘catch up’ with pace-setting 
cities that now exist outside the West.”  
However, what is seen in Istanbul is, as a central government official talking about the IFC 
Project reveals:  
“In fact, Istanbul was already a leading centre in the global financial system in the 
past. Possibly, Istanbul was a centre before other financial centres have emerged in 
Frankfurt, Europe or elsewhere. Especially, Galata, Galata Bankers was the core of 
this financial centre. That is why Istanbul had already experienced globalisation but 
then it lost due to the subsequent economic and political developments. Now, it has 
been reliving this with new experiences” (MHA#1). 
 180 
 
As one may remember, Chapter 3 has raised a different argument about this issue and has 
argued that the regaining notion might be more explanatory for Istanbul even though it has not 
been so dwelled on. The central argument of this notion was that the transition from imperial 
to the national period means a decline in the city’s status31, so globalisation offers an 
opportunity for the city to regain its old importance. Interviews have confirmed these 
predictions. The discussions and conclusions made so far are already a sign for this; many 
people are discussing the significance of Istanbul and its position by referencing the imperial 
period. What is more important and obvious is that the idea that Istanbul is achieving its old 
status occupies an important place in people’s mind, at least of those who rule the city. As in 
the above quote, this belief might be seen in the following words from a local government 
executive:  
“Istanbul has a historical mission. For a certain period, especially after the 1900s, after 
the war, we lived serious things which deeply influenced us, namely that there has 
never been an opportunity to unlock our potential. But now we are blowing away the 
cobwebs and unlocking our potential” (IMM#6). 
Just as in the above quote, another central government official, thinking that Istanbul has been 
reclaiming its power in the imperial period, stated that as it was the major financial centre of 
the region in the nineteenth century becoming a financial centre today is a historical reality for 
Istanbul (MHA#3). There were also more interesting examples in this issue such as the 
Milion32 example given by three local officials (IMM#2, IMM#5, UCLG#1). According to 
them, Istanbul was the centre of the world (symbolised by the Milion which is the zero-point) 
until the collapse of the empire and it then lost this status. For them, Istanbul was beginning to 
regain its importance now. Another interviewee, an executive manager in a leading 
construction company, stated that one of the first underground railways of the world opened 
in Istanbul but it was not developed later (until recently) (BSR#4).    
In sum, the postcolonial critique offers an analytical method of thinking in the sense of 
bringing together different historical patterns with the global city formation. However, 
looking exactly from this perspective, Istanbul has gone through different historical processes, 
                                                 
31In fact, there were a few participants who directly mentioned this decline, as the overall course of the 
interviews was about current developments (IDA#1, IMM#5, AA#1, MHA#3, ACT#1, NGOR#2). Yet, as seen 
in the quotes, it was possible to read this mentality through between the lines. 
32 The Milion (also known as the Milion Stone) was a monument erected in the 4th century AD in the Byzantine 
period. It was a zero-mile marker of the empire, namely that distances for the roads leading to all cities in the 
empire and other leading cities in the world were measured from that stone.  
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not only from the global cities in the west but also from today’s postcolonial cities. Given the 
views of almost all interviewees, whether opponent, pro-government or officials, about the 
historical and present importance of Istanbul and about its privileged position, one could say 
that the different historical trajectory of Istanbul has created different perspectives for the city. 
Since such feelings and perspectives are difficult to see in postcolonial cases, explaining 
Istanbul through the lenses of postcolonial theory may be useful in terms of the way of 
thinking, but it is incomplete in terms of final conceptualisation. 
7.6 Concluding Comments: Explaining an In-between City 
This chapter has examined the global city characteristics of Istanbul through the lenses of four 
major global urban approaches. Some of the fundamental claims of each approach given in 
Chapter 2 have been used to do this examination. The chapter has, therefore, functioned as a 
stress-testing tool for these approaches. It has been discussed thus far that the relationship 
between urbanisation and globalisation is a fuzzy process having many shapes in local 
contexts. Similar policies, strategies, and even similar transformations appear in different 
forms in different geographies, which have led to the emergence of different urban 
approaches to make sense of these developments. The arguments in this chapter have revealed 
that these existing global urban approaches have provided a significant but partial 
understanding of Istanbul’s global development. In other words, the basic hypothesis of this 
thesis that owing to its geographical and historical features Istanbul does not fully fit into any 
of these approaches have been confirmed with the research findings. 
At first, global city formation of Istanbul has been examined through the four main 
assumptions of global cities research, each of which referred to a different body of the 
research; political, economic, functional and relational. In three of the four assumptions, the 
developments in Istanbul are contradictory to what has been asserted in the global cities 
theses. Unlike the well-known deindustrialisation hypothesis of the global cities research, 
apart from being a service city, Istanbul has still an industrial characteristic. Moreover, 
contrary to London, for example, globalisation has not weakened but strengthened the ties 
between Istanbul and other cities in the domestic network. However, globalisation has not had 
as much of an economic or relational impact as often assumed. On the other hand, the 
functions of Istanbul in the global economic order and the policies framed regarding these 
functions are not different to the assumptions. While the core global cities function as the 
global command and control nodes, Istanbul undertakes this role for its own hinterland. 
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The political deficit within the core of the global cities research has been filled here by the 
state-scaling approach as expected. The state rescaling approach has adequately explained the 
changing nature and dynamics of the local politics under contemporary neoliberal 
globalisation. This is because the entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance and the 
state rescaling strategies, were born as a response to the crises of the late 1970s in the 
industrialised economies (Harvey, 1989), have transferred into non-western states wherein 
governments had been advised by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to 
liberalise their economies, and adopt the mission of becoming the entrepreneurial and 
mediator states to ensure economic growth (IMF, 2000). What has happened from that time, 
the policies implemented, the visions, the strategies are more or less similar in many 
countries, cities, city-states which are under a similar neoliberal restructuring (Old and Yeung, 
2004; Dupont, 2011; Zhang, 2013).  
In this regard, neoliberalisation is likely to be a comfortable and somewhat easier explanation 
kit. Not only in Turkey, but elsewhere also, a significant number of studies explain what is 
happening with a pre-packaged concept called neoliberalism (Le Galès, 2016). However, as 
revealed above, the political side of this restructuring in Turkey, indeed in many non-western 
states as well, does not totally fit into the neoliberalisation experiences of western countries. 
This is because: 
“Neoliberalism has rolled out from the West to encounter the structural forces of non-
Western communities. Negotiations between non-Western structural forces and the 
ideas of neoliberalism take place in two ways - first, between political actors who cope 
with neoliberalism in various manners, ranging from adoption to rejection and, 
secondly, within each of these actors who interpret and apply neoliberalism according 
to their own values, interests and purposes derived from their time-space-specific roles 
and backgrounds” (Tsukamoto, 2012: 872). 
Looking from this perspective, what is expected is that as a non-western city the experience of 
Istanbul should be more like other non-western experiences rather than like the western cases. 
However, as it is not a western city, it is not a city which can be comfortably identified as an 
eastern, or southern city either. For example, the approach of the developmental scholars 
explains well how central governments, especially strong ones like that in Turkey, have a role 
in making their cities as global cities and how they keep their central characteristics even 
under the destructive influences of globalisation. However, even though Turkey (or Russia or 
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Hungary) is doubtlessly more centralised than the USA, or western European states, this 
centralisation is far from being bureaucratically institutionalised and plan-rational, which are 
the core features behind the developmental state approach (Park, 2017a). Such differences 
have demonstrated that the central governments that lack those characteristics might 
unconsciously harm, or at least contribute less to, the positions of their global cities in the 
global urban system. 
Finally, postcolonial urban theory provides an excellent way of critical thinking for 
researchers from non-western contexts by revealing that different historical trajectories result 
in different outcomes (Chakravarty, 2000, Grant and Nijman, 2002), In this sense, it has made 
an invaluable intellectual contribution to the understanding of Istanbul. Yet, based on this 
same historical point of view, in empirical basis, it could be said that the long imperial history 
of Istanbul necessitates to put it in a different place from the postcolonial cases. This is the 
most explicit in the sources of the global aspirations of the city; whilst colonial background 
and catch-up still occupy a place in the minds of rulers in the global South cities, interviews 
demonstrated that the main source of motivations in Istanbul are the imperial past of the city 
and the aspiration of regaining the power lost after the collapse of the Empire.  
To conclude, Istanbul is in many ways contradictory to the narratives of global urban theories. 
The centralised nature of city-state relations or the political-economic transformation of this 
relationship, the imperial roots of Istanbul’s and Turkey’s global aspirations, the economic 
structure of the city and its importance for the country; these are not the issues that the 
existing theses can sufficiently explain. Yet, this does not mean that Istanbul is totally 
different from other cities and can never be explained by these theses. In contrast, as seen 
above, each theory has contributed to the understanding of a different aspect of Istanbul’s 
global development. Then the question in the title can be asked again: Is there a place for 
Istanbul? That is, can the existing theories be blended in a way that they explain Istanbul and 
other similar cities? Or, is it necessary to develop a new theoretical concept to explain these 
cities? The next chapter will conclude the debate that has been made thus far by giving 
emphasis to these questions.
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CHAPTER 8 
The Way Ahead: What does Istanbul Tell us about the Future of Global Urban Studies?  
8.1 Introduction  
The recent phase of globalisation has dramatically changed the political and economic 
geography of the world from the 1970s onwards. This new wave in which cities and city-
regions are at the centre has brought along new economic, institutional, and spatial 
transformations; has provided new cross-border linkages of cities; has constituted a new 
global urban order and inter-urban hierarchies; and, in brief, has offered new opportunities 
and challenges to cities/city-regions and their nation-states. Over the past forty years, 
numerous geographers, urban scholars, sociologists and economists have shed light on 
different sides of these developments, and by doing so, have built a critical body of work 
known as global urban research. 
A central component of global urban studies is global and world cities research. This stresses 
the global economic developments as the constitutive elements of global cities (Sassen, 2016; 
van Meeteren et al., 2016). It also concerns the impacts of these developments on 
global/globalising cities (Sassen, 2018) and the relations between – i.e. networks of – cities 
(Taylor and Derudder, 2018). Partly contrasting with this geoeconomic approach to cities in 
globalization, the state-rescaling approach suggests a geo-political-economic reading which 
unlocks the dynamics of state-scalar territorial restructuring of nation-states, most notably in 
the advanced capitalist states of the global North (Brenner, 2004a, 2018b; Keating, 2013; 
Jonas, 2013; Moisio and Paasi, 2013b; Harrison, 2015; Moisio, 2018a). The other two 
counter-theories, postcolonial and developmental approaches, are rather built on an 
epistemological objection questioning the validity of western-produced urban theories for the 
cities of the Global South (Robinson 2002; Roy, 2009, 2016), East Asia (Fujita, 2011; 
Tsukamoto, 2012; Heo, 2015) and beyond.  
One way or another, each of these four approaches classifies cities by the certain attributes 
conforming their fundamental assumptions and putting them into categories and groups 
(global, globalising, postcolonial, developmental etc.) Today, most of the world’s geography 
and of the cities/city-regions seem to be identified and covered by at least one of these 
approaches. Yet, this does not imply a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach can explain all the cities 
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around the world. Just like Istanbul, cities such as Moscow or Vienna, or Australian and 
Chinese global cities, mean there are still numerous examples having more hybrid and sui 
generis characteristics which are not easily fitting into any of these approaches alone. 
Bearing this ‘not-easily-fit’ characteristic of Istanbul in mind, this research had two main 
aims: to stress-test the fundamentals of four major global urban approaches in a case study 
which none of them can explain alone, and to extend the conceptual map of the global urban 
research towards a more hybrid case. In doing this, it has been built on three research 
objectives:  
(i) to provide a critical conceptual analysis of Istanbul under globalisation;  
(ii) to argue the role of the global city makers, with particular attention to the political 
actors, in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city, and to assess the relationship 
between these actors; and  
(iii) to situate the story of Istanbul within the wider context of major global urban 
theories. 
In line with these aims, the thesis has critically examined the four major perspectives in global 
urban studies and has discussed how the globalisation of Istanbul can be explained within, and 
outside of, these approaches. Furthermore, it has begun to formulate an alternative 
conceptualisation of the ‘in-between’ city to account for cities such as Istanbul. Then, the 
empirical chapters have conducted a comprehensive analysis of Istanbul’s globalisation with a 
comparative perspective to reveal the dynamics which these major approaches can explain 
and those which they fail to explain. Now, this final chapter draws together these discussions 
and critically outlines a research agenda. Before this, Section 8.2 draws together the findings 
of the empirical chapters to resolve the research questions. Section 8.3 then builds on this and 
goes further by discussing how Istanbul can act as a lens on to the challenges and 
opportunities for advancing the scope of global urban research more broadly; (i) Is it by 
blending and improving the existing four approaches in a way to produce more politically, 
historically, sensitive global and world cities theory? or (ii) Is it by developing the ‘in-
between’ conceptualisation more explicitly to account for globalising cities located between 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which carries the danger of being geographically-narrow 
and strengthen existing polemics and polarisations in the literature? 
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8.2 Istanbul: Understanding the Globalisation of an In-Between City 
One of the questions this thesis has addressed is how globalisation occurs in Istanbul and how 
it influences Istanbul’s position within national and international urban systems. With regards 
to the former, it could be said that Istanbul, with globalisation, experiences a considerable 
economic growth, and demographic and environmental changes which are closely relevant to 
this economic growth. Some of these developments like economic growth, the growth of the 
real-estate sector, internal and external migration and population present similarities with that 
of other global cities. In other words, these are the experiences that can be forecasted within 
globalisation process. Yet, a more in-depth analysis has revealed that Istanbul has strong local 
characteristics, which are unobservable in many global cities, in terms of the sectoral 
distribution of the economy or the motivations of this migration. 
Looking at the national context, another unexpected side of this process has further appeared. 
As it is known, one of the key arguments in global cities research is that globalisation 
increases the economic disparities within the national urban systems in favour of the global 
cities (Sassen, 2008; Crouch and Le Gales, 2012; Cardoso and Meijer, 2016; Iammarino et al., 
2018). In this sense, globalisation is often argued as if it is a zero-sum-game of which the 
winners are the global cities and the losers are the second-tier cities. Looking at the case of 
Istanbul, one observation was that there is an obvious gap between the total economic value 
produced by Istanbul and by the other major cities in the country, in favour of the first one. 
Despite this superiority of Istanbul, another observation was, however, that all the analysed 
cities have caught a similar trend of economic growth to Istanbul. More interestingly, 
according to the market reports, three of these cities, along with Istanbul, ranked among the 
world’s top ten in 2014, in terms of economic growth rate (Parilla et al., 2015). Even though 
there has been no direct data showing that Istanbul’s global development has positively or 
negatively influenced these cities, at the minimum, it seems reasonable to claim that all major 
Turkish cities have benefitted from the economic development that globalisation brings. 
The questions exploring Istanbul’s position within international urban systems have revealed 
an interesting, but not unsurprising, diversity in the views of participants. Whereas a group of 
participants, most of whom were the officials and business people, have positioned Istanbul 
within top global cities, others have generally thought that Istanbul can be assessed together 
with the cities of the global South. In this sense, these views have confirmed this thesis’ 
premise that Istanbul carries some traces from both East and West, and North and South (for a 
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similar conceptualisation see Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). On the other hand, there has also 
been a consensus about Istanbul’s position among the cities located in Central Asia, Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East.  Almost all interviewees claimed that Istanbul is the leading city 
of the hinterland covering these regions. By the participants, this leadership has often been 
associated with Istanbul’s former status as an imperial capital. This link references an 
interesting continuity between the imperial city and the global city, which has not received the 
attention it deserves in the literature (for three exceptions see King, 2016, for Istanbul see 
Harris, 2009; Sassen, 2018).  
Another important discussion has been about Istanbul’s geographical position in between East 
and West and about how this position affects the potential functions of Istanbul on the global 
scale. The views of the participants on this issue have been similar to the general assumptions 
in the relevant literature. As in previous research (e.g. Walker and Taylor, 2000; Sassen, 
2009; Khanna, 2016), the interviewees too have thought that Istanbul, thanks to its privileged 
location, might undertake a gateway/corridor function between its East and its West for 
various purposes such as people, information and capital mobility, energy and trade routes or 
transportation. 
As the second objective, the thesis has addressed how actors, especially official authorities, 
have a role in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city. It has also assessed the relations 
between the central and the local governments and questioned the dynamics of this 
relationship. This corresponds to an important debate in the literature. In general terms, the 
global cities research concentrates on the geoeconomic logic behind global urbanisation, 
global city formation, and the cross-border linkages between cities (van Meeteren et al., 
2016). One of the critiques of this approach is that it overlooks the role of the actors and 
practices in these processes (Acuto, 2013a/b, Hoyler et al., 2018a). As well-stated by many 
researchers, global city formation is at the same time a political process in which local, 
regional and national governments take part (e.g. Olds and Yeung, 2004; Golubchikov, 2010; 
Jonas, 2013; Moisio and Paasi, 2013a; Zhang, 2013; Harrison, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 
2017). 
In the beginning, the thesis had simply premised that any research not touching upon the role 
of central and local governments cannot adequately explain Istanbul’s transformation into a 
global city. The findings too have confirmed this premise. Both the central and the local 
governments have been actively involved in the globalisation process of Istanbul, and even 
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have shaped this process. The global integration policies that were implemented in the 2000s, 
strategic goals such as becoming a global financial centre and international transportation hub, 
and the mega-projects and other infrastructure investments which support these goals, have 
shown that AKP governments, both centrally and locally, have read and managed the 
globalisation process and the economic opportunities that it offers. 
Moreover, looking at the distribution of the roles between central governmental institutions 
and Istanbul’s local government, the findings indicate an interesting situation: Turkey’s 
central government has dominated the process in comparison to the local government. This 
was noteworthy because, if leaving the developmental researchers aside, the general view in 
the literature is that either as an enforced and inherent result of the developments in the global 
economic order (Ohmae, 2005; Sassen, 2005, 2007; Taylor, 2013), or as a political-economic 
strategy developed by the nation-states faced with these developments (Brenner, 2004b; 
Jonas, 2012a, 2012b; Keating, 2013; Harrison, 2015), central governments have transferred 
some of their regulatory powers to the local and regional governments. One way or another, 
this implies that global cities and city-regions have been gradually gaining a more 
autonomous power in shaping their political and economic relations (Le Galès, 2016).  
Yet, what has been observed in the case of Istanbul was that in the institutional base, Turkey’s 
central government is the main actor of Istanbul’s globalisation. Developing the legal 
framework for the global integration of Turkey and Istanbul, setting the main strategies of the 
city, deciding on and conducting mega-projects, are generally shaped by the central 
government and in line with its priorities. Istanbul’s local government rather plays a 
secondary role due to various fiscal and administrative deficiencies and a strong centralised 
governmental tradition of the country. Local government, for example, participates as a local 
stakeholder in policy-making and decision-making processes related to Istanbul, and is rather 
responsible for operating day-to-day municipal services and improving infrastructure systems 
other than mega-projects (e.g. underground investments). 
Another controversial topic in global urban research is the relations between cities/city-
regions and nation-states, and the determinants of this relationship (Jonas and Wilson, 2018). 
One view is that relations between local and central governments tend to be in a tension 
which stems from the changing political and economic interests of cities and their increasing 
cross-border connections (Taylor, 1995, 2007; Langley, 2002; Sassen, 2006; Barber, 2013; 
Pincetl, 2018). On the other hand, there are also examples showing that nation-states are not 
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troubled by these developments and even actively support the global connectivities and 
competitiveness of their leading cities so as to ensure nation-wide economic growth (Hill and 
Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012; Moisio, 2018b). From an economic 
standpoint, Istanbul seems to better fit the second perspective: The central government 
promotes Istanbul’s global city development to maintain national economic development; and 
the local government, thus, attracts more global investments (e.g. through integration policies 
and incentives), increases its global linkages (e.g. through mega-projects), and above else, 
gains financial flexibility since much of the relevant investments are funded by the central 
government.  
Nonetheless, the economy is just one face of this issue: Ideological differences or similarities 
between local/regional and central governments are still an important determinant of this 
relationship. For example, empirical work on London (King, 1989), Paris (Subra and 
Newman, 2008; Fouchier, 2013) or Taipei (Wang and Huang, 2009) gives an idea of how 
political differences between city and state governments may cause tensions and conflicts 
between those. The fact that Istanbul and Turkey are governed by the same political party 
brings with it that the local government works in tandem with the central government. All 
officials clearly expressed that they work in coordination, cooperation and harmony with each 
other since they are from the same party. They also highlighted that they might encounter 
problems if one of these were to be governed by a different party. Though not including 
Istanbul, a recent study comparing three metropolitan cities in Turkey (two governed by 
opposition parties, and one by the ruling party) affirms the views of the officials in a sense 
(Kuyucu, 2018). It shows that while one of them built a better relationship with the central 
government to receive support in fiscal and approval processes, the other two faced some 
problems in the same processes. 
As for the third part of this relationship, that is, the representatives of civil society and 
business sector, although these participants stated that the two governmental bodies work in 
harmony owing to the above-mentioned factors, their positions within this relationship have 
varied depending on the group they represent. The private sector actors have been observed to 
be a part of this harmony. With a more explicit statement, they have been satisfied with not 
only the relationship between the central and local governments but also, and more 
importantly, with the relationship that they build with the governmental institutions in terms 
of their involvement in the policy-making processes. However, as expected, it is hard to say 
the same for the NGOs, activists and other opposition groups. These expressed their view that 
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decisions are given behind closed doors and that they are excluded from these processes, even 
if the projects necessitate their direct involvement. 
Finally, the research has evaluated the emergence of Istanbul as a global city from the 
perspectives of four major approaches in global urban studies; respectively global cities 
research, state rescaling approach, developmental state approach, and postcolonial urban 
theory. This can be read as an effort both to situate Istanbul’s own experience within the 
broader body of global urban studies and at the same time to stress-test some key hypotheses 
of the mentioned approaches. From the perspective of global cities theory, the foremost 
discussion has been about the source of the global city formation of Istanbul. In consideration 
of the empirical findings, one can say that this process cannot be fully understood to follow an 
either-or logic. That is, neither states, as claimed by the statist researchers, nor the global 
economy, as widely-accepted in globalist academic circles, is the only driver of global city 
formation. Instead, the central and the local governments, perceiving the changes in the global 
economy as an opportunity of economic development, have been actively involved in global 
city making processes. 
The second testing-point concerned the sectoral distribution of Istanbul’s economy. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key identifiers of global cities is the sharp decline in the 
manufacturing industries vis-a-vis FIRE and APS sectors (Beaverstock et al., 2000; Sassen, 
2005, 2016; Parnreiter, 2013). However, in Istanbul, there has been no such decline. In this 
sense, Istanbul stands in a closer position to the developmental cities in comparison to the 
classical global cities. As the third, the command and control function of Istanbul has been 
explored. Istanbul functions as a control and command point for many global companies, 
however, this function is not yet on the global scale, but rather on the regional scale. Finally, 
the changes in the national and international connections of Istanbul were explored and 
compared with that of London, as one of the top global cities. As Sassen (2018) puts it, one of 
the likely outcomes of globalisation is that the cross-border connections of global cities are 
increased whereas their national linkages weaken. London’s data, based on airline passengers 
and flights, was compatible with this assumption. However, in Istanbul, the statements of 
interviewees and airline data indicated that globalisation has made a positive impact on the 
city’s national and international connections. 
In relation to the state-rescaling perspective, the discussion covered two important aspects; 
decentralisation of the central government and rising entrepreneurial policies. For the first, it 
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has been revealed that Turkey has not experienced an administrative decentralisation but has 
even strengthened its centralised tradition with the recent and ongoing interventions of the 
central government (Le Galès, 2016; Kuyucu, 2018). However, for the point of the 
entrepreneurial mentality, Turkey and Istanbul are no exception: The rising entrepreneurial 
trend in urban policies has penetrated deeply into the approaches of local and central officials. 
In this sense, it is quite possible to read the current urban strategies through the notion of 
entrepreneurial governance, but on the condition of considering the decentralisation-
decentralisation debate. 
As for the developmental approach, some strong similarities between Istanbul and the 
developmental cities have been found. These similarities can be summarised in three points; 
the strong position of the central government, its role in shaping urban policies and national 
urban system based on one dominant city, which is necessarily the global city of the country. 
Yet, for Turkey in general, it is hard to say that there has been an efficiently working planning 
system and bureaucracy, both of which are among the typical characteristics of state-
developmentalism. İnterviews have shown that these problems have also been reflected in 
planning and policy-making processes in Istanbul.  
The final approach was postcolonial urban theory. As can be remembered, postcolonial 
researchers raise serious criticisms of the ranking-based aspects of global cities research, 
claiming that these provoke cities to compete against each other for positions in these 
rankings. During the study, it has been possible to see the various signs of this attitude in the 
interviews made with officials and private sector representatives (see Chapter 7). It has been 
observed that many interviewees accept the assumption that cities compete against each other 
in the global order as if it is an inherent reality. Further, the position, development, strength 
and weakness of Istanbul have often been explained by referencing the well-known city 
indexes. However, looking with a historical reference which is advocated by the theory itself 
(Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016), a remarkable difference, which is probably not seen in any 
postcolonial city, has appeared in Istanbul. The ambition of Istanbul to be a leading global 
city has generally been associated with the notion of regaining its former, imperial, status. 
This issue has perhaps been the most incompatible side of Istanbul’s development with a 
postcolonial perspective, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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8.3 From Istanbul to the Globe  
In the light of all discussions made thus far, this section is reserved to the most important 
discussion of the thesis: How can the global city development and characteristic of Istanbul 
and of other similar cities be better understood; whether through a bricolage of the existing 
approaches or by formulating a new in-between concept? This discussion also shows the 
position of this thesis with regard to the wider body of global urban research; (i) within the 
academic circles who call for new theories to understand new dynamics of contemporary 
global urbanism (e.g. Roy, 2009; Brenner and Schmid, 2015); (ii) within those advocating to 
strengthen the existing approaches through stress-testing, empirical and/or comparative case 
studies (e.g. Hoyler and Harrison, 2017).  
Table 8.1 compares the existing approaches with the in-between concept by their strengths 
and weaknesses in the case of Istanbul. Whereas the first four columns give a breakdown of 
the existing approaches, the last column presents the alternative in-between concept. The final 
row shows how the existing approaches can be blended to understand the cities argued as in-
between. The following paragraphs respectively examine these five perspectives and discuss 
which one can provide a better understanding of Istanbul.   
Table 8.1 Existing Global Urban Approaches vs. In-Between City Concept 
 
 
CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
STRENGTHS& 
WEAKNESS 
Global/World 
City Theory 
State Rescaling 
Approach 
Developmental 
State Approach 
Postcolonial 
Urban Theory 
In-between 
City 
Strengths 
*Gives a 
world-wide 
understanding 
of the cities’ 
developments 
under 
globalisation.  
*Changing 
positions and 
functions cities 
in the global 
*Well explains 
the changing 
attitudes of 
central and local 
governments on 
local policies. 
* Strong on the 
political 
conditions which 
have enabled 
the globalization 
*Highlights the 
role of the 
central 
governments. 
*Shows the 
possibility of 
the alternative 
scenarios for 
the city-state 
relationship. 
*Proves that 
*Shows the 
importance of 
the individual 
historical 
trajectories in 
global city 
formation. 
* Strong on 
understanding 
the 
development 
*Offers a 
closer and in-
depth analysis 
of global cities 
in the regional 
context 
(between 
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia), including 
their positions, 
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order. 
*Cross-border 
relations of 
cities 
* Strong on 
understanding 
the 
geoeconomic 
development 
of cities in 
globalization. 
of cities in North 
America and 
Western Europe. 
local 
differences 
create different 
outcomes in 
globalisation 
* Strong on 
understanding 
the 
development of 
cities in East 
Asia. 
of cities in the 
Global South. 
functions, local 
and regional 
characteristics.   
*Gives a 
background for 
the historical 
analysis of the 
relationship 
between 
imperial cities 
and global 
cities.  
*Strong on 
understanding 
the 
development 
of cities such 
as Istanbul, 
Moscow, St 
Petersburg, 
Vienna in 
globalisation. 
Weaknesses 
*Too 
economy-
centred, 
therefore, 
minimises the 
role of the 
other of 
actors, 
political, 
economic etc. 
*Misses the 
local 
determinants 
of city-state 
relationship. 
*Assumes that 
global city 
development 
is harmful to 
the other cities 
within the 
national 
context and to 
*Overgeneralizes 
the claims of 
decentralisation. 
*Heavily 
Westernised in 
its original 
formation, 
therefore how 
useful is it for 
understanding 
non-Western 
settings. 
*Can be seen to 
overplay the role 
of the state vis-
à-vis other non-
state actors. 
*Critiqued for its 
original 
territorial-scalar 
conceptual 
framework vis-à-
vis more 
*Too narrow 
because it only 
works in a 
specific-geo-
political 
context. 
*Hides the 
politics of scale 
in city-state 
relations. 
*Suspicious 
about non-
colonial cases. 
* Can be seen 
to critique 
how global 
cities research 
has been 
captured (i.e. 
setting up a 
straw man 
argument) 
rather than its 
original 
foundations. 
*Danger to 
serve a 
polemical 
pluralism and a 
narrow 
understanding 
of global 
urbanism. 
* Makes the 
field of global 
urban studies 
more parochial 
by adding 
another new 
approach. 
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city's national 
connections. 
fashionable 
relational-
network 
perspectives. 
BRICOLAGE 
OF FOUR 
APPROACHES 
A Politically, Historically, Locally Nuanced Approach for Conceptualising Cities in 
Globalisation 
The first column engages with the global city concept. There is no doubt that global/world 
cities research has provided a general and worldwide understanding of changing functions, 
positions, economic and social dynamics of cities under globalisation, and of how cities 
connect to each other in supranational networks (Hoyler et al., 2018a). In this sense, by 
ignoring the theoretical and empirical grounds that the global cities research provides, it is 
hard to discuss the increasing international connections of Istanbul, its regional superiority as 
a command and control point, and its position as an international air transport hub, and even 
its ambitious goal to be a global financial centre. On the other hand, there is much empirical 
evidence to show that some local dynamics of Turkey, in general, and Istanbul contradict the 
fundamentals of the global city concept: for example, the undeniable role of the central 
government, growth in the industrial economic output, increase in the national connections of 
Istanbul, and there being no considerable negative impact of globalisation on existing 
economic inequalities between major cities of Turkey. 
As for the second approach, the concept of rescaling of the state brings an extensive insight 
into the political economy of global cities (Swyngedouw, 2004; Brenner, 2009; Jessop, 2013). 
It provides a strong analytical ground to discuss the entrepreneurial turn in local policies in 
Turkey, as elsewhere around the world. As discussed earlier, this entrepreneurial mode of 
governance has been adopted and legitimised by both the central and the local government 
and at the same time has somewhat legitimised their local policies and strategies thanks to the 
economic development discourse which the term implies. In this sense, entrepreneurial 
governance is a key term to understand the current interventions of the governmental actors in 
the urban space. Yet, it does not seem possible to say the same for the argument that national 
governments have been decentralised. Discussions in Chapter 3 and the last two empirical 
chapters have questioned the validity of the decentralisation arguments in the Turkish context. 
Further, considering the similarities in their administrative structures and central 
governments’ approaches to local policies, these assumptions can also be claimed to be valid 
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for other states such as Hungary and Russia (Golubchikov, 2010; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; 
Clark and Moonen, 2017).  
The developmental state perspective puts emphasis on the role of political factors in global 
city formation, but within a narrow geopolitical context: East Asia. The arguments of the 
developmental scholars encourage researchers to think not only about how and why 
governmental actors are actively involved in global city making processes but also about the 
possibility of the various kinds of relationship between global cities and their nation-states, 
and between global cities and cities within their national borders. For all these points, Turkey 
stands in a closer position to the developmental states than to western contexts. In addition to 
Turkey, given other examples like Russia or Hungary, the developmental approach can 
explain the strong influence of the central governments in these countries on local policies. 
However, looking at the constitutive elements of the developmental state concept, such as an 
effective bureaucracy and bureaucratic planning, historical trajectories of these countries, 
even religious and cultural factors, it is quite questionable whether this approach works in the 
other geographies beyond East Asia. Indeed, as mentioned above, the lack of a politically-
independent bureaucracy and an efficient spatial and strategic planning are two of the crucial 
problems of Turkey and Istanbul. These are substantive points which are hard to be explained 
by the developmental perspective. 
Postcolonial urban theory, before anything else, produces a valuable critique of the 
global/world cities research by framing historical differences as the key factors (Roy, 2016). 
Moreover, as mentioned above, their claims on how rankings influence city rulers are also 
noteworthy. Nevertheless, there is an obvious ontological difference between the postcolonial 
cities and Istanbul. Along with Vienna, St. Petersburg and Budapest, Istanbul has a strong 
imperial background and as discussed in Chapter 7, this imperial background still influences 
the city’s global position, functions and even ambitions (Harris, 2009; Sassen, 2018). 
Additionally, postcolonial scholars, at least some of them, highlight dualities such as global 
North/South, colonizers/colonies, but Istanbul presents a more hybrid characteristic including 
some elements of both global North and global South. Therefore, to understand such a hybrid 
city and possibly others in the region there is a need to go beyond these dualistic perspectives. 
Altogether, there is no doubt that all these four major approaches have given invaluable 
insights into characteristics of urbanisation under the influence of contemporary globalisation 
and into economic, political and social aspects of this experience. These are also valid for 
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Istanbul to a large extent. Yet, as discussed thus far, each approach alone fails to explain some 
points of the global development of Istanbul. In that case, as the first alternative, it needs to be 
discussed whether these approaches can be improved to explain the cities which have initially 
been conceptualised in Chapter 3 as in-between cities. 
For such an attempt, the main theoretical ground should be the global/world city concept. This 
is not only because this research is the flagship of global urban studies but also because it 
produces the most comprehensive theoretical, empirical and methodological knowledge of 
contemporary urbanism and provides a very extended base for discussing, interrogating, and 
testing various hypotheses in local contexts. Given the strong and weak points of the four 
approaches, three main axes can be identified: political, local and historical.  
First, if an approach explaining the cities in this region is developed, it should certainly be 
politically sensitive. As mentioned earlier, the administrative structures of many of the 
countries in this region are more or less similar to each other. Perhaps these are not as 
characteristic as the East Asian countries, but nevertheless, the countries located in the region 
spreading from Eastern Europe to Central Asia present a more politically centralised 
characteristic than the countries in the North-Atlantic axis. Moreover, even though it is 
limited, there has been some evidence that countries like Russia (Golubchikov, 2010; 
Kinossian, 2017), Hungary (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015) or Turkey blend entrepreneurial 
policies with national political and/or economic interests and that (global) city-making is part 
of this hybrid formation. Therefore, such a perspective must necessarily include the 
entrepreneurial governance practices and take the involvement of the central governments into 
account.  
Second, the concept should be locally/regionally sensitive. As discussed throughout the thesis, 
the overgeneralised theoretical assumptions might fail in local contexts. In order not to fall 
into this fallacy, a more deductive methodology focusing on local dynamics, positions or 
functions of these cities can be adopted. Musil’s (2009) work on Vienna can be given as an 
example for this kind of approach. His argument about Vienna as a bridge and gateway 
between Eastern and Western Europe complements the arguments made for Istanbul in this 
thesis. Therefore, by remaining within the general logic of globalisation/neoliberalisation, 
producing case-based or comparative studies might give interesting and valuable results for 
the understanding of global cities in this region. 
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The third point is to adopt a historically sensitive approach. Not only the cities themselves but 
also the political, economic and planning practices which constitute the cities are historical 
products. They have been produced and reproduced many times within individual historical 
trajectories of cities and states. The historical differences between cities are, therefore, one of 
the fundamental factors that create current differences between them. Likewise, cities having 
similar historical patterns, often present similar characteristics today in terms of their 
functions and positions in the global urban order (King, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
both postcolonial and developmental researchers have produced an extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature, however, all these studies built on the historical trajectories of their own 
cities. Nevertheless, by taking their perspectives as a way of thinking, not a theoretical 
ground, such kind of approach can be developed for the cities mentioned above. That is, as in 
this thesis, potential studies exploring the links between current positions, functions, 
ambitions, in brief, global city formations of the former imperial cities in the region and their 
imperial backgrounds might give an extensive and robust explanation. 
On the other hand, as a second alternative, instead of producing a bricolage of the existing 
approaches, these cities might be categorised under the title of in-between cities. The first and 
foremost question here is why such a concept might be needed, and also how this could make 
a contribution to the existing literature. In human geography or urban studies literature, the 
terms like north, south, east or west are not just concepts defining directions, but also 
ontological and epistemological categories (Müller, 2018). They are used to conceptualise and 
classify countries, regions, and cities which are assumed to have similar patterns. These 
patterns might be framed by similar historical and economic trajectories as is global North 
and global South (Roy, 2016), or they might also include political, cultural and religious 
factors, as in East Asia example (Saito, 2003)  
Looking at the conceptual map of global urban studies, existing approaches are seen to be 
concentrated in global North-South (or the former East-West) dichotomy (Tuvikene, 2016; 
Müller, 2018). However, the cities located in between Europe and Asia cannot be easily 
placed within any of these divisions, namely, they are often ‘‘fallen between the cracks’’ 
(Müller, 2018: 2). Rather than having certain attributes like global, developmental or 
postcolonial cities, these cities present more hybrid and intersectional characteristics between 
global North and global South (see Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018; Müller, 2018). Therefore, 
developing such a regional city concept might serve to inject these hybrid cities into the 
conceptual map of global urban studies and, by doing so, fills the crack sitting between the 
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map and advances the global urban theory. Furthermore, this concept offers a closer 
perspective to these cities so that it could bring a better explanation to the global city 
formations of cities like Istanbul, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Budapest or Moscow (Table 8.1). 
Finally, as these cities have similar geographical, historical, political and economic 
characteristics, the in-between concept inherently includes three main nuances that are 
suggested for improving existing theories. 
In order to show how in-between concept might serve for these aims, the table below (8.2) is 
formed through improving and supporting the city typologies table (3.1) in Chapter 3 with the 
empirical discussions made in the previous chapters. As different from the previous one, the 
present table has also been given place to different processes that show why in-between cities 
can be understood through a separate concept. First, as mentioned above, the in-between 
concept might cover cities in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Eurasia. In addition to being 
located in this conjunctural region (for the term of conjunctural urbanism see Peck, 2017a), 
these cities have a different historical pattern than the cities conceptualised by the existing 
approaches.  
Table 8.2 Existing City Concepts vs. In-between Cities  
İdentifiers 
Classical 
Global Cities 
Developmental 
Cities 
Postcolonial 
Cities 
In-between Cities 
Location Global North East Asia Global South 
Between Central Europe 
and Central Asia  
Historical 
Development 
Process 
Industrial to 
Postindustrial 
Colonial, National 
and Global 
Colonial, 
National and 
Global 
Imperial, National and 
Global 
Types of Global 
Corporations 
Global 
Headquarters 
Global and 
National 
Headquarters 
National 
Headquarters 
Regional and National 
Headquarters 
Economic 
Functions 
Global 
Command and 
Control 
Command and 
Control for 
National Economy 
National 
Command and 
Control 
Regional Command and 
Control and Gateway 
Positions in 
Global Urban 
Networks 
Dominate the 
global urban 
network 
Dominate the 
national network 
and in the top-
rankings in the 
global networks 
Dominate the 
National 
Urban System 
Dominate both regional 
and national network 
Position in the 
Urban 
Hierarchy 
Top (Alpha++ 
and Alpha+) 
Top (Alpha++ and 
Alpha+) 
Lower 
rankings 
Between Global North 
and South Alpha, Alpha- 
and Beta+. 
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Role of the 
Politics 
Increasing role 
of the local-
regional 
administrative 
bodies. 
Distribution 
between central 
and local bodies, 
with a greater role 
of the central 
government 
Mixture 
The central government 
undertakes the key role. 
The Motivation 
to the Global 
City-Making 
Become more 
influential and 
local/regional 
economic 
development 
To ensure the 
national economic 
development 
Catch-up 
To integrate 
to the world 
Catch-up 
National economic 
development 
Regain the old 
importance and 
privileges 
Often blended with 
nationalism, national 
political targets, and 
post-imperialism. 
Centre-Local 
Relations 
Mixture 
Assumed in 
conflict 
Harmony Mixture Harmony  
Civil Society 
Participation 
High Low  Low Low 
In historical context, the existing division between global North and global South can be read 
through another division: the colonisers and colonies. It is difficult to place the in-between 
cities into one of these categories, as they were ‘‘not just colony, but neither just coloniser’’ 
(Müller, 2018: 15). In other words, they have undergone neither the colonial-postcolonial nor 
the industrial-postindustrial transitions, and consequently, have not experienced the similar 
political, economic or social transformations with these cities (ibid, 2018). Conversely, they 
followed a sui generis and a more interstitial historical trajectory. With a brief reminding, as 
an inherent result of the political upheavals at the beginning of the previous century and the 
collapse of the multinational empires, they lost their significances, powers, links, and 
networks which they used to have in the imperial era. While some of them became the cities 
of the newly founded nation states (Keyder, 2008), some others, then, were involved in the 
Soviet Bloc (Joenniemi. 2003, Hirt et al., 2016, Tuvikene, 2016). 
The global economic and political integration process into which these cities (indeed their 
host states) incorporates since the post-1980s offered them new economic opportunities, roles 
and possibilities of new connections in both regional and global scale. In other words, thanks 
to globalisation, ‘‘many (though not all) one-time imperial cities of the late nineteenth century 
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have at the close of the twentieth, mutated into what have, since the 1990s, increasingly been 
termed of the world or global cities’’ (King, 2016: 186). Thus, in a sense, not only Istanbul 
but also many major Eastern European cities such as Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague have 
included in a process in which they ‘‘regain some of their pre-war importance’’ (Sassen, 
2018: n.p.). For example, like Istanbul, Vienna begins to regain its regional financial centre 
function and international linkages, which it lost after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (Zademach and Musil, 2014). The same can be said of Moscow (Argenbright, 2014) 
or St. Petersburg (Golubchikov, 2010). 
So, how did this happen? With an economic point of view, it is widely acknowledged in the 
global cities literature that cities have begun to undertake different functions with the 
integration of global economy. As summarised at the table 8.2, whereas the leading global 
cities are the global command and control points, the postcolonial cities are often framed as 
the national gateways and command and control points, and the developmental cities 
generally function as the stations for the global operations of their national corporations. 
However, the process causing the emergence of in-between cities and the postcolonial cities 
are slightly different than the current examples, and, just as the term implies, it can be framed 
between the leading global cities and others. 
With the participation of their nation-states into globalisation process, the in-between cities 
both have emerged as the centres in which their host states open up to the global economy, 
and also have begun to undertake regional gateway and command and control functions 
(Argenbright, 2014). These cities were already the major cities of their own national urban 
system until the 1990s, even though they had been mainly remained outside of the 
international networks. The national economic production of countries such as Russia, 
Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey had mainly agglomerated within their capital or the 
leading cities. Then, with the starting of the integration, these major cities have appeared as 
the doors which their nation states have opened to the global economy, and vice-versa.  
In a regional sense, owing to the favourable locations, cities like Istanbul, Warsaw, Moscow, 
Budapest, and Vienna have functioned as emerging gateways for flows of the business, trade, 
knowledge, transportation or people between east and west (Walker and Taylor, 2000; Brade 
and Rudolph, 2004; Musil, 2009; Sassen 2009, 2018; ESPON, 2013). Another process having 
a direct and positive impact to this has been that many leading MNCs have begun to make 
their investments into this region. Given the qualification of these investments, it is seen that 
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much of MNCs have established the regional headquarters in the major cities of the region to 
manage their supranational operations. In this way, these cities have been placed at the very 
centre of different regional (and to a lesser extent global) networks, links, connections, and 
flows. 
A reading of the positions of the in-between cities in the global urban order can also be made 
through global cities league tables and the competition between cities. For example, according 
to the recent GaWC World Cities Index, whereas the leading global cities of the global North 
and the major cities of the East Asian developmental states are classified among the Alpha+ 
and Alpha++ cities, the global Southern cities are generally ranked among the lower groups 
(GaWC, 2016). The position of the in-between cities, however, is rather between the global 
North (and the developmental cities) and the global South cities, namely they are generally 
ranked as Alpha, Alpha- and Beta+. Based on their regional leading positions and their 
functions explained above, the in-between cities can be positioned above the global Southern 
cities and be thought as the secondary global cities (Sassen, 2009; 2018; Zademach and 
Musil, 2014; Uszkai, 2016). Furthermore, the in-between cities dominate the interurban 
networks in their own region, and they are in a regional competition (albeit not yet in the 
global) between each other to keep their command and control point positions in these 
networks. 
Another similarity that makes us think that these cities can be conceptualised together is their 
traditions of state, that is, the existence of the centralised nation-states, and their role in the 
development of their cities as global cities. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a 
vast literature examining the role of the states in the emergence of global cities in many 
different parts of the world. Nevertheless, to make a distinction here, it is possible to mention 
that this process appears in the global North with the effects of the global economic actors and 
often involvement of the local/regional governments. Existing studies reveal that in the global 
South, there are, implicit or explicit, coalitions between global capital, international 
organisations such as IMF and the World Bank, and national/regional/local administrations 
(Dupont, 2011). Likewise, in the developmental states, the characteristic roles of the national 
and local governments as well as national capital are more central (Waley, 2007). Unlike 
these examples, what has been observed for in-between cities is that the national governments 
appear as the primary actors in the global city making process. 
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As discussed above, the states of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Turkey have 
traditionally more centralised administrative structures in comparison to their western 
counterparts (see Schmitt and Well, 2016). Even in the global period, the decentralisation 
reforms in much of these states ‘‘have been rather cosmetic, with local governments enjoying 
only very limited discretion on important decisions relating to local issues’’ (Sienkiewicz, 
2007: 94); even though other parts of the world have experienced different processes of and 
levels of administrative decentralisation (see Hambleton and Gross, 2007; Clark and Moonen, 
2017). Further, these powerful national governments have supported and even actively 
participated in the processes in which their major cities have emerged as global cities; which 
also challenges to both economic and political-economic theses about the global city 
formation. Through numerous ways such as implementing global integration policies, leading 
foreign direct investments to their major cities, making mega infrastructure investments, and 
supporting international organisations and events which will be held in these cities, these 
central governments have made major positive impacts on the global positions of in-between 
cities (Golubchikov, 2010; Argenbright; 2014; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 
2017; Kinossian, 2017). Moreover, in many cases, it is observed that central governments 
shape the urban policies (and so global-city making process) directly, insomuch that they 
sometimes by-pass the local or federal governments. 
Another critical question here is what the motivations of the central governments of in-
between cities to make of their cities as global cities are. In the literature, the motivations of 
global-city making are generally explained through economic factors, especially, for the 
leading global cities of the global North. These cities compete each other to attract more 
foreign investments, to keep their leading positions and to ensure their local economic 
developments. In the postcolonial and the developmental cases these factors are somehow 
dolled with the catch-up and late developmentalism (or neo-developmentalism). Yet, for in-
between cities, different political, economic and ideological motivations can be mentioned. Of 
course, national economic development is a primary and major motivation here. However, 
global-city making is often supported and/or legitimised by the central governments through 
nationalist discourses and regaining motivations (Akcan, 2015; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). 
This sense of regaining blended with nationalism, which is difficult to observe in other cities, 
not only constitutes a discursive and legitimatising ground for global city-making policies, but 
also triggers to (and associated with) the regional geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions of 
the nation governments, which can be discussed as post-imperialism, or neo-imperialism. 
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Although there has been a dominant role of the central governments in the in-between city 
formation, this does not mean that the local governments have no role in this process and the 
relationship between local and central governments are in tension (Kolossov and O'Loughlin, 
2004; Sanli and Townshend, 2018). On the contrary, this makes visible that there are different 
types of city-state relations and different factors shaping this relationship. For example, in in-
between cities, as well as economic motivations, political and ideological factors have also a 
crucial role in shaping these relationships and these factors demonstrate the local and the 
central government might work in harmony(Kinossian, 2017; Clark and Moonen, 2017; Sanli 
and Townshend; 2018), which is different from the many western examples which this 
relationship is assumed as a conflict (Barber, 2013), Considering the historical role and 
importance of these cities, their primate positions within their national urban system, these 
cities provide appropriate grounds for their national governments to aim their national 
political and economic targets. Further, the support of the central governments and the 
benefits which they achieve by doing this create a mutual economic gain for both cities and 
states (Argenbright, 2014; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 2017). Therefore, the 
central governments can be said to seek the support of the local governments of these cities 
and to avoid entering an implicit conflict between each other, and of course vice-versa.  
One consequence of this coalition between local and central government, which can also be 
called as harmony, is that civil-society participation, excluding the economic actors, in global 
city making processes often remain lower degrees (Trumbull, 2002; ALB, 2011; Akcan, 2015; 
Ünsal, 2015; Sanli and Townshend, 2018; Florea et al., 2018). As also discussed in this thesis, 
they are generally excluded from the decision-making processes. Therefore, the objections 
here are mostly from civil society representatives or from opposition parties. With these 
characteristics, in-between cities stand closer to the non-western cases, rather than the western 
examples. Although the democratic participation to the decision-making show an alteration 
from case to case, and project to project, it is generally argued that the involvement of civil 
society representatives is higher in the countries of the western world than the global South 
(Miraftab, 2004, Goldman, 2011; Schindler, 2014); and Asian examples (Miller and Bunnel, 
2012).  
On the other hand, such a conceptualisation carries some serious risks. At first, despite its 
persuasive arguments in the regional context, it is questionable, at least for now, whether it 
can be improved in a way to give a global understanding of contemporary urbanism. That is, 
just as the developmental state approach, the in-between concept too might only work in a 
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narrow geopolitical context. This also poses another risk. As Taylor and Lang (2004) point 
out, hundreds of concepts can be developed to describe today’s urban forms and intercity 
relations. However, producing an excessive bulk of concepts might muddy the water, namely 
might make it difficult to notice and to understand the common experiences of 
global/globalising cities. Further, considering the recent debates on engaged/polemical 
pluralism (see Robinson, 2016a; van Meeteren et al., 2016), insistent calls for new 
theories/concepts, which also imply to reject the existing ones, have a danger of fuelling the 
ongoing polemics between different approaches of global urban studies, which is definitely 
not what this research wants to serve.  
Thirdly and finally, almost all arguments and hypotheses presented in this thesis have been 
developed based on the empirical information produced from a single case study. Although 
the thesis has also benefited from relevant literature sources suggesting that the cities 
identified as in-between cities have similar common characteristics in many aspects (see 
Chapter 3), to develop such a concept there is a need to obtain more empirical knowledge of 
these cases. As can be remembered from Chapter 2, one of the serious criticisms of early 
global cities research, especially Sassen’s theses, was that the global city concept had been 
built upon the experiences and commonalities of only a few cities (Robinson, 2002) and that it 
had been lacking empirical evidence (Beaverstock et al., 2000). From this point, there is no 
significant methodological difference between universalising common aspects of a few cities 
like New York or London and producing a regional conceptualisation through blending the 
empirical information collected from a case study with a few relevant sources. Therefore, in 
order not to fall into the same fallacy, this conceptualisation should be empirically supported 
and strengthened with further case studies in cities mentioned above. 
To conclude, instead of choosing one of these two methods, it makes sense to think that both 
alternatives can contribute to the wider body of global urban research. The first option, which 
seems more reasonable for now, responds to some recent valuable calls in the global urban 
studies: stress-testing (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017), engaged pluralism (van Meeteren et al., 
2016) and cosmopolitan global urban research (e.g. Robinson, 2002; Mcfarlane, 2010; Myers, 
2014). First, it is obvious that there is a need to stress-testing the validity of the fundamental 
assumptions of the existing approaches (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). This research, along 
with similar potential studies, can be used to reveal where the existing theories need to be 
improved, and to improve them.  
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Second, this research also contributes to recent calls for engaged pluralism in global urban 
research. As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis, much of the existing research 
has been done in cities having certain characteristics. Of course, such an approach provides a 
very comfortable ground to show the explanatory strength of a particular theory and/or the 
weakness of others, however, in the grand scheme, it also feeds the ongoing polemics between 
different global urban theories. This research has shown the existence of more hybrid global 
city formations which all theories have difficulty to explain in some respects. Therefore, 
future studies exploring hybrid cases like Istanbul might make positive impacts to develop a 
more pluralist and a less conflictual body of global urban research. That is, as the frequently-
used bridge metaphor for Istanbul and Vienna implies, this conceptualisation can function as a 
bridge between the different approaches. Thirdly, as this concept necessarily suggests looking 
at divergent, as well as convergent, patterns of in-between cities, a more cosmopolitan and 
inclusive global urban research might also be developed, which is what especially 
postcolonial researchers insist on (Robinson, 2016b; Robinson and Roy, 2016). 
Nevertheless, in principle, this does not mean to reject the alternative option. The term ‘in-
between’ can be used as a conceptual ground for both comparative and case studies exploring 
cities located between Europe and Asia. When/if enough empirical evidence is produced, this 
term can be elevated to a concept status which defines the many global/globalising cities in 
this intersectional geography of the world. This would also advance the global urban theory in 
a different way. Yet it seems premature to be ambitious in this regard, so it would be more 
appropriate to leave the last word to future studies.  
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Appendix-1 Interview Questions 
Opening  
Could you begin by briefly telling me about your role here at [   ] and how you came to be in 
this role? 
Istanbul’s City Development 
1. How would you characterise the urban development of Istanbul?  
2. How much does Istanbul’s history (e.g. Ottoman Empire) still impact its urban 
development? 
3. How has Istanbul’s urban development changed under globalization? 
4. How has the strategy for Istanbul’s urban expansion changed under globalisation? 
5. Who are the major actors in the expansion of Istanbul as a globalising city? 
6. What does Istanbul being a “global city” mean to you?  
7. How coherent is the strategy for the expansion of Istanbul as a globalising city? 
8. Is there tension between the political-economic strategy for Istanbul as a globalising 
city and other strategies – perhaps around social inclusion, environmental issues etc.? 
9. How complementary are Istanbul’s global aspirations with more local issues? 
Istanbul’s Position Within Turkey 
10. How would you characterise Istanbul’s position within the political and economic 
landscape of Turkey? 
11. What structural advantages/disadvantages does Istanbul have in Turkey? 
12. What are the duties of local and central government in relation to Istanbul’s aspiration 
to be a leading global city?  
13. How coherent is the strategy for Istanbul to become a leading global city and the 
national strategy for the growth of Turkey’s economy more broadly? How does this play out 
in relation to the 2023 goal? 
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14. Do you see any tension between Istanbul’s aspiration to be a leading global city and 
the national government’s wider aspirations for Turkey as a whole? 
15. Erdoğan was quoted in 2009 as saying that “When I was the mayor of Istanbul, I 
aimed to transform Istanbul into a global financial centre but the central government did not 
allow this. Now, I am the Prime Minister of Turkey and local government of Istanbul is from 
our party, so there is not any obstacle on front of the make it real.” (Erdoğan, 2009). 
o How far do you agree with Erdoğan’s assertion that when he was Mayor of Istanbul 
the central government prevented the transformation of Istanbul into a global financial 
centre/global city?  
o Can you identify any examples of policies/developments which were blocked by 
central government? 
o How far does this reveal a tension between how political elites in Istanbul and Turkey 
do not identify with a common strategy for Istanbul’s development as a global city? 
o How far do you agree with Erdoğan’s assertion that with Istanbul and Turkey being 
controlled politically by the same party that there are no longer any obstacles to making 
Istanbul a global financial city/global city?  
o Is there any evidence for this? 
o Are there any examples of policies/developments which have gone ahead since 2009 
that would not have gone before?  
16. How would you characterise the current relationship between the local government of 
Istanbul and the central government? Could you compare this relationship with previous eras, 
in particular the times when being central and local governments from different parties?  
17. What is the relationship between Istanbul and other cities in Turkey – notably Ankara? 
18. How far is Istanbul’s aspiration to be a global city complementary to/at the expense of 
other Turkish cities (e.g. Ankara)? 
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19. Historically, how do you define the municipal organizations in Turkey? What are the 
pluses and minuses of Turkey’s municipal organization? (In which situations do they need the 
help of central government?) 
Istanbul & Turkey within International Urban System 
20. How would you position Istanbul in relation to other cities in Europe? 
21. How would you position Istanbul in relation to other cities in the world? 
22. What would you say are comparable cities to Istanbul (in Europe or the world)? 
23. Which city does Istanbul aspire to be? 
24. What structural advantages/disadvantages does Istanbul have in relation to other cities 
(in Europe/globally)? 
25. How does Istanbul’s position on the edge of the European Union impact its 
development as a global city? 
26. How does Istanbul’s position as a city between east and west impact positively on its 
development? 
27. How does Istanbul’s position as a city between east and west impact negatively on its 
development? 
Looking to the Future 
28. How do you expect Istanbul’s urban transformation to progress? 
29. What do you think about the mega-projects, such as Third Bridge, Third Airport, or 
Canal Istanbul? To what extent do you consider that these projects are essential to move 
Istanbul in the global arena on a higher level?  
30. An important part of this transformation is the “urban transformation projects”. What 
are your opinions about current urban transformation projects? To what extent they are 
essential for improving the urban fabric or increase the competitiveness of the city?   
31. How do these transformations (urban transformation projects, mega-projects, etc.) 
affect Istanbul’s urban development? 
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32. There are some criticisms about these projects, in particular in terms of urban fabric 
and environment. What is your opinion about these criticisms? 
33. How could some of the barriers, or areas of contestation, be resolved better in future? 
34. How can the relationship between local and national government be 
strengthened/better aligned? 
35. What is your future goal/vision/plan for Istanbul?  
36. If I came back in 5 years, how do you think things will have changed? 
37. Finally, is there anything that we have not covered that you would like to add or think 
it would be useful for me to know/explore?  
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Appendix-2 Coding Framework 
User Guide:  
Bold Font – Codes that were in the original framework that has been developed after 
completing both the interviews and transcription, but before any interview analysis had been 
initiated. 
Normal Font – Codes that emerged from the data as actually coded the material. 
1. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES - LEGAL REGULATIONS 
a) 5216 - The Law on Greater-Metropolitan Municipality 
b) 6306 - The Law of transformation of Areas under Disaster Risks 
c) Local Government Reform 
d) Regulation about Earthquake 
e) Regulations about Planning 
f) State of Emergency 
2. CITY 
a) Current Developments - Trends 
I. Dispossession 
II. Gentrification 
III. Growth and Expansion 
IV. Land - Property Prices 
V. Loss of Uniqueness 
VI. Less Public Space 
b) Dynamics of Urbanisation 
I. Global Dynamics 
II. Historical Dynamics 
III. Local - National Dynamics 
c) Features 
I. Historical Features 
II. Unique City 
d) Location - Geopolitics 
I. Bridge 
II. Gateway to East and to West 
III. In between East and West 
IV. Intersection 
e) Problems 
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I. Earthquake 
II. Lack of Green Space 
III. Migration - Rapid Growth 
IV. Other Problems 
V. Overcrowdedness - Density 
VI. Physical Infrastructure 
VII. Traffic 
VIII. Unplanned Urbanisation - Illegal Housing 
3. DEMANDS - SOLUTIONS - FUTURE EXPECTATIONS\\ 
a) Criticisms 
b) Demands - Expectations from Local Government 
c) Demands Expectations from Central Government 
d) Solution 
I. Administrative 
II. Economy 
III. Legal 
IV. Planning 
V. Urban Fabric 
4. ECONOMY 
a) Economic Growth 
b) Employment 
c) Foreign Capital 
d) Private Sector 
e) Public Private Partnership 
f) Sectors 
I. FIRE AND APS 
II. Industry 
5. ENVIRONMENT SUSTAINABILITY 
a) Absorption of Natural Resources 
b) EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
c) Environmental Impacts of Mega-Projects 
d) Environmental Sustainability 
e) Socio-Economic Sustainability 
6.         GEOGRAPHY 
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a) Ad. and Disad. of Istanbul in Global Order 
b) Europe - European Union 
c) Global - Globalisation 
d) Istanbul and Turkey in Global Order 
e) The Middle East 
7. GOVERN GOVERNANCE 
a) Centralization 
b) Pros and Cons of Local Government 
I. Autonomy 
II. Political Continuity 
III. Finance - Budget 
IV. Lack of Expert - Qualified Personnel 
V. Populism 
c)       Pros and Cons of National Government 
I. Continuity 
II. Populism 
d) Trends 
I. Decentralization 
II. Deregulation 
III. Entrepreneurial Governance 
IV. Emergence of Neo-liberalism 
V. Selling city 
e) Urban Planning 
8.         ISTANBUL IN TURKEY 
a) Historical Representation 
b) Interests of the city and the country 
c) Istanbul and other cities 
d) Istanbul as a Region 
e) Istanbul for Turkey 
f) Istanbul vs Ankara 
9.         ORGANISATION – AGENCIES 
a) Central Government 
I. Council of Ministries 
II. MOEU 
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III. ISPAT 
IV. MOD 
V. Other Ministries 
VI. Presidency 
VII. The Prime Minister's Office 
VIII. TOKI 
IX. Ministry of Transportation 
b) Development Agencies 
I. ISTKA 
c) IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Centre) 
d) International Agencies – Events – Institutions 
I. MIPIM 
e) Local Government 
I. City Councils 
II. District Municipalities 
a. Fatih 
b. Kadıköy 
c. Sarıyer 
d. Others 
III. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  
IV. Other Cities Municipalities 
a. Ankara 
b. İzmir 
c. Others 
f) NGOs 
I. Business Groups 
a. Musiad 
b. Tusiad 
II. Chambers of Urban Planners 
III. Environment and Urban Solidarity Groups 
a. IKS 
b. KOS 
10.       POLITICS – IDEOLOGIES 
a) AKP 
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b) CHP 
c) Other Political Parties 
d) Political Polarisation 
e) Political Stability 
f) Secular - Conservative Conflict 
11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS 
a) Conflict 
b) Harmony 
I. Interests 
II. Required 
III. Values 
c) Hierarchy 
d) Lack of Coordination 
12.       SOCIAL 
a) Change in Social Life 
b) Inclusion - Exclusion 
c) Neighbourhood Culture 
d) Quality of Life 
e) Social Fabric 
f) Socio-cultural diversity 
g) Socio-economic welfare 
13.       STAKEHOLDERS INTEGRATION 
a) Buy-in 
b) Decision Making Mechanisms 
c) Getting Around the Law 
d) GONGOs 
e) Informing 
f) Legal-Process 
g) Otherisation - Labelling 
h) Participation 
i) Pretending 
j) Representation 
14.       STATISTICS - EVIDENCES – FACTS 
a. FDI 
 256 
 
b. GDP - IMEX 
c. Housing 
d. Physical Infrastructure 
e. Population 
f. Tax - Revenues 
g. Tourism 
h. Transport 
i. Trends 
j. Urban Transformation 
15.       STRATEGIES = GOALS – POLICIES  
a) European Capital of Culture 2010 
b) Historical Responsibility 
c) IFC 
d) Local 
I. Attraction Centre 
II. Brand City 
III. Competitive City 
IV. Focus City  
V. Control Command Centre  
VI. Controlled Growth 
VII. De-industrialisation 
VIII. FIRE - APS 
IX. Global City 
X. Istanbul Environment Plan 
XI. Istanbul Region Plan 
XII. Other Strategies (Culture, History, Tourism, etc.) 
XIII. Regional Leadership 
XIV. Role Model 
XV. Transport Hub 
e) Mega-Projects 
f) Municipal Policies - Services 
I. Daily Municipal Services 
II. Environmental Policies 
III. Public Transportation 
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IV. Social Policies 
g) National 
I. 2023 
II. Regional Leader 
h) Slogans 
i) Urban Transformation 
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Appendix-3 Informed Consent Form 
Title of the Project: Istanbul – The Making of a ‘Global City’ Between East and West 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM                                 (                                                              ) 
 
Taking Part                                                                                                       Please initial box 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand 
that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all 
procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethics 
Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee.  
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form.   
  
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.  
  
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study, have the 
right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and will not be 
required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
  
I agree to take part in this study. Taking part in the project will include being 
interviewed and recorded (audio). 
 
Use of Information 
 
I understand that all the personal information I provide will be treated in strict 
confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers 
unless (under the statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers 
are working with), it is judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for 
the safety of the participant or others or for audit by regulatory authorities.   
  
I understand that anonymised quotes may be used in publications, reports, web 
pages, and other research outputs. 
  
I agree for the data I provide to be securely archived at the end of the project.  
  
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to 
Ozgur Sayin. 
 
Bodily Samples  
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I agree that the bodily samples taken during this study can be stored until 
31/12/2023 for future research in the same research theme as this project. 
[Or] 
I agree that the bodily samples taken during this study can only be used for this 
study and will be disposed of within 5 years [or]upon completion of the 
research 30/09/2018. 
  
 
________________________ _____________________ ________  
Name of participant [printed] Signature              Date 
 
__________________________ _______________________ _________  
Researcher  [printed] Signature                 Date 
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Appendix-4 Full List of Affiliated Names for each of the 45 Interviews 
 
AA#1 Academic Advisor Academic Researcher 
AA#2 Academic Advisor Academic Researcher 
ACT#1 Activist A Well-known Urban Activist 
BSR#1 Business Sector Representative  Member of Board of a one of the top National Real-Estate 
Companies  
BSR#2 Business Sector Representative  Executive Member of a National Business Association 
BSR#3 Business Sector Representative  Executive Member of a National Business Association 
BSR#4 Business Sector Representative  Executive Member of a National Business Association 
BSR#5 Business Sector Representative  Executive Member of Foreign Investors Association 
CCP#1 Chamber of City Planners  Spokesperson 
IDA#1 Istanbul Development Agency  Senior Official 
IMM#1 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at City Planning Workshop 
IMM#2 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at Planning Department 
IMM#3 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at City Planning Department 
IMM#4 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at Institutional Development and Governance 
Systems Department 
IMM#5 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at Urban Design Department 
IMM#6 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Executive at Urban Transformation Department 
ISPAT#1 Investment Support and Promotion 
Agency of Turkey 
Senior Official 
LPL#1 Local Political Leader  Executive of Provincial Organisation of an Opposition 
Party  
LUR#1 Labour Union Representative  Senior Official of a National Labour Union 
MHA#1 TOKI Member of Board  
MHA#2 TOKI  Executive at Strategy Development Department 
MHA#3 TOKI  Urban Transformation Specialist 
MOD#1 Ministry of Development  Senior Official at IFC Project 
MOD#2 Ministry of Development  Senior Official at IFC Project 
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MOEU#1 Ministry of Urbanization and 
Environment 
Executive at Provincial Organisation of the Ministry 
NGOR#1 Non-Governmental Organisation 
Representative 
Spokesperson of an Urban-Environment Organisation 
NGOR#2 Non-Governmental Organisation 
Representative 
Spokesperson of an Urban-Environment Organisation 
NGOR#3 Non-Governmental Organisation 
Representative 
Executive of an Istanbul based Urban Solidarity 
Organisation 
NGOR#4 Non-Governmental Organisation 
Representative 
Spokesperson of a National Environment Organisation 
PA#1 Policy Advisor  Policy Advisor - Urban Planning  
PA#2 Policy Advisor  Policy Advisor - Urban Planning and Strategy 
Development 
UCLG#1 United Cities and Local 
Governments 
Executive of Istanbul's Organisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
